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INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court excised two provisions
1
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) that had made the Sentencing Guidelines binding on sentencing judges: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b),
the provision that had confined departures to specified, limited circumstances, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), the standard of review under
2
which courts of appeals had enforced those limitations. The Court
made the law of sentencing the purposes and factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the standard of review for all sentences, inside
or outside the guideline range, the “reasonableness” of the sentencing
3
judge’s application of that law.
The mandatory guidelines system Booker replaced was badly out of
balance in ways never contemplated by the framers of the SRA or the
Supreme Court when it upheld the U.S. Sentencing Commission
4
against separation-of-powers challenges. Yet Booker was initially met

1

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987.
543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). Booker made clear that sentencing judges would still
consider the guideline range as one of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the
Court instructed judges in a subsequent decision to begin the sentencing determination by calculating the guideline range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007).
3
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 264.
4
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (rejecting several constitutional
challenges to the Commission, its composition, and its delegated authority).
2
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with resistance by the Commission and the Department of Justice, and
many lower courts continued to treat the guidelines as “virtually man6
datory.” In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court firmly insisted
7
that the guidelines are—and must be—advisory only. The result has
been a gradual but marked improvement in the quality, transparency,
and rationality of federal sentencing, in both the sentencing of individual defendants and the Commission’s rulemaking. The advisory
guidelines system has broad support: the vast majority of federal judges
believe that advisory guidelines achieve the purposes of sentencing
better than any kind of mandatory guidelines system or no guidelines
8
at all, the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
9
United States supports the advisory guidelines system, prosecutors

5

The Commission promptly instituted a “standard training program” that explained
“how the sentencing guidelines reflect Congress’ objectives in the SRA and that the
guidelines accordingly should be given substantial weight in fashioning sentences . . .
post-Booker.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES
V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 42 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT]. The
Department of Justice initially directed prosecutors to “actively seek sentences within
the [guideline] range . . . in all but extraordinary cases . . . involving circumstances that
were not contemplated by the Sentencing Commission.” Memorandum from James
B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors 2 ( Jan. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/memo-01282005.pdf.
6
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 366 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring).
7
See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (stating that a district court commits “significant procedural error” by “treating the Guidelines as mandatory”). For a further discussion of
the Court’s post-Booker decisions, see infra Part II.
8
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.19 (2010) (reporting that when asked
which system “best achieves the purposes of sentencing,” 75% of district court judges
selected the current advisory guidelines system, 8% selected no guidelines, 3% selected
the mandatory guidelines in effect before Booker, and 14% selected mandatory guidelines
with broader ranges and jury factfinding, if coupled with fewer mandatory minimums).
9
See Theodore McKee, Chief U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http://
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/201202
15-16/Testimony_16_McKee.pdf; Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of N.H.,
Statement Before the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http://
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/201202
15-16/Testimony_16_Barbadoro.pdf; see also Letter from Hon. Myron H. Bright, U.S.
Circuit Judge, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n ( Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20120215-16/Testimony_16_Bright.pdf.
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prefer advisory guidelines to other available options, and the organized
11
public and private defense bars support the advisory guidelines system.
Nevertheless, a former Chair of the Sentencing Commission and
the current Commission itself have each proposed that Congress enact
a Booker “fix.” Former Commission Chair Judge William K. Sessions III
proposes “the resurrection of presumptive (formerly called ‘mandatory’) guidelines,” with enhancing facts to be charged in an indictment
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the
12
defendant.
The Commission proposes codification of a variety of

10

See Lanny A. Breuer, The Attorney General’s Sentencing and Corrections Working
Group: A Progress Report, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 110, 112 (2010) (noting that prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges “were not enthusiastic” about a return to a mandatory
guidelines structure, and that the Department of Justice “does not plan to seek legislative reinstatement of a mandatory Guidelines system”); Matthew Axelrod, Assoc. Deputy
Att’y Gen., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 88-89 (Feb. 16, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_
Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Hearing_Transcript_20120216.pdf) (noting that
“any change is going to result in lots of litigation and be disruptive” and that “uncertainty is not good for prosecutors or . . . the justice system”).
11
See, e.g., Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission Six Years After Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, &
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of James E.
Felman, Member, Am. Bar Ass’n) [hereinafter Felman Testimony], available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Felman%2010112011.pdf; Letter from Thomas W.
Hillier, II, Fed. Pub. Defender, to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chair, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the House Committee on the Judiciary, and the Hon. Robert C. (Bobby) Scott, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 2011),
available at http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/
files/Hillier111011.pdf.
Several representatives of the defense bar testified at the U.S. Sentencing Commission Hearing on “Federal Sentencing Options After Booker,” including Federal Public
Defenders Raymond Moore, Henry J. Bemporad, and Michael Nachmanoff; James E.
Felman, Co-Chair of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section Committee
on Sentencing; David Debold, Chair of the Practitioners Advisory Group; and Lisa Wayne,
President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The written and
oral testimony of all witnesses is available on the Sentencing Commission's website.
See Public Hearing Meeting—February 16, 2012, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2012021516/Agenda_16.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
12
William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 346, 350 (2011). For an in-depth analysis of Judge Sessions’s
proposal, see infra Section IV.A.
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devices designed to give its guidelines, as well as its restrictions on nonguideline sentences, increased weight at sentencing, and to more
13
strictly enforce the guidelines on appeal. These proposals—seeking
to fix a system that, far from being broken, is actually working properly
for the first time—are unwise, unworkable, and likely unconstitutional.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the history and
failings of the former mandatory guidelines system. Some of the history
we set forth has not previously been examined, yet is critical to understanding how the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements and commentary, as well as its
guidelines, were binding on judges—a conclusion that was essential to
the Court’s recognition in Booker that the guidelines regime was “man14
datory.” Part II describes the improvements made by the advisory
guidelines system, drawing primarily upon new data and recent cases.
Part III examines the flawed justifications that have been offered for a
Booker “fix.” Most importantly, we carefully examine and refute the
claim that judges have exercised their increased discretion after Booker
in a racially biased manner. Drawing on a variety of evidence including
empirical analyses by others, we conclude that (1) increased judicial
discretion after Booker has mitigated racial disparity built into the
guidelines; (2) racial disparity after Booker is driven primarily by the
increased impact of mandatory minimums that constrain judicial discretion and apply most frequently to black offenders; and (3) if it were
possible to devise a study controlling for all legally relevant factors, a
finding of racial disparity in judicial decisionmaking would be unlikely.
Part IV sets forth practical, policy, and constitutional reasons for
rejecting both Judge Sessions’s and the Commission’s proposals. We
conclude that these proposals would likely violate Booker and its progeny, and that Judge Sessions’s proposal would violate fundamental
principles of separation of powers.

13

Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Six Years After Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 55-60(2011) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris,
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n) [hereinafter Commission Testimony], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_
Reports/Testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf. For an in-depth discussion of the
Commission’s proposal, see infra Section IV.B.
14
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-35 (2005).
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I. THE FAILURE OF THE MANDATORY GUIDELINES SYSTEM
A. The Vision of the Sentencing Reform Act’s Framers:
An Expert Judicial Branch Agency Insulated
from Political Influence
Congress could have enacted a set of statutory sentencing guide15
lines. But the framers of the SRA recognized that Congress lacked
the expertise and political neutrality required for this task, and chose
16
instead to delegate the job to a sentencing commission. As envisioned
by Congress, the Commission was to be a politically neutral expert
body that would promulgate guidelines based on empirical research
and judicial experience.17 The Commission would be guided by the
18
“intelligible principles” set forth in the SRA, which required it to develop guidelines on the basis of sentencing data, empirical research,
and consultation with frontline participants.19 The Commission would

15

Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987.
See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United
States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 297 (1993) (describing the
considerations that “commanded” the decision to delegate promulgation of guidelines
to a sentencing commission). Kenneth Feinberg served as Special Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1975 through 1980.
17
Expertise and political neutrality were to be the core features of a sentencing
commission since sentencing reform was conceived. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 53-60, 118-23 (1973); Edward M. Kennedy,
Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 380
(1979).
18
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (holding that Congress
did not grant the Commission excessive legislative discretion in violation of the nondelegation doctrine because Congress directed the Commission to comply with sufficiently detailed “intelligible principle[s]” in promulgating the guidelines).
19
See SRA, sec. 217(a), § 991(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1) (2006)) (directing the Commission to “establish sentencing policies and
practices” that “assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2)” and that “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of
human behavior”); id. § 991(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2))
(directing the Commission to “develop means of measuring the degree to which the
sentencing . . . practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth
in section 3553(a)(2)”); id. § 994(n), 98. Stat. at 2022 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o))
(directing the Commission to “periodically . . . review and revise” the guidelines “in
consideration of comments and data coming to its attention,” and to “consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the
Federal criminal justice system”); id. § 995(a)(12)–(16), 98 Stat. at 2024-25 (codified at
16
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be engaged in an “essentially neutral endeavor” and would not be
21
coerced or co-opted by the political branches. Because the SRA’s
framers intended for the new Commission to be insulated from politi22
cal influence, the judicial branch was the natural place to put it.
There were other compelling reasons for locating the Commission
within the judicial—and not the executive—branch. One was Congress’s “strong feeling” that sentencing was “within the province of the
23
judiciary” and “should remain primarily a judicial function.” Another
was that the executive branch had no constitutional or historical au24
thority to make sentencing policy or to impose sentences. Another
was Congress’s related concern that placing sentencing authority within the executive branch would violate constitutional separation of
powers principles (a concern that, as noted below, the Supreme Court
shared).25 Congress had no expectation that the Department of Justice
would dominate the Commission. The SRA gave the Department only
26
an ex officio, nonvoting seat, and placed the Department on the
27
same footing as other institutional actors in the rulemaking process.

28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)–(16)) (empowering the Commission to establish a research and
development program and to collect, study, and disseminate sentencing data and other
empirical research).
20
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407.
21
See id. at 408 (“[W]here the subject lies so close to the heart of the judicial function and where purposes of the Commission are not inherently partisan, such enlistment [of judges in the creation of sentencing rules] is not coercion or co-optation, but
merely assurance of judicial participation.”); id. at 411 (“[P]recisely to ensure that they
would not be subject to coercion [by the President] . . . Congress insulated the members from Presidential removal except for good cause.”).
22
SRA § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
23
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 54, 159 (1983).
24
See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916).
25
“Traditionally, the courts and Congress have shared responsibility for establishing Federal sentencing policy. Congress defines criminal conduct and sets maximum
sentences, while the courts impose sentences in individual cases. Any suggestion that
the Executive Branch should be responsible for promulgating the guidelines would
present troubling constitutional problems.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 95 (1984)
(footnote omitted). See also infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
26
SRA § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
27
The Commission was to “review and revise” the guidelines based on, inter alia,
consultation with and regular reports from the Judicial Conference, the Department of
Justice, the Federal Public Defenders, the United States Probation System, and the
Bureau of Prisons. Id. § 994(n), 98 Stat. at 2022-23 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)).
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Moreover, aware that ex ante sentencing rules might have the effect of
28
transferring sentencing power to prosecutors, Congress directed the
29
Commission to issue policy guidance to judges to avoid that result.
The expectation was that the judicial branch would have the greatest ongoing influence over the development of the guidelines, not only
30
because at least three voting Commissioners had to be judges, but
also because judges were to be the primary source of information
regarding whether and how the guidelines needed to be revised. To
determine whether the guidelines were effective in meeting the pur31
poses of sentencing—and to revise them if they were not —the Commission was to systematically collect and study data regarding
sentences imposed, the relationship between the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a) and sentences imposed, and the effectiveness of sentences
32
imposed in meeting the purposes of sentencing. District courts were
required to state their reasons for departure,33 and appellate courts
were to uphold “reasonable” departures having regard for the sentenc-

28

According to a 1979 study by the Federal Judicial Center, reducing judicial discretion was likely to increase prosecutorial control over sentencing and consequently
unwarranted disparity. See 1 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM 3, 8-13 (1979).
29
In response to the 1979 study, Congress directed the Commission to promulgate
policy statements for judges to use in deciding whether to accept plea agreements.
SRA § 994(a)(2)(D), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E)); see also
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 241 (1989). Moreover, the
guideline range would be determined by the judge, based on aggravating and mitigating factors identified by the parties and by the probation officer in the presentence
report, and the judge would have the power to depart from the guideline range. See
SRA § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)); id.
§ 994(c)–(d) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)–(d)); id. sec. 212(a), § 3553(a)–(b), 98
Stat. at 1989-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–(b) (Supp. II 1984)).
30
SRA, sec. 217(a), § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(1998)).
31
See id. § 991(b), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)–(2) (2006))
(enumerating the foundational purposes and duties of the Commission); id. § 994(n),
98 Stat. at 2022-23 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)) (directing the Commission to review
and revise the guidelines in light of data and comments coming to its attention).
32
Id. § 995(a)(13)–(16), 98 Stat. at 2024-25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(13)–
(16)).
33
SRA, sec. 212(a), § 3553(c), 98 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)).
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ing court’s reasons and the factors set forth in § 3553(a). The Commission would study the district courts’ reasons and the appellate
courts’ decisions, and revise the guidelines based on what it learned.
As then–Chief Judge Breyer stated:
[T]he very theory of the Guidelines system is that when courts, drawing
upon experience and informed judgment in such cases, decide to depart,
they will explain their departures. The courts of appeals, and the Sentencing Commission, will examine, and learn from, those reasons. And,
the resulting knowledge will help the Commission to change, to refine,
35
and to improve, the Guidelines themselves.

The Commission’s placement within the judicial branch proved
critical in Mistretta v. United States; largely for this reason, the Supreme
36
Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to the SRA. Emphasizing the “consistent responsibility of federal judges to pronounce sen37
tence within the statutory range established by Congress,” the Court
noted that it was proper to delegate to the judicial branch rulemaking
38
power related to the “conduct of its own business.” Sentencing rules,
the Court reasoned, were “attendant to a central element of the histor39
ically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch” and were “not
40
more appropriate for another Branch.” The Court recognized that the
Commission had been placed “in the Judicial Branch precisely because
of the Judiciary’s special knowledge and expertise” in making “sub41
stantive” policy judgments in sentencing individual cases. Because
“substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been and remains
appropriate to the Judicial Branch,” Congress’s decision to locate the
Commission “within the Judicial Branch simply leaves with the Judici42
ary what long has belonged to it.” The Court therefore rejected the
Solicitor General’s argument that the Commission did not violate sep-

34

Id. sec. 213(a), § 3742(d)(3), (e)(3), 98 Stat. at 2011-13 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(d)(3), (e)(3) (Supp. II 1984)).
35
United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1993).
36
488 U.S. 361, 380-408 (1989).
37
Id. at 391.
38
Id. at 388.
39
Id. at 391.
40
Id. at 390.
41
Id. at 395-96.
42
Id. at 396-97.
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aration of powers principles because its power to promulgate enforceable sentencing guidelines was executive in nature, despite its “judicial
branch” label.43 Indeed, the Court noted that “had Congress decided
to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the
Executive Branch, we might face the constitutional questions whether
Congress unconstitutionally had assigned judicial responsibilities to
the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute
44
and the power to sentence within one Branch.”
The SRA, as written and as construed by the Court in Mistretta,
thus envisioned an expert judicial branch commission insulated from
undue influence by the political branches. But the Mistretta Court’s
rosy view of the Commission’s independence and of its “judicial” role
was based on a number of assumptions—some grounded in the SRA
45
and others purely speculative—that later proved to be false. As Professor Frank Bowman has observed, “[T]he architects of the [SRA]
miscalculated and created a sentencing structure almost perfectly
designed for capture and manipulation by the political branches.”46
The framers miscalculated by failing to place sufficient checks—
particularly a judicial check—on the Commission.

43

Brief for the United States 33-43, Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028),
1998 WL 1026050. The Solicitor General went on to suggest that the Supreme Court
could “sever[]” the “‘judicial branch’ label,” leaving the Commission designated as an
“independent agency.” Id. at 40-42.
44
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17.
45
See, e.g., Kate Stith, United States v. Mistretta: The Constitution and the Sentencing
Guidelines (“If the [Sentencing Commission is] indeed in the judicial branch, then the
political branches commandeered that branch, obscuring who is responsible for the
[sentencing] rules . . . and who is really exercising sentencing authority in criminal
cases.” (footnote omitted)), in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 455, 482 (Carol S.
Steicker ed., 2006); id. at 476-82 (discussing a number of false assumptions made by the
Mistretta Court); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28-40 (1991) (contending that the Mistretta Court upheld the Commission and its guidelines based on a
number of assumptions—including (1) an optimistic assessment that granting judges
such legislative and executive powers would not compromise their impartiality, (2) a
presumption that substantive judicial rulemaking would not stray too far from acceptable past precedent, and (3) a belief that the President could exercise little influence
over the judges on the Commission—and did not address whether the Commission and
its guidelines would be constitutional if those assumptions proved to be ill-founded).
46
Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of
Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (2005).
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B. The Breakdown of the Framers’ Vision: Insufficient
Checks on the Commission
Although Congress’s desire to insulate the Commission from political pressures was sound in theory, it was as unrealistic for this federal
agency as it would be for other prominent agencies that issue rules
47
regarding politically contentious matters.
Given this reality, Congress’s decision to exempt the Commission’s work from the judicial
review applicable to other federal agencies caused the framers’ vision
to quickly unravel. The only functionally similar mechanism under
the SRA was judicial authority to depart based on circumstances not
“adequately taken into consideration” by the Commission in formulat48
ing the guidelines, and the Commission’s responsibility to review and
49
revise the guidelines based on what it learned from these departures.
But the departure power never operated as intended. The Commission
acted forcefully to prevent judicial departures and judicial scrutiny of
the guidelines even before, and repeatedly after, the guidelines went
into effect.
1. The Commission’s Exemption from Judicial Review and Related
Transparency and Explanation Requirements
The SRA required that the notice, comment, and hearing requirements of § 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) be
50
applied to the Commission’s “guidelines” in order to ensure that the
51
Commission took into account “all relevant views.” Congress also
required the Commission to consult with experts and representatives
of each of the primary institutional actors in the federal criminal jus52
tice system.

47

See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 48-51 (1998) (noting that from its inception, the Commission
has been both “acutely sensitive to the political environment in which it operates, and
controversial”); see also infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
48
SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 212(a), § 3553(b), 98 Stat. 1987, 1990
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. II 1984)).
49
Id. sec. 217(a), § 994(n), 98 Stat. at 2022 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006)).
50
Id. § 994(w), 98 Stat. at 2024 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(x)).
51
See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 181 (1983).
52
See supra note 27.
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Significantly, however, the Commission was not subject to the most
important procedures and constraints designed to ensure honesty,
transparency, and accountability in rulemaking by federal agencies.53
The failure to provide for judicial review of the Commission’s rulemaking is a major reason that the framers’ vision was never realized.
The APA subjects other federal agencies to this judicial check, whereby
the reviewing court must “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action
found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” contrary to constitutional right or statute,
or “without observance of procedure required by law.”54 Moreover,
other federal agencies must hold “every portion of every meeting . . .
55
open to public observation,” and may not engage in ex parte com56
munications regarding matters subject to a public hearing. When
promulgating regulations, they must follow the “logical outgrowth”
principle, which requires a second notice and comment period if a regulation under consideration differs significantly from a version previ57
They must provide a statement of
ously published for comment.
58
“basis and purpose” for their rules that includes a thorough explanation in light of the factors made relevant by the enabling legislation,
factual evidence supporting the rule, a reasoned response to com-

53

The Commission was subject only to § 553 of the APA. For other agencies, the
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), id. § 552,
and the Government in the Sunshine Act, id. § 552b, require additional procedures.
“The openness these acts require reflects what is perhaps a peculiarly American political idea, that publicity can serve as an effective constraint on government action—that
‘sunlight is the best disinfectant.’” PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (1989).
54
5 U.S.C. § 706(2). While the APA provides that this judicial review provision is
not applicable to “the courts of the United States,” id. § 551(1)(B), it is not clear that
this exclusion should apply to the Commission, even if one accepts its “judicial branch”
label. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“[T]he Commission is
not a court.”).
55
5 U.S.C. § 552b(b).
56
Id. § 557(d)(1).
57
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007).
58
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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ments opposing the rule, and a “rational connection between the facts
59
found and the choice[s] made.”
None of these requirements was made applicable to the Commission. Although the Commission might have voluntarily adopted open
and rigorous procedures, it chose not to do so. Pursuant to its Rules
of Practice and Procedure, it deliberates in private meetings closed to
all but the Justice Department’s ex officio commissioner,60 engages in
unrecorded ex parte communications with Department staff, law en61
forcement officials, and others, and excludes these and all internal
62
The Commission
communications from its public comment file.
provides reasons in connection with its notices of proposed amendments only “to the extent appropriate and practicable” and information relevant to the issues only if such information is “publicly
63
available.”
Without enforceable constraints, the Commission failed to take into
account the views and evidence presented by the judiciary, the defense
64
bar, and others who advised against its proposals. It promulgated
amendments materially different from those originally proposed for
65
comment, to which stakeholders had no opportunity to respond. And

59

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42-43 & n.9 (1983); see also 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 7.1, at 559 (5th ed. 2010); id. § 7.4, at 592-94, 599.
60
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE r.3.2 (2007)
(stating that only meetings “with outside parties shall be conducted in public”).
61
See id. r.3.3 (declaring that the Commission may hold nonpublic meetings to receive information from and participate in discussions with any person designated by an
ex officio commissioner as support staff, or to receive or share information deemed
inappropriate for public disclosure); id. r.3.5 (requiring that only public meetings be
recorded).
62
Id. r.5.1.
63
Id. r.4.4.
64
See Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”: A Call for Meaningful
Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1276 (1999).
65
See, e.g., Fred W. Bennett, A Direct Participant’s Perspective on the Guideline Amendment Process, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 148, 148 & 151 n.5 (1990) (noting that at least eighteen
of the fifty-three final amendments had materially different language than that published for comment); id. at 149 (“In some instances it was impossible to discern what
prompted options to proposed amendments and what empirical study or research,
if any, supported final language sent to Congress but not originally published in the
Federal Register . . . .”); Samuel J. Buffone, The Federal Sentencing Commission’s Proposed
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 67, 69 (1996) (noting that the Com-

Baron-Evans FINAL_v2.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1644

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/13/2012 1:05 PM

[Vol. 160: 1631

while the SRA required the Commission to include with amendments
66
sent to Congress a “statement of the reasons therefor,” the Commis67
sion typically provided little or no explanation for its amendments.
Neither a failure to explain nor an arbitrary result was reviewable
68
And under the departure standard
under the APA or otherwise.
promulgated by the Commission, discussed below, courts were required
69
to follow unexplained and unjustified guidelines. The Commission
was therefore under no pressure to base its actions on reasons, evidence,
or a sound empirical foundation, and frequently acted instead on the
70
basis of political pressure or the Commissioners’ personal policy views.
Shortly before leaving the Commission, then-Judge Breyer reportedly warned his colleagues against acting on the basis of their personal
71
views and advised the Commission to “revise the present version of
the Guidelines in light of its information-based analyses and sugges-

mission failed to provide notice and a second comment period for final guidelines
regarding environmental crimes and organizational sanctions that were not a logical
outgrowth of its initial proposals).
66
28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
67
The typical “reason for amendment” simply stated that the amendment increased
base offense levels or enhancements by specified levels, see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 189, reason for amend. (Nov. 1, 1989), or that
the amendment “sets forth the Commission’s position” that certain factors “are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range,” id. amend. 386, reason for amend. (Nov. 1, 1991).
68
See, e.g., United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 969-70 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Federal courts do not have authority to review the Commission’s actions for compliance
with APA provisions, at least insofar as the adequacy of the statement of the basis and
purpose of an amendment is concerned.”); United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293,
1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that, because Congress did not subject the Commission to judicial review under the APA, “this court lacks authority to review the adequacy
of the Commission's statement of reasons in support of its conclusion that age is not
ordinarily relevant to sentencing”).
69
See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
70
See Samuel J. Buffone, Control of Arbitrary Sentencing Guidelines: Is Administrative
Law the Answer?, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 139 (1991).
71
See Michael K. Block, Emerging Problems in the Sentencing Commission’s Approach to
Guideline Amendments, 1 FED. SENT’G REP. 451, 453 (1989) (quoting Commissioner
Breyer as warning that “this [Commission] will not last if the answer to the question
‘How did you choose that level?’ is that what happened was seven people sat around in
a room and they decided on the basis of what they thought was somehow appropriately
severe” (alteration in original)).
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72

tions from judges, probation officers and others in the field.” Just
before resigning, Commissioner Michael Block put the matter more
bluntly: “At times it appears that a majority of the Commission is
actively seeking an ‘information free’ environment in which to make
73
sentencing policy.” Early on, the Judicial Conference made a serious
effort to convince the Commission to explain its proposals, forego further increases in severity and restrictions on departures, and adopt
74
moderating changes to the guidelines, all to no avail. Judges and
practitioners watched with alarm as the Commission ignored the views
and evidence presented to it and set about implementing an unexplained agenda that profoundly altered federal sentencing in ways the
75
SRA’s framers clearly did not intend. The Department of Justice took
full advantage of this environment and its position as an ex officio
76
member to advocate its desired results behind closed doors.

72

What Are the Two Most Important Tasks Facing the Sentencing Commission, Through
Modification Either of the Existing Guidelines or the Process by Which the Commission Relates to
Judges and Practitioners?, 1 FED. SENT’G REP. 365, 366 (response of Stephen G. Breyer)
(1989).
73
Block, supra note 71, at 453.
74
See Hon. Vincent L. Broderick, Chairman, Comm. on Criminal Law & Probation
Admin. of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., & Hon. Mark Wolf, Chairman, Subcomm. on Sentencing Guidelines & Procedures, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (Mar. 5, 1991), in 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 276, 278-81 (1991); Judge Mark
Wolf & Judge Vincent L. Broderick, Testimony Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(Mar. 5, 1991), in 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 287, 287-88 (1991); What Are the Two Most Important Tasks Facing the Sentencing Commission, Through Modification Either of the Existing
Guidelines or the Process by Which the Commission Relates to Judges and Practitioners?, supra
note 72, at 365 (response of Marvin E. Frankel); Letter from Hon. Vincent L. Broderick,
to Hon. Avern Cohn ( June 13, 1991), in 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 48, 48-49 (1991).
75
See Thomas W. Hillier, II, The Commission’s Departure from an Evolutionary Amendment Process, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 45 (1991) (observing that the Commission had “all
but ignored the input of ‘outsiders’” in favor of its “internal agenda,” which was “not a
matter of public record or debate and, as a result, Congress’s view that the guidelines
evolve from a community of ideas [was] left unrealized”); Guideline Amendments, 2 FED.
SENT’G REP. 238 (1990) (including critical responses to proposed amendments and the
Commission’s failure to justify or explain them by Judge Becker on behalf of the Judicial Conference, Samuel Buffone on behalf of the American Bar Association, Benson
Weintraub on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and
Professors Daniel J. Freed and Marc Miller, among others).
76
See, e.g., Jeffery S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing Commission, P.M.
(Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 319-20 (1989) (explaining that the Department’s ex officio representative convinced four of six Commission-
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2. The Eradication of Reasoned Departures
The one mechanism under the SRA that would have placed pressure on the Commission to base its guidelines on reason and evidence
was the district courts’ authority to depart from the guidelines and to
explain their reasons for doing so. But the Commission, aided by the
Supreme Court, virtually eradicated the judicial departure power except as explicitly authorized by the Commission itself.
Departures were intended to serve two important functions: first,
to permit individualized sentences based on circumstances not ade77
quately taken into account in the guidelines, and second, to provide
systematic feedback to the Commission to assist it in reviewing and
78
revising the guidelines. Section 3553(b) of Title 18, as enacted in the
SRA in 1984, provided that sentencing courts “shall impose a sentence
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4)”—
which referenced the Commission’s authority to create “guide79
lines” —“unless the court finds that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that

ers to increase fraud penalties with a “fallacious” argument “that recent congressional
enactments had given oblique ‘signals’ to the Commission” to do so and “despite the
absence of any empirical proof that an increase would improve the effectiveness of
sentencing”); cf. Hon. Edward R. Becker, Suggestions for the New Sentencing Commission, 8
FED. SENT’G REP. 10, 10-11 (1995) (arguing against the inclusion of the DOJ as an ex
officio member because it raises separation of powers issues and “creates the appearance that the interest of the government . . . is favored in the promulgation of the
guidelines”); David J. Gottlieb, The Sentencing Commission’s Administrative Reforms: Two
Cheers, and Some Suggestions, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 71, 76 (1996) (arguing that the Commission’s work should be more open to the public, especially in light of the DOJ’s “unusual position” as both an “interested party” and an ex officio member).
77
See SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 991(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1987,
2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)) (directing the Commission to
“maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general
sentencing practices”).
78
See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
79
See SRA, sec. 211(a), § 3553(a)(4), 98 Stat. at 1989-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4) (Supp. II 1984)) (directing the court to consider “the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range . . . as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1)”).
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80

should result in a sentence different from that described.” The SRA
also directed the courts, in section 3553(a), to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” of
81
sentencing —that is, “just punishment,” “adequate deterrence,” protection of the public against “further crimes of the defendant,” and
82
rehabilitation “in the most effective manner.” In determining the
“particular sentence to be imposed,” judges were to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the need for the sentence imposed” to satisfy
the purposes of sentencing, the “kinds of sentences available” by statute, the kinds and range of sentences set forth in the “guidelines,”
“any pertinent policy statement,” and the “need to avoid unwarranted
83
sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained how subsections (a) and (b) would work together. The judge would first consider
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the purposes of sentencing, as required by
84
§ 3553(a). This consideration would inform the judge’s decision as
to whether the guideline range “adequately” reflected the circumstances of the case and whether a different sentence “should result,” as
85
required by § 3553(b). The judge would then determine the guideline range, and either sentence within the guideline range because it
appropriately reflected the relevant factors, or sentence outside the
86
guideline range because it did not. The standard of appellate review
for departures was also tied to § 3553(a) and the facts of the case: the
court of appeals was to determine whether a sentence outside the
guideline range was “unreasonable, having regard for . . . the factors to
be considered in imposing a sentence” as set forth in § 3553(a), and

80

Id. § 3553(b), 98 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. II 1984)).
Id. § 3553(a), 98 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. II 1984)).
82
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D), 98 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–
(D) (Supp. II 1984)).
83
Id. § 3553(a)(1)–(6), 98 Stat. at 1989-90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1)–(6) (Supp. II 1984)) .
84
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983).
85
Id. at 51-52.
86
Id. at 52, 75.
81
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“the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by
87
the district court.”
Congress did not intend to eliminate judges’ “thoughtful imposi88
tion of individualized sentences.” To the contrary, Congress’s goal
89
was to “enhance the individualization of sentences,” and it believed
that “the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines
90
in an appropriate case.” To this end, the SRA directed the Commission to consider for inclusion in the guidelines nonexhaustive lists of
91
aggravating and mitigating offense and offender characteristics, and
to “maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentencing
when warranted by mitigating and aggravating factors not taken into
92
account” in the guidelines. Congress recognized that it was not possible to write all relevant factors into general rules, and that “some var93
iation [was] not only inevitable but desirable.”
The Commission, however, read the SRA differently. In commentary issued in April 1987, before the guidelines went into effect, it took
the position that § 3553(b) meant that, “in principle, the Commission,
by specifying that it had adequately considered a particular factor,
94
could prevent a court from using it as grounds for departure.” The
commentary also described a departure standard quite unlike that described in § 3553; in the Commission’s view, departures were permissible only in “atypical” cases that “significantly differ[]” from the
“heartland” of “typical cases embodying the conduct that each guide95
line describes.” The Commission simultaneously issued policy statements declaring, without explanation, that the mitigating factors
Congress had directed it to consider for inclusion in the guidelines, as

87

SRA sec. 213(a), § 3742(d)(3), 98 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(3)
(Supp. II 1984)).
88
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52.
89
Id. at 52-53, 161.
90
Id. at 52.
91
SRA sec. 217(a), § 994(c)–(d), 98 Stat. at 2020 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)–(d)).
92
Id. § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)).
93
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150.
94
52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,050 (May 13, 1987) (emphasis added).
95
Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(b) (2011).
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well as others, were prohibited or “not ordinarily relevant” as grounds
96
for departure.
Notably, the original version of § 3553(b) did not direct the courts
to consider the Commission’s “policy statements” or “commentary” in
deciding whether to depart. Indeed, the SRA did not even authorize
the Commission to issue “commentary,” and while it did authorize
the Commission to issue “policy statements,” restricting departures was
97
not among their specified purposes. Nevertheless, the Commission
secured an amendment to § 3553(b) as part of the Sentencing Act of
98
1987 that came to mean that its “policy statements” and “commen99
tary” were binding on the courts.
On October 22, 1987, the Chair of the Sentencing Commission,
Judge William W. Wilkins, complained to the Senate Judiciary Committee that the departure standard under § 3553(b) was too “indefinite,
subjective, and impractical” because courts would have to “wrestle
with” whether a factor had been “adequately considered” by the
Commission and, in doing so, might feel the need to subpoena the

96

See 52 Fed. Reg. at 18,102-05; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1
policy statement (1987) (age); id. § 5H1.2 policy statement (educational and vocational
skills); id. § 5H1.3 policy statement (mental and emotional conditions); id. § 5H1.4
policy statement (physical condition, drug dependence, alcohol abuse); id. § 5H1.5
policy statement (employment record); id. § 5H1.6 policy statement (family ties and
responsibilities); id. § 5K2.12 policy statement (personal financial difficulties, economic
pressures on a trade or business).
97
SRA, sec. 217(a), § 994(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a)(2)).
98
Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266, 1266 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (1988)).
99
Some analyses of the legislative history of the SRA have noted the 1987 amendment
to § 3553(b). See, e.g., Luby, supra note 64, at 1256-57; Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed,
Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 235, 23637 (1991); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 270 (1993);
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 786-87 (1999). This Article, however, is the first (as far as we are aware) to explain its significance to the subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court that held, inexplicably and contrary to the usual canons of administrative law, that Commission policy statements and commentary were as
binding on courts as the guidelines themselves.
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100

Commission to enable them to “make the necessary determinations.”
To remedy these asserted problems, the Commission proposed that
§ 3553(b) be amended to permit departure only on a ground that
provides “a compelling reason” and that “is not expressly addressed in
the guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary” of the Sen101
102
tencing Commission, unless “specifically invited” therein. In addition, the Commission proposed that the courts be directed, in making
this determination, to “consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis103
sion.” The purpose of this request to “limit [the courts’] focus to the
‘four corners’ of the officially promulgated guidelines, policy statements, and commentary of the Sentencing Commission” was to “definitively preclude the possibility of any legal process directed at the
Commission . . . in an effort to look behind or beyond those official
Commission pronouncements in order to discover intent or resolve
104
matters in dispute.”
Congress declined to confine departures to circumstances that
provided “a compelling reason,” or to circumstances “not expressly
addressed” unless “specifically invited” by the Commission. Further, it
added language to § 3553(b), as proposed by the House, clarifying
that even if a factor appeared in some form in the guidelines, the sentencing judge was authorized to depart if he determined that the factor was “of a kind, or to a degree” not adequately taken into
consideration by the Commission.105 But Congress did address the

100

Sentencing Commission Guidelines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 29-30 (1987) (statement of William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing
Commission).
101
See id. app. at 158-59 (setting forth proposed amendments).
102
Id. at 31 (statement of William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission).
103
Id. app. at 158-59.
104
Id. at 32-33 (statement of William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission). Chairman Wilkins explained that the amendment was necessary to protect
the Commission from “repetitive, time-consuming, and unnecessary legal process.” Id.
at 30.
105
Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266, 1266 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)); 133 CONG. REC. 31,947 (1987).
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106

Commission’s fear of being subpoenaed by also inserting the following sentence in § 3553(b): “In determining whether a circumstance
was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only
the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary
of the Sentencing Commission.”107
The plain language of the 1987 amendments appeared to mean
that a court should determine whether the factors it found to be relevant in a case were adequately reflected, in kind and degree, in the
guidelines, and that, in doing so, it could not subpoena the Commission or its records to examine the adequacy of its actual deliberations.
Subsections (a) and (b) of § 3553 would work together as described in
108
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied the SRA.
The legislative history of the 1987 amendments generally pointed
to the same conclusion. The House of Representatives stated that the
purpose of the sentence confining the inquiry to the guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary was to address the Commission’s fear
109
that it would be subpoenaed.
The House firmly rejected the Commission’s assertion that “in principle” it could “prevent” departure by
110
specifying that it had adequately considered a factor. Instead, courts
would first ascertain as, “an objective matter,” whether “the guidelines
111
If so, “the
take into account at all the circumstance in question.”
court must then decide whether the guidelines ‘adequately’ take the
circumstance into account, a subjective determination,” made by looking “to whether the circumstance in the case differs in kind or degree

106

133 CONG. REC. 31,947 (explaining that the bill adopted the Commission’s suggested amendment to address its “fear[] that its members and records will frequently
be subpoenaed”); see also id. at 33,110 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (noting that the
sentence was added to address “concern that failure to specifically designate the materials that may be used in determining the appropriateness of departure could result in
members of the Commission, or their notes and other internal work products, being
subpoenaed”).
107
Sentencing Act of 1987 § 3, 101 Stat. at 1266 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (1988)). The Act was enacted on December 7, 1987, after the guidelines
went into effect on November 1, 1987.
108
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
109
133 CONG. REC. 31,947 (1987).
110
Id. at 31,947 & 31,949 n.12; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
111
133 CONG. REC. 31,947.
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from the circumstance as accounted for by the guidelines.” In deciding whether the guidelines took a circumstance into account “at all” or
whether it “differs in kind or degree from the circumstance as accounted for by the guidelines,” the court could consider only “the guidelines
themselves, the official commentary to the guidelines, and the policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission”113—i.e., it could not subpoena the Commission. The court would then determine, as a subjec114
tive matter, whether a different sentence “should result.” The House
also noted that § 3553(a) provided grounds for departure when the
guideline sentence was greater than necessary to serve the purposes of
115
sentencing.
A “Joint Explanation” issued by four of the SRA’s original Senate
sponsors muddied the waters a bit. The statement acknowledged that
the new sentence was added to protect the Commission from subpoenas, but asserted that § 3553(a) provided no ground for departure,
and that if the Commission stated “that it had adequately considered a
factor in formulating the guidelines . . . the court would be precluded
from departing unless, as a threshold matter, the court reasonably determined that the factor was not meant to be covered by the commission’s
116
statement.” Although their individual statements are ambiguous, the
four Senators appeared to abandon the position stated in their Senate
Judiciary Committee Report that judges would independently evaluate
whether the guidelines adequately reflected a given circumstance in
117
light of the factors and purposes set forth in § 3553(a).
Whatever the Senators’ statement meant, it could not amend the
118
plain language of the statute.
A statutory provision directing the

112

Id.
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 33,109 ( joint statement of Sens. Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch)
(emphasis added).
117
See id. at 33,109-10; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52-53, 75 (1983); supra notes
84-86 and accompanying text.
118
See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (“Floor statements
from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute.”);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1984) (expressing “grave doubts” that statements
of individual congressmen could overcome clear statutory language).
113
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courts to determine whether potential grounds for departure were
“adequately taken into consideration” by the Commission could not
reasonably be read to grant the Commission the power to dictate the
answer to this question. Moreover, the standard of appellate review
for sentences outside the guideline range was whether the sentence “is
unreasonable, having regard for . . . the factors to be considered in
119
Because the reasonimposing a sentence” set forth in § 3553(a).
ableness of a departure depended on the § 3553(a) factors, those factors must necessarily have guided the district court in determining
whether and to what extent to depart.
Thus, after the 1987 amendments, it should have been clear that
while the Commission was relieved of having to respond to subpoenas,
it was obliged to provide explanations in the Guidelines Manual itself
to demonstrate that it had “adequately taken into consideration” all
120
Unfortunately, in a
relevant factors in formulating the guidelines.
trio of misguided cases, the Supreme Court effectively read the statutory departure standard, as well as the reasonableness standard of review for departures, out of existence, and allowed the Commission to
dictate limits on departure through policy statements and commentary. In each of these cases, the fateful sentence added to § 3553(b) in
December 1987 to prevent the Commission from being subpoenaed
played a substantial—and questionable—role.
In 1992, the Court in Williams v. United States, over a vigorous dissent but in agreement with both parties, cited that sentence in holding
that a court’s use of a ground for departure that was prohibited by a
“policy statement” was reversible as “an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines,” and that such a departure could not be upheld
121
The majority rejected the dissent’s reliance on the
as reasonable.
distinction drawn by the SRA between binding guidelines and non122
binding policy statements, and failed to recognize the appellate re-

119

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(3) (1988).
See Miller & Freed, supra note 99, at 236 (“[T]he Commission must now shoulder the burden of demonstrating adequate consideration of each circumstance. Evidence of its thinking process—not just its conclusion—must be spelled out in the text
of its Guidelines Manual.”).
121
503 U.S. 193, 200-02 (1992).
122
Id. at 200-01.
120
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view provision’s clear language directing that guideline sentences were
to be reviewed for correctness, while departures were to be reviewed
123
In doing so, the majority noted that,
only for unreasonableness.
under § 3553(b), “in determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, a court must consider . . . ‘policy
124
statements.’”
In Stinson v. United States, the Court took Williams a step further,
holding that policy statements and commentary, though not subject to
notice, comment, or congressional approval requirements, were “bind125
ing” on the courts. The Court acknowledged that the SRA “does not
in express terms authorize the issuance of commentary,” but, pointing
to the new language adopted in 1987, noted that “the Act does refer to
126
it” in § 3553(b).
The Court went still further in its 1996 decision in Koon v. United
States, where it adopted the Commission’s policy statements and com127
mentary as the sole framework for review of departures.
The Court
again relied on the sentence added in 1987 for the purpose of shielding the Commission from subpoenas: “To determine whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration by the Commission,
Congress instructed courts to ‘consider only the sentencing guidelines,
policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis128
sion.’” Turning its attention, “as instructed,” to official commentary
in the Guidelines Manual, the Court “learn[ed] that the Commission

123

Cf. id. at 210-11, 217 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent highlighted the separate and distinct standards set forth in § 3742(e). Id. at 210-11. Section 3742 provided:
[T]he court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence . . . (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; [or]
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable, having regard for—(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth
in [§ 3553(a)] of this title; and (B) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of
section 3553(c) . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988).
124
Williams, 503 U.S. at 201 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
125
508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993).
126
Id. at 41.
127
518 U.S. 81, 92-96 (1996).
128
Id. at 92-93 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
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did not adequately take into account cases that are, for one reason or
another, ‘unusual,’” as compared to cases falling within the “‘heart129
land . . . of typical cases.’” The courts were not “left adrift,” however,
because the Commission had specified which factors were within or
outside the “heartland” through policy statements forbidding, discour130
aging, or encouraging their consideration. While the Court in Koon
131
adopted an “abuse of discretion” standard of review for departures,
this was meaningless in most cases because the areas within which
district courts had discretion were demarcated by the Commission’s
pronouncements. And the district court’s interpretation of those pro132
nouncements was reviewed de novo. Further, the Court made clear
that judges were not permitted to “test potential departure factors
133
against” the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). Remarkably, the Court made no mention of the standard of review for departures stated in the statute itself: unreasonableness with regard to the
134
factors set forth in § 3553(a).

129

Id. at 92-93 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (1995)).
130
Id. at 94-96. Relying on the Commission’s commentary, the Court said that if a
factor was “forbidden” by the Commission, “the sentencing court cannot use it as a
basis for departure.” Id. at 95-96. If a factor was “encouraged,” the court was “authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it into account.” Id. at
96. If a factor was a “discouraged factor” or an “encouraged factor already taken into
account,” the court “should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree
or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor
is present.” Id. If a factor was “unmentioned,” the court “must, after considering the
‘structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as
a whole,’” id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer,
C.J.)), then “decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline’s heartland . . . bear[ing] in mind the Commission’s expectation that departures based on
grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be ‘highly infrequent.’” Id. (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. 4, introductory cmt. 4(b) (1995)).
131
Id. at 91.
132
See United States v. Roberts, 313 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863,
871 (5th Cir. 2002).
133
Koon, 518 U.S. at 108.
134
See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994) (stating that the standard of review for sentences “outside the applicable guideline range” was whether the sentence “is unreasonable, having regard for . . . the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set
forth in [§ 3553(a)] of this title; and . . . the reasons for the imposition of the particular
sentence, as stated by the district court”).
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Through the status it gave to the Commission’s commentary and
policy statements in Williams, Stinson, and Koon, the Court “enhanced
the role of the Sentencing Commission vis-à-vis the sentencing court
135
The result was to virtually nullify
and probably vis-à-vis Congress.”
the statutory language giving courts the power to depart based on circumstances “not adequately taken into consideration” by the Commission in the guidelines, to make that determination in light of the
factors and purposes set forth in § 3553(a), and to have that decision
reviewed for “unreasonableness” with regard to § 3553(a). Pursuant
to these decisions, any factor mentioned in the Guidelines Manual, or
even implicitly considered through omission, was deemed to be ade136
The Commission
quately considered and within the “heartland.”
instructed sentencing courts that they could depart from the guideline
range only based on a circumstance that was “atypical,” and that they
were not permitted to disagree with the policy judgments of the
137
Courts acted at their peril in forthrightly expressing
Commission.
dissatisfaction with the guidelines in the course of explaining a depar-

135

THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1B1.7 (2011 ed.).
136
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 107 F. App’x 295, 298 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that “nothing about” an eighteen-year-old girl’s age “removes her situation from the
heartland of cases involving comparable drug crimes,” since drug importers often use
“young, naive men and women without extensive criminal experience”); United States
v. Bristow, 110 F.3d 754, 755, 757-58 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a departure would
have been impermissible for a young man who pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm based on his brief possession of an unloaded handgun lawfully owned
by his father, solely to pawn it in order to pay child support, because, although these
circumstances were not taken into account in the guideline range, the defendant was
motivated by financial difficulties, a factor prohibited as a ground for departure); United
States v. Webb, 49 F.3d 636 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the case of a single father
convicted of manufacturing and failing to register a “silencer”—here, a toilet paper roll
filled with toy animal stuffing—that he attached to a legally owned rifle that he intended to use to shoot animals in his yard, was within the “heartland” contemplated by the
guideline).
137
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 policy statement (1995)
(“In the absence of a characteristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as sufficiently atypical to warrant a sentence different from that called for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the guideline range is not authorized. For example,
dissatisfaction with the available sentencing range or a preference for a different sentence than that authorized by the guidelines is not an appropriate basis for a sentence
outside the applicable guideline range.” (citation omitted)).
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138

ture and were not permitted to correct for the most egregious problems in the guidelines because they were, or were assumed to have
139
been, intended by the Commission to be within the “heartland.”
3. Unexplained and Imbalanced Guidelines
The impact of giving an unaccountable agency unchecked power
over federal sentencing was quickly felt. The first Commission made
key choices that were not required by any specific directive in the SRA,
that were not the product of empirical study as required by the SRA,
and that diverged dramatically from sentences imposed before the
SRA, upon which the Commission claimed the guidelines were largely
based.140
For example, the SRA directed the Commission to include both
141
aggravating and mitigating factors in the guidelines and to maintain

138

See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 386 F.3d 273, 275, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reversing a departure based on a variety of grounds in part because the judge stated that
he was “not going to be the instrument of injustice in this case” and “[t]o the extent
the district court based the departure on its belief that the sentence was unjust, it relied
on a factor that is clearly impermissible under the Guidelines”).
139
See In re Sealed Case, 292 F.3d 913, 915-16 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (disallowing a departure based on the “crack/powder disparity” because this disparity was not “atypical” and
therefore was in the “heartland”); see also, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 358 F.3d 1278,
1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a departure was not permitted where a prior drug
trafficking offense led to the same 16-level enhancement that would ensue from a prior
murder because the Commission determined it was “serious enough to warrant [the]
enhancement,” and thus it “was adequately taken into account by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating” the guideline); United States v. Jared, 50 F. App’x 259,
261 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a departure based on “first offender” status was not
permitted because the Commission had instructed that such a departure “cannot be
appropriate” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 policy statement (2001))); United States v. Weaver, 126 F.3d 789, 792-94 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a departure based on “disproportionate results between high and low-level” theft
and fraud offenders was not permitted because such results were “squarely within the
norm contemplated” by the guidelines).
140
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(3) introductory cmt.
(2011) (noting that in the first set of guidelines, the Commission took an “empirical
approach that used as a starting point data estimating pre-guidelines sentencing
practice”).
141
See SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 994(c), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2006)) (listing offense circumstances); id. § 994(d)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)) (listing offender characteristics).
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“sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in” the
guidelines.142 But while the Commission included a vast array of
143
aggravating factors in the guidelines, it omitted all but one of the
144
mitigating factors Congress directed it to consider and issued policy
statements prohibiting or discouraging downward departure based on
these and other mitigating factors.145 The Commission gave no reasons
for its restrictions on downward departures. Later, it claimed that
some, but not all, of these policy statements were “require[d]” by a
146
That provision, however, directed only that
provision of the SRA.
the Commission was not to recommend imprisonment instead of probation or a longer prison term based on the defendant’s lack of educa147
But the SRA made clear that
tion, employment, or stabilizing ties.

142

Id. § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)).
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (Offense Conduct); id. ch. 3
(Adjustments); id. ch. 4 (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood).
144
Of the mitigating factors specified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), the Commission included only “role in the offense” in the guideline rules. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (1987) (allowing a downward adjustment for “minimal” or
“minor” participation in the criminal activity). The Commission included one other
mitigating factor in the guideline rules, acceptance of responsibility, which in practice
has meant pleading guilty. See id. § 3E1.1.
145
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.5 policy statement
(“Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is
warranted.”); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
146
The Commission amended the commentary in 1990 to “clarif[y]” that certain
policy statements were “require[d]” by § 994(e). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
app. C, amend. 357 (Nov. 1, 1990).
147
See SRA § 994(e), 98 Stat. at 2021 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(e)) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term
of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties
and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”). As the Senate Report
explained, the purpose of § 994(e) was “of course, to guard against the inappropriate
use of incarceration for those defendants who lack education, employment, and stabilizing ties.” S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 175 (1983). Section 994(e) was one of three provisions of the SRA that reflected Congress’s judgment that prison was not an appropriate
means of rehabilitation and that a term of imprisonment should therefore not be
imposed or lengthened solely on the theory that prison might be rehabilitative. The
other two provisions were 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). See S. REP. NO.
98-225, at 67 n.140, 76, 119 (explaining that § 994(k) and § 3582(a) recognize that
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation). Interpreting
these two provisions, the Supreme Court recently explained:
143

Baron-Evans FINAL_v2.docx (DO NOT DELETE)6/13/2012 1:05 PM

2012]

Booker Rules

1659

those and other factors were appropriate considerations in mitigation
148
of a sentence. Then-Commissioner Breyer explained that the Commission had omitted from the guidelines most of the mitigating factors
Congress directed it to consider as one of several “‘trade-offs’ among
149
Commissioners with different viewpoints.” Later, Justice Breyer, who
had hoped that the guidelines would evolve, said that the exclusion of
these factors was “intended to be provisional” and “subject to revision
150
in light of Guideline implementation experience.” That revision did
not materialize. Moreover, when courts sought to depart on grounds
not already disapproved, the Commission responded by adding those
grounds to its disfavored list, frequently overruling the courts of
151
appeals.

Section 994(k) bars the Commission from recommending a “term of imprisonment”—a phrase that again refers both to the fact and to the length of
incarceration—based on a defendant’s rehabilitative needs. And § 3582(a)
prohibits a court from considering those needs to impose or lengthen a period
of confinement when selecting a sentence from within, or choosing to depart
from, the Guidelines range.
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (2011).
148
Congress directed the Commission to consider the relevance of eleven characteristics, “among others,” in establishing categories of offenders in the guidelines and
policy statements regarding the type, length, and conditions of sentences. SRA § 994(d),
98 Stat. at 2020 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)). These included the five factors identified in § 994(e). Id. In other words, Congress considered all eleven offender characteristics to be relevant to all aspects of the sentencing decision, with the exception that
the factors listed in § 994(e) could not be a basis for imposing or lengthening a term of
imprisonment. As the Senate Report explained, “[E]ach of these factors may play other
roles in the sentencing decision.” S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 174. For example, “they may, in
an appropriate case, call for the use of a term of probation instead of imprisonment.”
Id. The Senate Report gave several examples suggesting how the Commission might
recommend that these and other offender characteristics be considered to mitigate the
kind or length of sentences. See id. at 171-74 & nn.410-11.
149
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1988).
150
Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180,
182 (1999).
151
For example, in United States v. Lara, the Second Circuit upheld a departure
based on the defendant’s “diminutive size [and] immature appearance,” after he was
sexually victimized and subsequently placed in solitary confinement for his protection.
905 F.2d 599, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1990). The Commission responded by immediately issuing an amended policy statement asserting that “[p]hysical appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant” in deciding whether to depart. U.S. SENTENCING
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The first Commission also created unnecessarily severe rules.
Though not required by statute to do so, the Commission linked
guideline ranges for drug offenses to the two mandatory minimum
152
punishment levels specified in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
added two severity levels to induce defendants to “plead guilty or
153
otherwise cooperate with authorities,” and spread the quantity-based
punishment scheme across seventeen levels.154 The effect was to more
than double the average time served by federal drug offenders and to
massively expand the federal prison population over the next twenty
155
The Commission also created a “relevant conduct” guideline
years.
that required punishment for separate uncharged, dismissed, and
acquitted crimes at the same rate as if charged in an indictment and

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 policy statement (1991). In response to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Floyd that a disadvantaged childhood could justify a
downward departure, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099-100 (9th Cir. 1991), the Commission issued
a policy statement asserting that a defendant’s “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds” for
departure. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 policy statement (1992).
The Commission also prohibited departure based on post-sentencing rehabilitation.
Id. § 5K2.19 policy statement (2000). In doing so, it effectively overruled seven courts
of appeals. See United States v. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2000); United
States v. Rudolph, 190 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Roberts, No. 988037, 1999 WL 13073, at *6-7 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999); United States v. Green, 152
F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rhodes, 145 F.3d 1375, 1379 (D.C. Cir.
1998); United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Sally, 116
F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, employment-related contributions, prior good
works, and military, civic, charitable and public service were all deemed “not ordinarily
relevant.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 policy statement (1991).
This amendment was also a “response to court decisions.” Simplification Draft Paper:
Departures and Offender Characteristics, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION (Nov. 1996), http://
www.ussc.gov/Research/Working_Group_Reports/Simplification/depart.htm.
152
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 49 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW];
see also Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
153
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 148 (1995).
154
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2011).
155
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 47-48, 53-54, 76. The federal prison population, not including those in community corrections centers or home confinement, grew from 35,781 in 1985 to 179,220 in 2005, a 400% increase. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.
6.13.2009 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6132009.pdf.

Baron-Evans FINAL_v2.docx (DO NOT DELETE)6/13/2012 1:05 PM

2012]

Booker Rules

1661
156

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule, which argua157
bly is contrary to the SRA’s most basic instructions, provided prosecutors with the power to obtain or threaten to obtain enormous
sentences, to pursue or avoid in their sole discretion, causing unwar158
In addition, the Commission recranted and hidden disparities.
ommended that the facts driving the decades-long sentences often
mandated by the guidelines be easy to prove, announcing its “belie[f]”
that the preponderance of the evidence standard was “appropriate to
159
meet due process requirements.” This recommendation was adopted
over the objection of the Judicial Conference, which advised the
Commission that setting minimum constitutional standards was beyond
160
The Commission also created a severe guideline for
its authority.
161
third-time offenders (the “career offender” guideline), as directed by
162
Congress, but much broader in scope than the statute required.163

156

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2011).
The Commission was to take into account “the circumstances under which the
offense was committed” and “the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense.”
SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 994(c)(2)–(3), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2)–(3) (2006)) (emphasis added).
158
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 86-87 (noting that the relevant
conduct rule is applied inconsistently because of “discomfort with the role of law
enforcement in establishing relevant conduct, and discomfort with the severity of sentences that often result”); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714-15 (1992)
(arguing that the relevant conduct rule, “contrary to the Commission’s rationale, . . .
enhances rather than reduces the power of the prosecutor,” allows “a prosecutor to increase an offender’s sentence more easily by dropping charges than by bringing them,”
results in “presentencing guideline manipulation,” “reduces visibility and candor in sentencing,” and is a “disaster for guidelines that purport to reduce unwarranted disparity”); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 501, 535, 540, 557 (1992) (describing the key role the relevant conduct rule plays
in plea negotiations and noting that Commission’s study found “circumvention” of the
guidelines based on prosecutors’ personal sense of justice that “produces arguably just
results” in some cases but is “hidden and unsystematic” and “obscures accountability”).
159
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 policy statement cmt. (2011).
160
See Wolf & Broderick, supra note 74, at 278 (“We suggest that the development
of sentencing procedures are beyond the Commission’s statutory authority, and that
difficult questions of procedural fairness are best left to resolution through traditional
case-by-case adjudication.”).
161
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2 (1989).
162
SRA § 994(h), 98 Stat. at 2021 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
157
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The Commission ignored Congress’s directive to recommend probation for first offenders not convicted of a violent or otherwise serious
164
offense, and instead required imprisonment in the vast majority of
cases, contrary to Congress’s intent that probation and intermediate
165
sanctions be broadly available under the guidelines.
The environment in which these radical measures were instituted
166
was not only “information free,” but also highly politicized and far
167
from neutral. In the very first amendment cycle, the Justice Department’s ex officio Commissioner persuaded four of six voting Commis-

163

See Amy Baron-Evans et al., Deconstructing the Career Offender Guideline, 2 CHARL. REV. 39, 51 (2010).
164
See SRA § 994( j), 98 Stat. at 2022 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994( j)).
165
Congress directed the Commission to promulgate a guideline for the use of the
courts in determining “whether to impose a sentence of probation, a fine, or a term
of imprisonment.” Id. § 994(a)(1)(A), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a)(1)(A)) (emphasis added). The Commission was also to ensure that the guidelines recommended a “sentence other than imprisonment” for first offenders not convicted of a violent or otherwise serious offense. Id. § 994( j), 98 Stat. at 2022 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994( j)). Congress required judges to consider the “kinds of sentences
available” by statute, id. sec. 212(a), § 3553(a)(3), 98 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984)), authorized them to impose probation for most offenses,
id. §§ 3559(a), 3561(a), 98 Stat. at 1991-92 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a), 3561(a)
(2006)), and directed them to consider probation, fines, imprisonment, and any combination thereof. See id. §§ 3551, 3561(a), 3562–3564, 98 Stat. at 1988, 1992-94 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3561(a), 3562–3564).
The Commission did not promulgate a guideline for courts to use to determine
whether to impose prison, probation, or a fine, and did not implement the first offender
directive. Instead, it implemented a zone system requiring straight prison for the vast
majority of offenders, requiring some confinement for offenders with a guideline range
greater than 0-6 months and up to 10-16 months, and permitting straight probation
only for offenders with a guideline range of 0-6 months. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (1992); id. § 5C1.1.
166
Block, supra note 71, at 453.
167
See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 765 (2005)
(“[T]he Sentencing Commission was a highly politicized agency from the outset.”);
Breyer, supra note 149, at 8 (“Some compromises were forced upon the Commission . . . by the fact that the Commission was appointed by politically responsible officials and is therefore, at least to some degree, a ‘political’ body.”); Michael Tonry,
Federal Sentencing Can Be Made More Just, if the Sentencing Commission Wants to Make It So,
12 FED. SENT’G REP. 83, 83 (1999) (noting that the Commission “chose . . . to view the
Department of Justice and conservative members of Congress as its primary constituency,”
while “federal judges were not well-integrated into the federal [guideline] development
process”).
LOTTE

Baron-Evans FINAL_v2.docx (DO NOT DELETE)6/13/2012 1:05 PM

2012]

Booker Rules

1663

sioners to increase fraud penalties—a move described by former
Commissioner Block as inflicting “gratuitous punishment” for reasons
168
At the same time, the
that were “overtly political and inexpert.”
Commission sought to suppress reasoned criticism of its policies by the
judges who applied them, going so far as to prohibit “dissatisfaction”
with the guidelines as a ground for departure.169
Without the balancing influence of the views of Article III judges (or
line prosecutors) who had to apply the Commission’s policies in real
cases, “Main Justice” in Washington, backed by its allies in Congress,
170
dominated the Commission’s agenda and specific outcomes. By failing to act neutrally or expertly, the Commission undermined its own
171
legitimacy and invited ongoing political interference.
Thus, until
recently, nearly all of the Commission’s amendments increased the
severity of punishment or restricted judicial departures, many in response to congressional directives, but most initiated by the Commis172
sion itself, frequently at the instance of the Department of Justice.

168

Parker & Block, supra note 76, at 318-20.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 policy statement cmt. (1995);
see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 policy statement cmt. background (2003) (“Departures were never intended to permit sentencing courts to substitute their policy judgments for those of Congress and the Sentencing Commission.”).
170
See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319-20 (2005) (“[T]he power to make and
influence sentencing rules has migrated away from the judiciary, from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and even from local federal prosecutors, toward political actors in
Congress and the central administration of the Department of Justice.”); see also Kate
Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE
L.J. 1420, 1440-43 (2008) (discussing how Main Justice used mandatory guidelines to
centralize control over sentencing).
171
See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a
Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 221 (2005); see also Jeffrey
S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; or, Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1025 (2001) (noting that
had the Commission “developed a guidelines system based upon coherent principles,
then Congress may not have perceived the need to intervene so frequently and in such
minute detail”); Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043,
1044, 1103-04 (2003) (contending that “the Commission’s failure to confront sentencing purposes” has rendered it a “weak institution” susceptible to political influence and
“Congressional meddling” and without “independent legitimacy”).
172
Through 2009, the Commission promulgated 737 amendments, set forth in an
appendix spanning nearly 1400 pages, with the large majority making substantive
169
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The concentration of power over sentencing in the executive
173
branch increased with the 2003 enactment of the PROTECT Act.
On March 11, 2003, an Associate Deputy Attorney General appeared
before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security to complain that the rate of downward departures not sponsored by the government had increased as the result of the Supreme
174
Court’s decision in Koon. Justice Department officials drafted legislation to implement their twin goals of reducing judicial discretion and
increasing prosecutorial power and enlisted freshman Congressman
175
On March 27, 2003, Congressman
Tom Feeney to introduce it.
176
Feeney, who said he was just the “messenger,” introduced the
amendment along with the Department’s message: judges were “arbitrarily deviating from the sentencing guidelines . . . based on their per177
sonal biases and prejudices, resulting in wide disparity in sentencing,”
as shown by an alleged fifty percent increase in downward departures
not based on substantial assistance to the government over the preced178
ing five years.

changes, often to several guidelines or policy statements at once. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2011). During this same period, Congress issued ninetyeight directives suggesting or requiring increased severity. Sentencing Res. Counsel
Project, Congressional Directives to Sentencing Commission 1988–2011, OFF. DEFENDER
SERVICES, 1-203 (Nov. 2011), http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/SRC%20directives%20Table
%20November%202011.pdf. Until recently, nearly all substantive amendments increased severity or removed grounds for departure. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL app. C. For recent notable exceptions to this trend of increasing severity, see
infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
173
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
174
See The Child Abduction Prevent Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 15-18 (2003)
(statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.).
175
See H. REP. NO. 108-66, at 58-59 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); see also Daniel Richman,
Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J.
1374, 1388 (2008).
176
Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, U.S. Prosecutors to Report, Appeal Short Sentences by
Federal Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1.
177
149 CONG. REC. 7643 (2003).
178
Id. at 9081.
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On April 30, 2003, a version of the Feeney Amendment to the
179
PROTECT Act was enacted into law. The new provision ordered the
Commission to “substantially reduce[]” the incidence of judicial down180
ward departures.
At the same time, it required the Commission to
create a new “early disposition” (or “fast track”) downward departure,
solely in districts designated by the Attorney General and solely upon
motion of the prosecutor, to induce defendants to swiftly waive a variety
181
The Feeney Amendment also replaced
of rights and plead guilty.
the by-now-vestigial “unreasonableness” standard of review for departures with a stricter standard that fortified and codified the holdings in
182
The new standard required reversal if the basis
Williams and Koon.
for departure was “not authorized under section 3553(b)” and also
required de novo review of the district court’s application of the guide183
lines to the facts. The Feeney Amendment had its intended result: “a
transfer of even more plea-bargaining power from judges to prosecu184
tors, resulting in higher sentences on prosecutors’ terms.”
Later, it came to light that the Department’s claim that Koon had
caused a significant increase in judicial departures was false. In October 2003, the Commission reported that while there had been an increase in the rate of non-substantial assistance downward departures,
this began well before Koon was decided and was primarily attributable
to an increase in government sponsored downward departures, mainly
185
in immigration and drug cases on the border.
Excluding border

179

PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 650, at 675.
Id.
181
Id.; see also Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys,
Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or “Fast-Track”
Prosecution Program in a District (Sept. 22, 2003) (stating that in order to qualify for a
fast track disposition, a defendant must enter into an expedited agreement to plead guilty
and waive his rights to file pretrial motions, to appeal, and to challenge the legality of
his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “except on the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel”), in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 135 (2003).
182
PROTECT Act § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)); see also
supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
183
PROTECT Act § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670.
184
Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power
to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 308 (2004).
185
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 53-65 (2003).
180
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districts, the rate of downward departures was the same before and
186
From the early
after Koon and had even declined in recent years.
1990s until 2003, the Commission had reported a large and growing
number of government sponsored departures in the same category
with judge-initiated departures; the only departures it identified as
187
government sponsored were those for cooperation with authorities.
This gave the impression that the increasing rate of “other” downward
departures was the result of judicial discretion, when in fact it was the
188
Unfortunately, while the Commisresult of prosecutorial discretion.
sion had become aware at some point that the rate of “other” downward
departures had been increasing since 1992 due to government189
initiated departures, it did not correct the way in which it publicly
190
reported departure data until after the PROTECT Act was passed.

186

Id. at 54-56, 60.
Through 2002, the Commission reported only two categories of downward departures: “substantial assistance departure[s]” and “other downward departure[s].” See,
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.26 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 SOURCEBOOK]. The Sentencing Commission publishes
annual Sourcebooks, which are available on the Commission’s website. Data and Statistics,
U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2012).
188
After receiving comments from the Judicial Conference expressing concern that
the Commission’s “approach to reporting the data has resulted in confusion, misinformation, and misuse by some who mistakenly infer that all ‘other downward’ departures
are attributable to judges” and “may have prompted the enactment of the PROTECT
Act,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that the Commission’s “data
are not recorded, coded, or reported in ways that clearly delineate other downward
departures due to judicial discretion from those due to prosecutorial discretion” and
that the Commission’s “other” departure category, which had been “generally thought
to represent judicial discretion,” included a significant proportion of government
sponsored departures, and suggested that changes to the way the Commission reports
“other” departures would be beneficial. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO04-105, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES: DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1999–2001, at 4, 11, 22-23, 24, 26, 64,
app. IV at 67, app. VI at 78-79 (2003).
189
See Oversight of the United States Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being
Followed? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 20-22, 38 (2002) (statement of John R. Steer, Vice-Chair, U.S.
Sentencing Commission).
190
Following the enactment of the PROTECT Act, the Commission reported that
after subtracting government-initiated downward departures, the 2001 rate of “other”
downward departures was reduced from 18.1% to 10.9%. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
supra note 185, at 60. In 2003 and 2004, the Commission separated the “other downward
187
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To one astute and long-time observer, the PROTECT Act simply
“followed the pattern of the previous twenty years—jeering disparities
created by judges while cheering those created by prosecutors,” and
confirmed that “[i]ncreasing prosecutorial power and the severity of
criminal punishments was not the unintended consequence of Guidelines
191
designed to reduce sentencing disparity,” but “the point all along.”
This may have pleased key factions within the Department of Justice in
the short term, but it damaged respect for law and ignited widespread
suspicion about the bona fides of the entire project of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.
II. THE SUCCESS OF THE ADVISORY GUIDELINES SYSTEM
In United States v. Booker and subsequent decisions, the Supreme
Court has “reset the balance of authority in federal sentencing.”192 The
193
Court has dismantled not only the provisions of the PROTECT Act,
but also the Commission’s previous restrictions on judicial discretion
194
that were contrary to or not required by the SRA. It has encouraged

departures” category into “government sponsored” and “other” downward departures.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.26A (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26A (2003) [hereinafter 2003
SOURCEBOOK]. Since Booker, the Commission has reported government sponsored
below-guideline sentences as § 5K1.1 (substantial assistance), § 5K3.1 (fast track), or
“other.” See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK].
191
Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 116 (2005) (emphasis added).
192
Stith, supra note 170, at 1477.
193
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005) (severing and excising
§ 3553(b) and § 3742(e)); see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1243-46 (2011)
(severing and excising § 3742(g)(2)).
194
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007) (stating that courts may find
that “the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or . . . do not generally treat certain
defendant characteristics in the proper way”); id. at 364-65 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that offender characteristics “not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines”
are “matters that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing judge to consider”); see also Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241-44, 1247-50 (holding that district courts may consider evidence of
post-sentencing rehabilitation in varying from the guideline range, despite a policy
statement prohibiting departure on that ground); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
56-60 (2007) (upholding a variance based on offender characteristics that are relevant
to the purposes of sentencing, though disapproved by policy statements).

Baron-Evans FINAL_v2.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1668

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/13/2012 1:05 PM

[Vol. 160: 1631
195

the Commission to act as the neutral expert body it was created to be
and to review and revise its guidelines based on what it learns from the
196
The Court has limited the ways
courts that apply them in practice.
in which the political branches and the Commission can restrict,
should they wish to do so, the sentencing authority of Article III judges
and has brought greater balance and transparency to the Commission’s
rulemaking.
Judges must treat the advisory guideline range as the “starting
point and the initial benchmark,” but must also consider all relevant
circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the defendant, in197
cluding factors the guidelines omit, prohibit, or discourage.
Policy
statements that disapprove consideration of individualized circumstances relevant under § 3553(a) may not be elevated over such rele198
vant factors and may be freely disregarded.
Judges may also vary from the guideline range based on a policy
disagreement, that is, a decision that the guideline recommendation
embodies a policy judgment that fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing, apart from any case-specific facts that might otherwise justify a
variance.199 The Court made clear in Cunningham v. California that the

195

See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (describing the Commission’s “characteristic institutional role” as its capacity to “base its determinations on
empirical data and national experience” (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d
1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring))).
196
The major theme of Booker and its progeny is that sentencing judges may impose
sentences outside the guideline range where doing so would better achieve the purposes
of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that the courts’ reasoned judgments
will assist the Commission in reviewing and revising the guidelines.
197
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50; see also id. at 53-60 (reviewing the factors considered
by the district court and concluding that based on these factors the sentence was
reasonable).
198
See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1247-50 (explaining that policy statements that prohibit
consideration of factors that are highly relevant to the purposes of sentencing cannot
be elevated above such relevant factors, and that instead the court must give “appropriate weight” to the factors); Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60 (upholding a variance based on factors relevant to the purposes of sentencing that had been deemed never or not
ordinarily relevant by policy statements, without addressing the policy statements or
requiring courts to address them). Justice Alito has expressed a view that judges should
give “some significant weight” to policy statements, id. at 68 (Alito, J., dissenting), but
no other member of the Court has agreed with this view.
199
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101-02.
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200

availability of this type of variance is constitutionally required.
In
Rita v. United States, meanwhile, the Court held that courts may not
employ a “legal presumption” that the guidelines should apply and
hence may consider arguments that “the Guidelines sentence itself
201
In Kimbrough v.
fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.”
United States, the Court reiterated that “courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.”202 The Court held that, since “the cocaine
Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only,” it “would not
be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a
sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes,
203
even in a mine-run case.” Similarly, the Court held in Pepper v. United
States that a district court may “disagree[] with the Commission’s views”
regarding the relevance of offender characteristics, particularly where
those “views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflect204
ed in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.”
The judicial check on the Commission that has arisen from Booker
and subsequent decisions resembles judicial review of the rules of other
205
federal agencies, but it differs in important respects. Under the

200

See 549 U.S. 270, 278-81, 292-93 (2007) (invalidating California’s guidelines system because, unlike the federal system, it required a sentence to a specified term unless
the court found case-specific “facts” about the offense or the offender and did not authorize a sentence outside the specified term based on a “policy judgment” in light of
the “[g]eneral objectives of sentencing”); see also id. at 304-08 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(disputing the majority’s conclusion that the California system did not allow courts to
sentence outside the specified term based on “policy considerations” such as the purposes of sentencing).
201
551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).
202
552 U.S. at 101-02 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).
203
Id. at 91, 109-10; see also Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009)
(“[D]istrict courts are entitled to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines in a mine-run
case where there are no ‘particular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a variance from the Guidelines’ sentencing range.”).
204
131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011).
205
For example, in a recent APA decision invalidating as “arbitrary and capricious”
a rule promulgated by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals, the Court used language
similar to that in Kimbrough and Pepper in holding that the rule was “unmoored from
the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws,” and stated that it could not “discern a reason for it.” Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 490 (2011).
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judicial review afforded by the APA, an agency’s interpretation of a
206
relevant statute is given “controlling weight” in some circumstances.
In contrast, district courts may never assume that a guideline sentence
207
complies with § 3553(a), and neither district courts nor courts of
208
appeals may presume that a non-guideline sentence is unreasonable.
A court of appeals may apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to a guideline sentence, but this is rooted in deference to the dis209
trict court, not to the Commission, and it does not reflect the sort of
deference “that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway
to an expert agency than to a district judge.”210 If it were otherwise, the
guidelines would again have a mandatory character and hence would
be unconstitutional. On the other hand, a court’s conclusion that a
guideline is unsound does not (as it would under APA review) result in
211
District courts
the guideline being held “unlawful and set aside.”
must still treat the guideline range as the “starting point and the initial
212
benchmark” in each case but may vary from that range to reach a

206

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
207
See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (“The Guidelines are not
only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable.”);
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007) (“[T]he district judge . . . may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.”).
208
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (“[T]he approaches we reject come too close to creating
an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354-55 (2007) (“The fact that we
permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that
courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness.”).
209
In Rita, the Court explained that
the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the
Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.
551 U.S. at 347; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 40 (noting that Rita permitted the appeals
court to presume reasonableness “when a district judge’s discretionary decision in a particular case accords with the sentence the [Commission] deems appropriate” (emphasis added)).
210
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
211
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
212
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49).
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sentence that they find better achieves the purposes of sentencing,
214
subject to review for procedural and substantive reasonableness.
Booker has thus created a dialogue between the courts and the
Commission that has, for the first time in the Commission’s history,
made possible the “continuous evolution helped by the sentencing
215
courts and courts of appeals” that the SRA’s framers envisioned.216
The Commission can persuade the courts to follow the guidelines
through “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
217
to control.” And the courts can persuade the Commission to revise
guidelines that they find to be unsound by varying from them and
218
explaining why.
Recall that, before Booker, judges were not permitted to depart based
on dissatisfaction with the guidelines, no matter how well-founded
219
their dissatisfaction or how ill-considered the guideline. Thus, for
example, judges were not permitted to depart based on disagreement
with the crack guidelines, even after the Commission itself found that
the 100-to-1 powder-to-crack ratio required excessive punishment and
created unwarranted disparity, because these problems were “typical”

213

See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1242-43 (2011); Kimbrough, 552 U.S.
at 110-11; Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
214
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
215
Rita, 551 U.S. at 350.
216
See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
217
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing the bases on
which courts may accord deference to an agency’s nonlegislative rules); cf. Stith &
Dunn, supra note 171, at 232 (“Booker makes the Sentencing Guidelines nonlegislative,
and Mead uses broad language in holding that nonlegislative agency rules are entitled
to less deference [under Skidmore] than regulations that have the force of law.”).
218
See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58 (“[T]he sentencing judge[’s] . . . reasoned sentencing judgment, resting upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through
§ 3553(a)’s list of factors . . . should help the Guidelines constructively evolve over
time.”); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“[T]he Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing
Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court sentencing decisions,
undertaking research, and revising the Guidelines accordingly.”).
219
See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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220

of all crack cases and thus within the guidelines’ “heartland.”
If a
judge disagreed with the punishment required by a guideline based on
the Commission’s own research or based on her experience in sentencing hundreds of defendants every year, she was unable to act upon
that disagreement. Although the courts of appeals occasionally called
upon the Commission to amend unsound guidelines, they nonetheless
221
enforced those guidelines and thus were easily ignored.
Booker has been transformative simply by permitting the courts to
communicate with the Commission (and with each other) in a transparent and effective manner. Supreme Court and lower court decisions have moved the Commission to revise a number of guidelines
and to use its expertise to persuade Congress to revise its own unsound
policies. The most well-known example is the reform of penalties for
crack cocaine. The Commission began exposing the excessive harshness and unwarranted disparity built into the crack cocaine guidelines
222
The courts were nonetheless required to follow those
in 1995.
guidelines because the unjust disparity was not a permissible ground
223
After
for departure under the Commission’s departure standard.
Booker, judges more frequently imposed reduced sentences in crack
cases, some based on individualized circumstances and others on the

220

See In re Sealed Case, 292 F.3d 913, 914-16 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v.
Canales, 91 F.3d 363, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 90 F.3d 302, 304-06
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996).
221
See, e.g., United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding
a career offender sentence predicated on a “pure recklessness” crime, but “recommend[ing] that the Commission consider a return to the original Guideline definition
of ‘crime of violence,’ adopted by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 16, or else in some other
way exclude pure recklessness crimes from the category of predicate crimes for career
offender status”); see also id. at 875 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I fully agree that the broad
definition of a ‘crime of violence’ in [guideline] § 4B1.2(1) merits reexamination by
the Sentencing Commission.”); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir.
1995) (sharing Parson’s concerns and calling upon Commission to reevaluate the
guideline); United States v. Stubler, 271 F. App’x 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (reluctantly
following Parson in a case involving reckless endangerment and noting that while Parson had “questioned the wisdom of the possibly inadvertent adoption of a definition for
‘crime of violence’ that can include offenses that do not involve the intentional use of
force . . . neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission has seen fit to revise that
definition” (citation omitted)).
222
See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 153.
223
See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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224

unjustified severity of the guideline itself.
The circuits split on
225
whether the latter was permissible, and the Supreme Court granted
226
certiorari. In January 2007, two of the original sponsors of the SRA,
Senators Kennedy and Hatch, along with Senator Feinstein, filed an
amicus brief in the Supreme Court, urging the Court to permit judges
to disagree with unsound policies reflected in the guidelines, includ227
228
Citing these developments, the
ing the crack/powder disparity.
Commission took the next step: it voted to reduce the crack guidelines by two levels (to include but no longer to exceed mandatory minimum punishment levels) and urged Congress to take further action
because it considered the amendment an incomplete solution to an
229
“urgent and compelling” problem. The Supreme Court then decided
230
Kimbrough v. United States, and courts began varying from the crack
231
guidelines more often. On April 29, 2009, the Administration urged

224

See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 126-31, 131 n.343 (explaining that, as of
2006, below-range sentences for crack cocaine increased from 4.3% of cases in the year
before Booker to 14.7% after Booker).
225
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 115-22 (2007) (noting the circuit split, that several cases
were pending on petition for certiorari, and that certiorari had been granted in
Claiborne v. United States).
226
Claiborne v. United States, 549 U.S. 1016 (2006).
227
Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch, and Dianne
Feinstein in Support of Affirmance, Claiborne v. United States, 551 U.S. 87 (2007) (No.
06-5618), 2007 WL 197103. After petitioner Mario Claiborne died, thus mooting the
case, the Court granted review in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007), and
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
228
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 225, at 115-22.
229
72 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 28,572-73 (May 21, 2007).
230
552 U.S. 85; see also supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
231
See Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker Restored Balance? A Look at Data on Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 326, 331 (2011) (reporting that, in fiscal year 2009,
57.1% of crack defendants without trumping mandatory minimums were sentenced
below the guideline range); 2008–2010 USSC Monitoring Datasets (revealing that the
rate of below-range sentences in all crack cases increased from 43.8% in 2008, to 51%
in 2009, to 60.4% in 2010). For a description of the Commission’s annual Monitoring
Datasets, see FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, app. D at 1, and U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2010/2011 GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS AND RESOURCES 26-28 (2010), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/Publications/2010_Guide_to_Publications_and_Resources.pdf.
Datasets for each fiscal year can be obtained from the Commission eighteen to twentyfour months after the conclusion of the fiscal year, and can be analyzed with a specialized software package.
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Congress to eliminate the crack/powder disparity, and noted that until
a comprehensive solution was implemented in the form of legislation
and amended guidelines, prosecutors would “inform courts that they
should act within their discretion to fashion a sentence that is con232
sistent with the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” On August 3, 2010,
Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the
100-to-1 powder-to-crack quantity ratio to 18-to-1 and directed the
233
Commission to reduce guideline penalties accordingly. Thus, Booker
and what followed in the courts prompted the Commission to take
direct action in 2007, and contributed to the confluence of events that
led Congress to take further action in 2010—fifteen years after the
Commission first sought to amend the crack guidelines.
The Commission has revised other guidelines in response to sentencing data and reasons in recent amendment cycles.234 The Commission is planning a report to Congress regarding the guideline
applicable to possession of child pornography, a guideline that both
235
And the
courts and prosecutors find to be highly problematic.
Commission recently announced that it intends to address problems
with the fraud guideline in response to high rates of below-guideline
sentences, both non-government sponsored and government spon236
sored, in certain kinds of cases.

232

Restoring Fairness to Federal Sentencing: Addressing the Crack-Powder Disparity: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 101
(2009) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen.).
233
Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; id. § 8, 124 Stat. at 2374.
234
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 742 (Nov. 1,
2010) (eliminating “recency” points from the criminal history score, citing frequent
below-guideline sentences in cases in which recency points were added to the criminal
history score); id. amend. 738 (Nov. 1, 2010) (expanding slightly the availability of
alternatives to straight imprisonment, citing judicial feedback); id. amend. 754 (Nov. 1,
2011) (reducing large increases under the illegal reentry guideline based on stale prior
convictions, citing appellate decisions finding unwarranted uniformity in requiring the
same increase regardless of the age of the conviction).
235
See 76 Fed. Reg. 58,564, 58,564 (Sept. 21, 2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 1 n.4, 8, 41-54 (2009); Letter
from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, Dep’t of Justice, to
Chief Judge William K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 6 ( June 28, 2010).
236
See 77 Fed. Reg. 2778, 2780, 2783 ( Jan. 19, 2012); Public Meeting Minutes, U.S.
SEN’T COMMISSION ( Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120110/Meeting_Minutes.pdf.
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Booker has also allowed the courts to share “principles of general
applicability” with each other, and in turn, to communicate more effectively with the Commission regarding whether the guidelines fulfill
237
the purposes of sentencing. Freed of the stunted departure standard
and the restrictive standard of review, district courts consider wellreasoned decisions of other district courts and courts of appeals in
238
other circuits regarding the soundness of particular guidelines. And
courts of appeals have held that district courts must consider nonfrivolous arguments raised by a party based on relevant analysis provided by
239
other courts. In this manner, courts are now engaged in an ongoing,
national conversation regarding sentencing policy and practice, and
240
are providing valuable feedback to the Commission in the process.
Sentencing in cases involving the guideline for possession of child
pornography illustrates the enormously influential effect of reasoned
241
judicial decisions across districts and circuits, which has produced
242
aggregate data that the Commission is taking into account.

237

See Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch, and
Dianne Feinstein, supra note 227, at 22-25.
238
See, e.g., United States v. Shull, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2011)
(agreeing with the analysis from the Northern District of Iowa regarding the unsoundness of the current crack guidelines, and adopting a one-to-one ratio in crack cases
(citing United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 891-92 (N.D. Iowa 2011))).
239
See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 958, 963 & n.4 (9th Cir.
2011) (reversing for failure to address a challenge to the child pornography guideline
after setting forth an extensive analysis and agreeing with principles stated by other
courts of appeals); United States v. Davy, 433 F. App’x 343, 349-52 (6th Cir. 2011) (reversing for failure to consider a challenge to the stolen-gun enhancement under
§ 2K2.1, with reference to a decision from the Eastern District of New York (citing
United States v. Handy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 437, 478-80 (E.D.N.Y. 2008))).
240
As Professor Berman observed five years before Booker, the SRA’s framers expected that “judges would share—with each other and with the Sentencing Commission—case-specific insights on sentencing policy and practice and thereby contribute to
the development of principled and purposeful sentencing law.” Douglas A. Berman,
Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 88 (2000). But “the ‘heartland’ and
‘abuse of discretion’ standards,” as described in Koon, “devalued departure authority as
a means for judicial contribution to the evolution of the sentencing law under the
Guidelines.” Id. “Lost along the way was an appreciation of departures as a mechanism
through which judges could provide meaningful feedback concerning the Guidelines
as they related to the fundamental purposes of punishment.” Id. at 71.
241
See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, No. 09-0024, 2011 WL 890502, at *5, *16 (D.
Me. Mar. 11, 2011) (citing nonbinding decisions from other circuits and districts re-
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As the Commission improves the guidelines, judges follow them
243
244
more often, as the Supreme Court predicted they would. Moreover,
as transparency has increased, the Justice Department’s influence on
the Commission has lessened somewhat, and Booker has had a salutary
influence on some of the Department’s own policies. Attorney General
Eric Holder has recognized that “equal justice depends on individualized justice,” and accordingly has authorized prosecutors to request
variances based on the purposes and factors set forth in § 3553(a),
with supervisory approval.245 Further, the Department has now required
United States Attorneys in all districts to implement an early disposition (“fast track”) program for illegal reentry cases, noting that the
availability of such departures in some districts but not others had

flecting “judicial disquiet” with the child pornography guideline, and quoting the First
Circuit’s “cautionary coda” in United States v. Stone that the child pornography “guidelines . . . are in our judgment harsher than necessary” (quoting 575 F.3d 83, 97 (1st Cir.
2009))); United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing eight
decisions from districts in other circuits in support of its conclusion that the child pornography guideline produces sentences greater than necessary to achieve sentencing
purposes); United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 892, 901 (E.D. Tenn.
2009) (relying on the analyses of “[c]ourts across the country” and deciding to sentence the defendant below the guideline range because “the child pornography Guidelines do not fully describe the current sentencing practices of district courts or adequately
differentiate between the least and worst offenders”).
242
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
243
After increasing nearly every quarter through fiscal year 2010, the overall rate of
non-government sponsored below-guideline sentences began to drop during the first
quarter of fiscal year 2011, concurrent with the reduction in the crack guidelines on
November 1, 2010. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT: 1ST Q UARTER RELEASE 12 tbl.4 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT] (showing a decrease from 18.7% in the fourth quarter of 2010 to 17.5% in
the first quarter of 2012).
244
See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007) (“[A]dvisory Guidelines
combined with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practices will help to ‘avoid excessive sentencing disparities.’” (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005))). Justice Scalia
explained in Rita v. United States that as the Commission “perform[s] its function of
revising the Guidelines to reflect the desirable sentencing practices of the district
courts . . . district courts will have less reason to depart from the Commission’s recommendations.” 551 U.S. 338, 382-83 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 218.
245
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors (May
19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf.
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246

generated concern about unwarranted disparity.
That concern had
247
been raised by the courts through variances made possible by Booker.
And what effect has loosening the hold of the guidelines had on
sentencing outcomes? In our judgment, no one can honestly say that
judges have been unduly lenient. One year after Booker, when the
guidelines were still being widely enforced, judges sentenced below
248
the guideline range in 12.5% of cases, an increase from 10.9% in
249
2001 when the guidelines were mandatory. In fiscal year 2011—four
years after the Supreme Court made clear in Gall that judges may consider all relevant circumstances, including those placed off limits by
the Commission’s policy statements, and in Rita and Kimbrough that
250
judges may discount unsound guidelines —the rate of sentences
251
below the guideline range had risen to only 17.4%. The low rate of
below-range sentences is even more remarkable in light of the near
absence of mitigating factors in the guidelines and the one-way upward ratchet in guideline penalties over the years, which the Commission has just begun to address. When judges do depart or vary, the
median decrease remains, as it was before Booker, exceedingly mod252
est—about twelve months. And average sentence length for all cases
is, and has remained since Booker, about ten months below the average
253
Average sentence length was roughly forty-six
guideline range.

246

Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys 2 ( Jan.
31, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf.
247
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485 (10th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 707-10 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. CamachoArellano, 614 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d
142 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 228 (1st Cir. 2008).
248
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 47.
249
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 60 (2003).
250
See supra notes 194, 197-99.
251
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl.N (2011) [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK].
252
See, e.g., 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.31A; 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 190, tbl.31A; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.31A-31D (2006); 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL S ENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.31A-31D (2008); 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbls.31A-31D;
2012 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 243, tbls.10-13.
253
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 32 fig.C
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT]; 2012 QUARTERLY DATA
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254

months before Booker and was forty-three months in the most recent
255
fiscal year. This small decrease is primarily attributable to variances
and lowered guideline ranges for crack cases and a large increase in
the number of immigration cases prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),
which has a statutory maximum of two years and a correspondingly low
256
guideline range. Average sentence length has remained the same or
257
slightly increased for all other important categories of offenses, except
258
that it has slightly decreased for marijuana offenses, and has substan259
260
tially increased for fraud offenses and child pornography offenses.
It appears that prosecutors, too, generally view the guidelines as
unduly harsh. The government moved for sentences below the guide261
line range in 26.3% of all cases in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, the
government either agreed to or did not oppose more than half of sentences the Commission classifies as “non-government sponsored below

REPORT, supra note 243, at 32 fig.C. Figures C through I of the quarterly data reports
graph average sentence length and average guideline minimum from fiscal year 2005
through the first quarter of fiscal year 2012.
254
The average sentence length was 46.8 months in 2001, 46.9 months in 2002,
47.9 months in 2003, 50.1 months in 2004 (pre-Blakely), 45 months in 2004 (postBlakely), and 46.3 months in 2005 (pre-Booker). See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13 (2001); 2002 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 187, tbl.13; 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.13; 2004 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 190, tbl.13; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF F EDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 SOURCEBOOK].
255
2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.13.
256
See 2010 FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 32 fig.C, 36 fig.G, 38
fig.I; 2012 QUARTERLY DATA R EPORT, supra note 243, at 32 fig.C, 36 fig.G, 38 fig.I.
257
See 2010 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 32-38 figs.C-I; 2012 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 32-38 figs.C-I. Average sentence length has
increased slightly for firearms offenses, alien smuggling offenses, and powder cocaine
offenses; has increased somewhat significantly for heroin offenses; and has remained
the same for methamphetamine offenses.
258
See 2010 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 38 fig.I; 2012 QUARTERLY
DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 38 fig.I.
259
See 2010 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 33 fig.D; 2012 QUARTERLY
DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 33 fig.D.
260
Compare 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.13 (reporting a mean sentence
of 119.1 months), with 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 254, § 2 tbl.13 (reporting a mean
sentence of 75 months before Booker), and id. § 3 tbl.13 (reporting a mean sentence of
78.6 months after Booker).
261
2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.N.
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262

range.”
And, although the government’s success rate on appeal is
roughly the same or better than before Booker, it appeals about the
263
same number of below-guideline sentences as it did before Booker.
Further, since the Attorney General’s May 2010 announcement that
prosecutors may request variances consistent with § 3553(a), the government has sought sentences below the guideline range for reasons
other than cooperation or fast track at an increasing rate, particularly
264
Inin cases in which the guidelines are most in need of revision.
deed, the decrease in recent years in government sponsored downward departures for cooperation may well be due to the ability of

262

This statistical inference is based on the following facts. First, the government did
not object to 44.5% of defense motions (3334 of 7488) for a below-range sentence classified as non-government sponsored in fiscal year 2011. Id. tbl.28A. Second, because
the statement-of-reasons form does not provide a checkbox for the court to indicate the
government’s position regarding reasons not addressed in a plea agreement or motion
by a party, there is no information regarding the government’s position on another
4664 below-range sentences, all of which are classified as non-government sponsored.
Id. Since defense attorneys generally raise all nonfrivolous grounds for below-range
sentences and judges do not raise meritless grounds sua sponte, it is likely that the government did not object to a significant portion of these sentences. Third, in 3030 other
cases classified as non-government sponsored below-range, the Commission did not
receive sufficient information to determine the government’s position or whether the
source was a plea agreement, a motion by a party, or something else. Id. Since a large
majority of cases for which information was available were sponsored or agreed to by
the government, it is reasonable to assume that the government sponsored or acquiesced in a significant portion of cases where information was not available. Together,
these cases easily exceed 50% of sentences classified as “non-government sponsored
below range.”
263
In fiscal year 2011, the government raised 92 issues on appeal; the government
prevailed in 65% of the 26 of those that involved § 3553(a) or a claim of unreasonableness. 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.58. In 1998, the government raised 122
issues on appeal; for the 41 of those that related to departures, it prevailed 63% of the
time. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl.56 (1998). In 1999, the government raised 54 issues on appeal; for the 25
related to departures, it prevailed 28% of the time. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.58 (1999). In 2003, under the
strict PROTECT Act standard of review, the government raised 176 issues on appeal;
for the 63 related to departures, it prevailed 73% of the time. 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 190, tbl.58.
264
The government sponsored below-guideline sentences for reasons other than
cooperation or fast track in 2.9% of cases in 2005 and in 4.4% of cases in 2011. Compare
2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 254, § 3 tbl.26, with 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251,
tbl.N. The rate was 14.7% in child pornography possession cases. Id. tbl.27.
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prosecutors to use other mechanisms to mitigate the harshness of
265
guideline sentences.
The observation of Professor Kevin Reitz, an expert on guidelines
systems, made soon after Booker still holds:
No member of Congress should work to overhaul the post-Booker
Guidelines on the theory that they herald a return to the bad old days of
fully discretionary judicial sentencing or on the theory that the new
“advisory” Guidelines are extremely permissive compared with norms in
guidelines sentencing systems nationwide. . . . [T]he Booker -ized Guidelines . . . remain as restrictive of judicial sentencing discretion as any sys266
tem in the United States.

Three-fourths of federal judges express agreement with the statement that the post-Booker advisory guidelines system “best achieves the
purposes of sentencing,” with only three percent preferring the pre267
Booker mandatory guidelines. Prosecutors also prefer advisory guidelines to other possible options, and the Department of Justice has thus
far followed their lead.268 The organized public and private defense
269
bars support the advisory guidelines system, as do organizations ded270
icated to fair and rational sentencing policy.

265

While the rate of cooperation departures has fallen from 15.5% in 2004 (before
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)) to 11.2% in 2011, the rate of government
sponsored fast track and other departures has grown from 6.4% in 2004 (before
Blakely) to 15.1% in 2011. See 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, § 2 tbl.26A; 2011
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.27.
266
Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155,
171 (2005).
267
See supra note 8. Fourteen percent believe the purposes of sentencing would be
best achieved by a system along the lines of Judge Sessions’s proposal, if coupled with
fewer mandatory minimums, which we analyze in Section IV.A, infra, while eight percent believe that having no guidelines at all would best achieve these purposes. Id.
268
Breuer, supra note 10, at 112 (noting that prosecutors “were not enthusiastic”
about a return to a mandatory guidelines structure and that the Department of Justice
“does not plan to seek legislative reinstatement of a mandatory Guidelines system”); cf.
Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 793 (2008) (noting that some line prosecutors welcome Booker,
as “a fair number of these assistants chafe at the Department’s insistence on draconian
penalties”).
269
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
270
Supporters include Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the ACLU, and the
Sentencing Project. See Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years After Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
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In sum, Booker and its progeny have established a measure of balance for the first time since the guidelines’ inception. Judges have
been remarkably restrained in exercising their discretion, and the
Commission—working with, instead of against, judges and educating
rather than automatically bowing to the harshest voices in Congress—
is beginning to fix broken guidelines. The Attorney General has directed federal prosecutors to comply with the new law of sentencing by
seeking sentences outside the guideline range when appropriate.271
Thus far, Congress has enacted fewer mandatory minimums and
issued fewer specific directives to the Commission after Booker than in
272
any other seven-year period since the guidelines went into effect.
To state the matter succinctly, there is no need for a Booker fix.
Booker was the fix.
III. THE UNCONVINCING RATIONALES FOR A BOOKER “FIX”
Judge Sessions observes that most sentences are within the guideline
range; that average sentence length has remained relatively constant;
and that, when judges depart or vary, the extent of the adjustments has
273
been “modest” and, indeed, slightly less than before Booker. Similarly,
the Commission observes that over eighty percent of sentences are
within the guideline range or pursuant to a government motion for a

& Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mary
Price, Vice President and General Counsel, Families Against Mandatory Minimums),
available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FAMM%20Testimony%20Booker
%20Hearing%2010-12-11.pdf; Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years After Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/
ACLU%20Sentencing%20Hearing%20Testimony%2010-12-11final.pdf; Mary Price, Vice
President and Gen. Counsel, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Statement Before
the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_FAMM.pdf;
Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., The Sentencing Project, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/
Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_Mauer.pdf.
271
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
272
See Study of Mandatory Minimums and Specific Directives (2011) (on file with
authors). The study, completed by the authors, catalogues mandatory minimum statutes and specific directives enacted from 1987 through 2011.
273
Sessions, supra note 12, at 316, 329.
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274

sentence outside the guideline range, and that the “clear linkage”
between guideline ranges and sentences imposed “demonstrates that
the guidelines . . . continue to work to guide the sentencing decisions
275
of federal judges.” Yet, Judge Sessions and the Commission both call
for a legislative fix. In support of their proposals, they claim that judges
create unwarranted disparities. These claims, however, rest on flawed
and incomplete data analyses. Moreover, Judge Sessions and the
Commission fail to acknowledge that much more troubling forms of
unwarranted disparity have been reduced as a result of Booker and
would be reintroduced by their proposals.
A. Disparities Under the Mandatory Guidelines
The SRA was largely motivated by the perception that the “unfettered discretion” the law conferred on judges in imposing sentences,
and on parole authorities in setting release dates, had resulted in wide,
276
Yet reexamination of the studies that purunwarranted disparities.
ported to show significant disparity in judicial sentencing decisions
before the guidelines revealed both that the data and methodologies
upon which these claims were based were flawed and that sentencing
outcomes generally corresponded to relevant differences in offenses
277
The most sophisticated studies of sentencing under
and offenders.
the mandatory guidelines found that interjudge disparity in average
sentence length fell by one month or less.278 The Commission viewed

274

The precise rate is 82.6%, including 54.5% within the range, 26.3% below the
range based on a government motion, and 1.8% above the range. 2011 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 251, tbl.N.
275
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 22.
276
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38-49, 74-75 (1983).
277
See DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? THE T RANSITION TO
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986–90, at 25-26 (1993) (“Differences clearly thought to
be unwarranted (e.g., by the offender’s race or ethnicity) were found to be uniformly
small or statistically insignificant.”); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 47, at 107 (“[T]he
more sophisticated the study, the less clear the evidence of unwarranted disparities.”
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 107-12 (discussing the flaws of the studies that most influenced Congress).
278
See James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 294
(1999) (finding that the average difference in sentence length fell from 4.9 months
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279

this reduction as “significant progress,” but others considered it to
be a sign of failure and not sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the
280
more problematic kinds of disparity that the guidelines introduced.
The Commission itself recognized that interjudge disparity is only one
form of disparity and that reducing interjudge disparity created and
281
left unchecked other kinds of disparity.
In fact, the guidelines created—and masked—much more troubling disparities. The new, harsher rules had a disproportionate impact on black offenders, and some of these rules were not necessary to
282
satisfy the legitimate purposes of sentencing.
Offenders who differed significantly in their culpability, danger to the public, risk of re283
cidivism, and rehabilitative needs were treated the same. Moreover,
the guideline range—assumed by many to be identical for similar
offenders convicted of similar offenses—can be, and is, calculated very
284
differently for any number of reasons, including happenstance, lack of
285
286
clarity in the guidelines, different interpretations of the guidelines,

before the guidelines to 3.9 months after the guidelines); Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 286-89 (1999) (finding that the average difference in sentence length fell
from 7.87 months before the guidelines to 7.61 months after the guidelines).
279
FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152, at 99.
280
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 191, at 89-100; see also Anderson, Kling & Stith,
supra note 278, at 301-04.
281
FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152, at 79-92, 131-35.
282
See id. at 131-34 (finding that the guidelines and mandatory minimums for crack
offenses as well as the use of prior drug trafficking convictions in the career offender
guideline have an adverse impact on black defendants and “serve no clear sentencing
purpose”).
283
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 851-70 (1992).
284
See, e.g., United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“To a considerable extent, the amount of loss caused by this crime is a kind of accident,
dependent as much on the diligence of the victim’s security procedures as on [the defendant’s] cupidity.”); Robert L. Hinkle, Dist. Judge, Statement Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20090210-11/Hinkle_statement.pdf (“By happenstance, one defendant provides information to the prosecutor first and benefits
from § 1B1.8, but a codefendant comes in later and thus faces a markedly higher
offense level.”).
285
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 50, 87 (explaining that the relevant
conduct rule is inconsistently applied, in part because of “ambiguity in the language of
the rule”); Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of
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different views of the evidence, and varying prosecutorial practices.
The Commission’s “statistics showing the number of sentences within
the guideline range do not pick up these disparities, because they are
289
disparities in the calculation of the guideline range.” Furthermore,
measuring disparity solely with reference to judicial decisionmaking
ignores disparities inevitably created by differing prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining policies and strategies across cases and dis-

the Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 16, 17-20 (1997) (reporting
that, in an empirical study of the relevant conduct rule, forty-six probation officers
assigned the same “typical drug distribution case” widely varying base offense levels,
and hypothesizing based on the results that officers interpreted the rule in three different ways).
286
See Hinkle, supra note 284, at 2-3 (“In one district a defendant is tagged only
with the drugs involved in a specific transaction; in another the concept of relevant
conduct is applied more broadly, and the offense level skyrockets.”); see also Panel Discussion, Federal Sentencing Under “Advisory” Guidelines: Observations by District
Judges (Mar. 7, 2006) (statement of Judge Gerard E. Lynch) (remarking that, “in perfect good faith,” it is often possible to interpret a guideline in more than one way), in
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 16 (2006).
287
For example, in United States v. Quinn, at the sentencing of one codefendant, the
prosecutor and probation officer argued for a guideline range of 37-46 months based
only on the drugs found on her person and at her and her codefendant’s residences on
the date of arrest. 472 F. Supp. 2d 104, 105-06 (D. Mass. 2007). At the later sentencing
of the other codefendant, the same prosecutor and a different probation officer urged
a guideline range of 151-188 months, based primarily on additional drugs he allegedly
sold over the previous five years. Id. at 106-07. Although there was hearsay information indicating that the first codefendant was involved in these uncharged sales as
well, the prosecutor explained that the information was more reliable with respect to
the second codefendant. Id. at 109. To avoid a very substantial disparity, the judge
sentenced the second codefendant based on the same amount of drugs as the first
codefendant, observing that “it is more likely in a Guidelines calculation than in a formal trial that different evaluators of particular information will form different conclusions about it” and that “inconsistent resolutions of essentially the same question with
respect to two separate but similar defendants is a structural problem within the Guidelines’ manner of addressing ‘relevant conduct.’” Id. at 110-11.
288
See Hinkle, supra note 284, at 3 (“In one district the government files a notice of
the defendant’s prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851 and the defendant thus faces a
long minimum mandatory sentence; in another district the government chooses not to
file the notice.”). The severity of the career offender guideline range also depends on
whether prosecutors file a notice under § 851. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(b) & cmt. 2 (2011); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 851(a) (2006).
289
Hinkle, supra note 284, at 3.
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290

tricts. Moreover, it is standard practice in some quarters for law enforcement officers to manipulate the guideline range by determining,
for instance, the quantity or type of drugs bought, sold, or agreed upon
291
before an arrest is made.
B. Racial Disparity
Perhaps the most inflammatory claim by some proponents of the
guidelines was that judicial discretion led to racial disparity in sentenc292
But, as noted earlier, subsequent reanalysis of
ing in federal court.
293
the studies relied upon belied that claim.
Judge Sessions and the

290

See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 82-85 (listing and describing prosecutorial “decision points” that affect the ultimate sentence). Prosecutors, with or without
guidelines, treat similar offenders differently for reasons of administrative efficiency.
See id. at 86. They also exercise their charging and plea bargaining authority and control over sentencing facts to induce guilty pleas, and to seek higher sentences for similarly situated offenders after trial. See id. at 83-84; Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 158,
at 539-40; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 150-53 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a sentencing disparity of more than twenty-one years between codefendants
who went to trial and those who pled guilty was a permissible consequence of prosecutorial plea bargaining discretion under the guidelines).
291
See Jon O. Newman, The New Commission’s Opportunity, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 44,
44 (1997) (“[T]he guidelines permit undercover drug enforcement agents to determine the ultimate punishment by shaping the conversation with a suspect concerning
the extent of future deliveries.”); Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated
Culpability, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 49-54), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362 (describing “fictional stash house operations” in
which informants recruit suspects to engage in fictitious robberies of quantities of
drugs invented by the informants).
292
See Stith & Koh, supra note 99, at 227-28 (describing “unwarranted disparity,”
including “alleged bias against minorities,” as one of the fundamental concerns motivating Congress to enact the SRA); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal
Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1246 (2005) (recounting that some early
reformers were “convinced that racial discrimination was a driving force behind imprisonment disparities and that the only way to ameliorate or eliminate it was to remove judges’ and parole boards’ discretion to discriminate”); Tom Wicker, Judging the
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1976, at A29 (discussing Judge Frankel’s view that the “pervasive racial discrimination that mars American justice” is a problem caused by judicial
discretion); cf. Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE
121, 121, 126 (1975) (arguing in regard to sentencing in state court that racial discrimination “is widely perceived in our communities and clearly supported by statistics” and
calling for reform to “correct the procedural and systematic defects involved in the
sentencing process”).
293
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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Commission now claim that racial disparity has increased as a result of
294
the Supreme Court’s decision to make the guidelines advisory. This
claim is based on a multivariate study the Commission conducted, which
reports a growing difference in sentence length between black and
white males after Booker and Gall, as compared to the period following
the PROTECT Act, when judicial discretion was most constrained.295
Rather than implement a Booker “fix” and only then reanalyze the basis
for this claim, we should carefully examine the basis for the claim right
now. We undertake a thorough examination of the Commission’s
multivariate study in the second section below. To set the stage for
that examination, we first consider more generally how the presence
or absence of judicial discretion has affected racial disparity in federal
sentencing.
1. Improvements in Racial Fairness Through
Increased Judicial Discretion
It is now apparent that “the degree of capriciousness or prejudice
evident in the sentencing behavior of federal judges before the estab296
lishment of the guidelines [has been] often overstated.” At the same
time, the advent of mandatory guidelines and mandatory minimums
created a new kind of racial unfairness that did not previously exist. As
shown in Figure 1 below, the average time served by defendants of different racial groups varied little before the guidelines and mandatory
minimums went into effect in the late 1980s. But when these laws were
fully implemented, average time served by black offenders soared
above the others.

294

See Sessions, supra note 12, at 329-30 & n.127; Commission Testimony, supra note
13, at 1, 53-55.
295
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 53-55.
296
David Weisburd, Sentencing Disparity and the Guidelines: Taking a Closer Look, 5
FED. SENT’G REP. 149, 149 (1992); see also supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1: Average Time Served in Months by Black, White, and
297
Hispanic Offenders from FY 1984–2010
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This racial gap was the result of new and harsher mandatory sentencing rules, including statutes mandating minimum sentences for
drug trafficking and other offenses, that applied more frequently to
298
black offenders than to offenders of other races. To the extent that
these rules required punishment that was greater than necessary to
achieve the legitimate purposes of sentencing, they created unwarranted racial disparity.299 Most notable in this regard were mandatory

297

A version of this graph first appeared in the Commission’s 2004 assessment of
fifteen years of guidelines sentencing. See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 116
fig.4.2. It has been expanded by its designer, Paul J. Hofer, former Special Projects
Director for the Commission, to include data through 2010. The source of the data is
1984–1990 USSC AO FPSSIS Datafiles and 1991–2010 USSC Monitoring Datafiles. The
2011 Monitoring Datafile has not yet been made available. Time served is estimated
from the sentence imposed. In the Commission’s Monitoring Datafile, TIMESERV
assumes good time credits will be applied. Offenders receiving no term of imprisonment are excluded.
298
See MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 277, at 1, 15; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra
note 152, at 117, 135; John Scalia, Jr., The Impact of Changes in Federal Law and Policy on
the Sentencing of, and Time Served in Prison by, Drug Defendants Convicted in U.S. District
Courts, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 152, 155-57 (2001–2002).
299
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 113-14, 131-35; see also Rodney
Engen, Racial Disparity in the Wake of Booker/ Fanfan: Making Sense of “Messy” Results and
Other Challenges for Sentencing Research, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1144-45
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minimums and sentencing guidelines applicable to crack cocaine
300
offenses and the so-called “career offender” guideline. The Commission concluded that the career offender guideline—as applied to
those who qualify based on prior drug convictions, which most defendants subject to this guideline do—vastly overstates the risk of recidivism, has no general deterrent effect, and has a disproportionate
301
Other guideline provisions and mandaimpact on black offenders.
tory enhancements that result in excessively severe sentences apply
disproportionately to black offenders as well.302
Only after Booker have judges been able to mitigate such unwarranted racial disparity. By imposing below-guideline sentences that
they could not have imposed under the mandatory guidelines, in fiscal
year 2010 alone, judges spared more than 860 black defendants
sentenced under the crack or career offender guidelines over 3300 years
of unnecessary incarceration. More than 230 defendants of other
races were likewise spared over 900 years of unnecessary incarceration
303
under these two guidelines.
Moreover, contrary to the suggestion
that judges exercise discretion in a biased manner, in cases in which a
mandatory minimum did not constrain judicial discretion, black and
304
white offenders received below-guideline sentences at the same rate.

(2011) (noting that “[r]acial disparity may be built into the guidelines,” and citing as
examples the drug guidelines and the career offender guideline).
300
See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 225.
301
FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152, at 133-34.
302
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 352-54 (2011) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES] (finding that the “cumulative impacts” of broadly defined “felony drug offense[s]”
under 21 U.S.C. § 851, criminal history score, and ineligibility for safety valve relief “can
result in disproportionate and excessively severe sentences,” and that these cumulative
impacts are “particularly acute for Black drug offenders”); id. at 359-64 (finding that
sentences for certain firearms offenses can be “unduly severe” and “these effects fall on
Black offenders to a greater degree than on offenders of other racial groups”).
303
These estimates were made using the Monitoring Datasets for fiscal years 2003
and 2010. See supra note 231. They are based on the increase in the rate of nongovernment sponsored below-guideline sentences for crack and career offenders in
fiscal year 2010 as compared to the rate in 2003 and the average extent of these reductions. Fiscal year 2003 was used as the comparison year because it preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which affected
how cases were handled in anticipation of Booker.
304
According to the 2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, in cases where a mandatory
minimum did not trump or truncate the guideline range, 24.1% of black defendants
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Judges have also reduced unwarranted racial disparity stemming
from the exercise of discretion by prosecutors and law enforcement
agents. As the Commission has found, prosecutors and agents can
control sentencing outcomes in at least three ways: (1) by controlling
the quantity or type of drugs used to determine the guideline range or
a mandatory minimum, (2) through charging and plea bargaining
decisions, and (3) through their sole authority to move for certain
305
Research has revealed unexplained racial
types of departures.
306
disparities resulting from the exercise of these forms of discretion,
and that much of the gap in average sentence length can be traced to
charging decisions, particularly decisions to bring charges carrying
307
mandatory minimums.

and 24% of white defendants received a below-guideline sentence. See 2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra note 231.
305
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 82-87.
306
See id. at 90-91, 131 (finding that among offenders who possessed or used a gun
during a drug offense, black offenders are more likely to be charged with a mandatory
minimum of five or more years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) rather than receive a two-level
increase under the guidelines); MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 302, at 35960, 363-64 (finding that “stacking” § 924(c) counts results in sentences that are “excessively severe and disproportionate to the offense committed,” and that black defendants are charged with such stacked offenses at a greater rate than defendants of other
races); id. at 257-58 (reporting that 29.9% of eligible black drug offenders received an
increased mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 851, while only 25% of eligible white
offenders, 19.9% of eligible Hispanic offenders, and 24.8% of offenders of “other” races
received such an increase); id. at 159-60, 179, 214-15, 221, 291 (reporting that black
offenders receive government sponsored substantial assistance departures less often
than defendants of other races); FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 104-05 (same).
307
See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging
and its Sentencing Consequences (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 12-002,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377. In a study comparing offenders
who were similar based on arrest offense, Rehavi and Starr found that “compared to
white men, black men face charges that are on average about seven to ten percent
more severe . . . and are more than twice as likely to face charges carrying mandatory
minimum sentences” and that “[t]hese disparities persist after charge bargaining and,
ultimately, are a major contributor to the large black-white disparities in prison sentence length.” Id. at 46. While only 12% of defendants in the sample were charged
with mandatory minimums, “disparities in their application appear capable of explaining virtually all of the aggregate racial disparity in case outcomes” in the entire sample.
Id. at 42. The authors cautioned that the disparities they found “could reflect unobserved differences in case characteristics.” Id. at 24. The authors did not have data, for
instance, on differences in eligibility for a charge carrying a mandatory minimum.
Moreover, their analysis excluded drug, child pornography, and immigration offend-
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As the mandatory guidelines era came to a close, the Commission
noted that “[d]isparate effects of charging and plea bargaining are
a special concern in a tightly structured sentencing system like the
federal sentencing guidelines, because the ability of judges to
308
compensate for disparities in presentence decisions is reduced.”
After Booker, judges are better able to compensate for some of these
disparate effects.309
The gap in time served between black and white offenders was
310
largest in 1994, at 37.7 months. It narrowed to 25.4 months in 2010,
311
This is in part due to judicial variances
the smallest since 1992.
made possible by Booker, and in part due to the two-level reduction in

ers, who compose more than half of the federal docket, see 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 251, fig.A, because of limitations and complications in the data. Rehavi & Starr,
supra, at 12-13. Their conclusions, however, are consistent with the Commission’s
research on mandatory minimums. See supra note 306. A second recent study concluded that the increased impact of the differential imposition of mandatory minimums
accounts for racial disparity after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. See Joshua B. Fischman &
Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities, Judicial Discretion, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines 3 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series No. 2012-02, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636419.
308
FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152, at 92.
309
See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 397 F. App’x 329, 332-33 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the court varied appropriately from 235-293 months to 132 months where the
drug quantity used to calculate guideline range was based on nonexistent drugs in a
“‘reverse sting’ operation,” thus “overstating [the] defendant’s culpability”); United
States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A] defendant’s claim of sentencing factor manipulation may also be considered as request for a variance from the
applicable guideline range under the § 3553(a) factors [rather than under] . . . the
stricter standard for a departure . . . .”); United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227,
1231-32, 1260 (D. Utah 2004) (imposing a sentence of one day for drug counts to partially compensate for a fifty-five year mandatory sentence produced by stacked charges
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) brought by the prosecutor after the defendant declined to
plead guilty), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006). In addition, courts may now impose
below-guideline sentences based on cooperation when the government fails to make
the motion. See United States v. Blue, 557 F.3d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 688 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jackson, 296 F. App’x
408, 409 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Doe, 218 F. App’x 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 33 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Lazenby,
439 F.3d 928, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2006); see also 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251,
tbls.25-25B (reporting 589 downward variances or departures based on cooperation in
absence of a § 5K1.1 motion).
310
See supra Figure 1 and note 297.
311
See supra Figure 1 and note 297.
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the crack guidelines in fiscal year 2008 prompted by Booker.
The
precise effect of the more substantial reduction in the crack guidelines
under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which was also prompted in
313
part by Booker, will not be known until the fiscal year 2011 data are
314
315
available. It is likely to be substantial.
2. The Commission’s Study
The Commission recently testified that a Booker fix is needed
316
because, according to its most recent multivariate regression study,
increased judicial discretion had resulted in growing demographic
disparities.317 Judge Sessions, referring to the same study, asserts that
“[r]eliable evidence suggests that, as a result of the decreasing adherence to the sentencing guidelines since the Supreme Court rendered
them ‘advisory’ in 2005, . . . demographic disparities . . . have been
318
increasing steadily.”
Multivariate regression studies like the Commission’s measure differences among demographic groups, in average sentence lengths or

312

See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
314
The reduction in the crack guidelines directed by the Fair Sentencing Act took
effect on November 1, 2010, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 748 (Nov. 1, 2010).
315
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 132 (“Revising the crack cocaine
thresholds would better reduce the gap [in average prison sentences between black
and white offenders] than any other single policy change . . . .”); cf. Memorandum
from Office of Research & Data, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, to Chair Saris 19 & tbl.4, 28
(May 20, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Retroactivity_Analyses/
Fair_Sentencing_Act/20110520_Crack_Retroactivity_Analysis.pdf (estimating that defendants sentenced under the guidelines in effect before November 1, 2010 and eligible for a retroactive reduction in their sentences would receive an average reduction of
thirty-seven months, and that eighty-five percent of these defendants would be black).
316
Since 2004, the Commission has conducted three different multiple regression
studies and has updated two of them. See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 11827; BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 105-09; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER
REPORT ’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 14, 16, 22 (2010) [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT].
317
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 1; see also DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
REPORT, supra note 316.
318
Sessions, supra note 12, at 329-30 (citing DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT,
supra note 316).
313
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in rates of imprisonment, after adjusting for some “legally relevant”
319
Researchers conducting this type of
differences among the groups.
study make statistical adjustment for applicable guidelines, mandatory
minimums, and other legally relevant factors, and any differences in
sentences remaining after these adjustments are reported as race effects
320
Statistical adjustment, however, is made
in the decisions of judges.
only with respect to those factors (1) for which data are available and
(2) that researchers choose to include in their statistical model. For
several reasons previously identified by the Commission itself and discussed below, its multivariate study does not constitute evidence that
judges discriminate against racial minorities.
In addition, the Commission’s study ignores racial disparities that
are built into the rules or that result from presentencing decisions of
investigative agents or prosecutors, because it treats the guidelines,
321
statutes, and charging decisions as “legally relevant.” That is, including mandatory minimums and guidelines as control variables fails to
capture racial disparity resulting from their application. Yet, as shown
above, these rules and decisions “are no more or less fallible than the
322
Indeed, viewing all of the procedures and
actions of the judges.”
considerations that affect sentencing leads us inexorably to the
conclusion that judges are the institutional actors least likely to exercise
racial bias. Judges determine sentences after adversarial testing by
opposing parties (and a probation officer), impose sentences in open
court, explain their decisions in public, and are subject to appellate
review. At each of these points, judges are challenged to act only on
the basis of relevant factors and to avoid any biases they might have.
There are no such external checks on the decisions of prosecutors or
law enforcement agents. Multivariate research has focused on judges
not because judges are a likely source of disparity, but because their
323
decisions are made on the record and result in accessible data.

319

See Hofer et al., supra note 278, at 243-45.
Cf. FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 118-19; Hofer et al., supra note 278,
at 242-44.
321
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at xiv.
322
Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Social Science Research and the Legal
Threat to Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 461, 463 (2007).
323
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 135 (“[D]iscrimination by judges
has been exaggerated by the existing research, while other stages of the criminal justice
320
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The Commission reported that, according to its study, “differences
in sentence length” between black and white male offenders “have in324
But the same study also found that
creased steadily since Booker.”
black females received increasingly shorter sentences than white or
Hispanic females after Booker and Gall, and that differences associated
325
Noncitizens reportedly
with educational level decreased after Gall.
received increasingly longer sentences than citizens after Gall, even
though Hispanic males and females, who compose the vast majority of
noncitizens prosecuted in federal court, reportedly received increas326
ingly shorter sentences. And the Commission, using a different statistical model spanning the entire ten-year period from 1999 through
2009, previously found the greatest difference in sentence length
between black and white offenders in 1999, when the guidelines were
327
mandatory.
As these varying results suggest, and as the Commission previously
warned, multivariate studies provide an unreliable basis from which to
conclude that judges exercise discretion in a racially biased manner.
The Commission has used three different methodologies over the
years (the Fifteen Year model, the Booker model, and the “refined”
328
model used in its most recent study). Its methodological choices for
the refined model produced a greater reported race effect than previ329
Significantly, peer-reviewed academic research using
ous models.

process have been relatively neglected, in part because of the paucity of data that can
be used to investigate them.”). The recent research by Rehavi and Starr seeks to overcome this problem by directly studying prosecutorial decisionmaking through available
data from arrest through sentencing. See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 307, at 10-12, 15.
324
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 54.
325
See id. app. E.
326
Compare id., with DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 22 fig.C.
327
Using the Booker model, the Commission reported a 14.2% difference in sentence length between all black and white offenders in 1999, as compared to a 7.4%
difference after Booker, and a 10% difference after Gall through fiscal year 2009.
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES R EPORT, supra note 316, at 14 fig.13, 16 fig.B.
328
See supra note 316.
329
Compare DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 22 fig.C (reporting a difference in sentence length for black and white males of 15.2% after Booker
and 23.3% after Gall through fiscal year 2009 under the refined model), and Commission Testimony, supra note 13, app. E (reporting a difference in sentence length for
black and white males of 20% after Gall through fiscal year 2010 under the refined
model), with DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 16 fig.B (report-
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different methodologies reached results that conflict with, and ex330
plain, the Commission’s results.
a. Missing and Excluded Variables
The Commission sought to identify how much racial disparity, if
any, results from the exercise of judicial discretion, by controlling for
all “legally relevant” factors. A problem with this approach is that the
Commission does not collect, and its datasets therefore do not include, many relevant factors that legitimately and legally affect judges’
sentencing decisions and that would change the results if they were
included.331 The Commission has previously warned against drawing a
conclusion of discrimination from its analyses because relevant factors
are missing from its datasets, and because other factors may have been
332
As the Commission explained, “judges make
erroneously omitted.
decisions when sentencing offenders based on many legal and other
333
legitimate considerations that are not or cannot be measured.” “The
omission of one or more important variables usually causes the value
of the variables that are included in the model [such as race] to be
334
overstated.” “[O]ne or more unmeasured factors . . . potentially could
335
change the results of the analysis if they were included.”
Among the factors that are missing from the Commission’s datasets
are criminal history not taken into account by the guidelines, including violent criminal history events and crimes not included in the
criminal history score; seriousness of the offense not taken into consideration by the guidelines, including in some instances violence that
was part of the present crime; employment history, current employ-

ing a difference for all black and white defendants of 7.4% after Booker and 10% after
Gall through fiscal year 2009 under the Booker model), and BOOKER REPORT, supra note
5, at 109 fig.13 (reporting a difference of 4.9% for all black and white defendants after
Booker through January 11, 2006 under the Booker model).
330
See infra subsection III.B.2.c.
331
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 119, 125, 131; BOOKER REPORT,
supra note 5, at 84, 105-06, 108; DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316,
at 4, 9-10 & nn.35-39, app. A at 3.
332
See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 4, 9-10 & nn.35-39.
333
Id. at 4.
334
Id. at 9.
335
Id. at 9 n.35.
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ment, or employment prospects; any other mitigating or aggravating
factors not incorporated into the guideline rules; and any reason for a
departure or variance other than substantial assistance to the govern336
When a relevant factor is not accounted for in the Commisment.
sion’s data, and that factor is correlated with race (i.e., it appears more
frequently in some racial groups than others), the effect is erroneously
attributed to consideration of race. For example, the Commission has
found that black offenders are about twice as likely as offenders of
337
And while
other races to have had violent criminal history events.
the Commission does not collect or report data on the employment
status of defendants, African Americans in the general population
338
have a higher unemployment rate than members of other races.
Violent criminal history events and employment status legitimately influence sentencing decisions, but because these factors are not included in the analysis, their effect is erroneously attributed to race.
Another problem, particular to the Commission’s most recent study,
is the failure to include variables that have been shown to impact sentencing decisions beyond their contribution to the guideline calculation. The Commission excluded from its refined model several such
variables that it had included in previous models, including criminal
history, classification as a “Career Offender” or “Armed Career Crimi339
nal,” and meeting the requirements for the “safety valve.” These factors have been shown to influence sentencing decisions beyond their

336

DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES R EPORT, supra note 316, at 4, 9-10 & nn.35-39,
app. A at 3; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 119, 125.
337
See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 105 n.317 (reporting that in a review of a
“25% random sample of cases” from fiscal year 2000, “24.4 percent of white offenders
had violent criminal history events, as did 43.7 percent of black offenders, 18.9 percent
of Hispanic offenders, and 23.7 percent of ‘other’ offenders”).
338
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at
378 tbl.588 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.
html (reporting that 16% of blacks were unemployed in 2010 compared with 8.7% of
whites).
339
See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 19-20 (enumerating factors excluded from the refined model); BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, app. B at
23 (explaining that the model included criminal history points, Career Offender status,
Armed Career Criminal status, and the safety valve adjustment); FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW,
supra note 152, app. D at 12 (noting that the model included criminal history category
classified as low, medium, or high).
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contribution to the guideline range, for example with respect to
choosing the type of sentence, placement within the range, or the ex340
341
tent of a departure. Because these factors are correlated with race,
342
excluding them inflates the weight that the model assigns to race.
These missing and excluded factors are one reason the Commission’s study found an increase in sentence length differences between
black and white males from the PROTECT Act period to the post343
Booker period to the post-Gall period.
Sentencing decisions were
most rigidly controlled by guidelines that excluded relevant sentencing considerations during the PROTECT Act period. Booker made
§ 3553(a) the sentencing law, but this holding was not fully implemented until after Gall and Kimbrough were decided. The import of
the Commission’s study is that judges are taking greater account not of

340

See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, app. B at 5-6 & n.81;
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, app. B at 23-24; FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152,
at 108-09, 130.
341
See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 302, at 354 (noting that only
14.4% of black drug offenders received safety valve relief compared to 39.5% of white
offenders, 46.3% of Hispanic offenders, and 48.4% of other race offenders, because
many black offenders are disqualified by having more than one criminal history point);
id. at 363 (explaining that black offenders constitute a large majority of offenders subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies on the basis of criminal history);
2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra note 231 (revealing that black defendants comprised 20.7% of all defendants but 32.6% of defendants in three highest criminal history categories and 64.4% of defendants classified as career offenders).
342
The Commission stated that it omitted these factors from the refined model because they “directly contribute to or are highly correlated with the value of another
variable that is already included in the analysis, i.e., the presumptive sentence.” DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 19. Other researchers disagreed
with the Commission’s decision to omit a control variable for criminal history from its
refined model. See Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/
Fanfan Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 1077, 1086 (2011). These researchers conducted statistical tests to ensure
that multicollinearity was within acceptable limits. Id. Their study and other studies
they relied on “did not report severe multicollinearity” with criminal history and presumptive sentence, but they did find that “criminal history was notably correlated with
race.” Id. They found it important to control for criminal history beyond its influence
on the presumptive sentence because “sentencing variation explained by criminal history is not variation explained by race.” Id. at 1087; see also infra notes 376-79 and
accompanying text.
343
The more frequent application of mandatory minimum sentences to black
offenders appears to be another reason. See infra notes 383-88 and accompanying text.
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race, but of legally relevant factors that are missing or excluded from
its study.
b. Failure to Report Fluctuations That Would Undermine the Discrimination
Hypothesis
Under its earlier Fifteen Year and Booker models, the Commission
found race effects for all offenses combined in some years but not in
other years, and found race effects only for drug offenses in some
344
The Commisyears and only for non-drug offenses in other years.
sion concluded that these fluctuations were “difficult to reconcile with
theories of enduring stereotypes . . . or overt discrimination” on the
345
part of judges.
Fluctuations continue in the refined model, but they are concealed
by aggregating years and offense types. Each iteration of the refined
model aggregates years into periods defined by changes in the law—
346
post–PROTECT Act, post-Booker, and post-Gall.
This aggregation,
which assumes that changes in disparity are caused by changes in the
law, masks yearly fluctuations that would undermine the discrimination hypothesis. For example, during a twenty-one-month period after
Gall through 2009, black males reportedly received sentences 23.3%
longer than white males, and Hispanic males reportedly received sen347
But during the longer thirtytences 6.8% longer than white males.
three-month period through 2010, these reported differences dropped
to 20% for black males and to statistical insignificance for Hispanic
348
males. We are left to wonder what the results were for 2010 alone.
Similarly, in its congressional testimony, the Commission included a
new “post-Koon” period, during which black males reportedly received
349
sentences 11.2% longer than white males. This period, which, in the

344

See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 108-09, app. B, at 31; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW,
supra note 152, at 121-27.
345
FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 125; see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note
5, at 108 & n.320 (cautioning against inferring discrimination in light of fluctuations by
year and offense type).
346
See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 22.
347
Id. at 22 fig.C.
348
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at app. E.
349
Id.
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Commission’s testimony, begins over three years after Koon was decid350
ed and ends with enactment of the PROTECT Act, aggregates threeand-a-half individual years for which the Booker model yielded no statistically significant difference or greater differences than in the post351
Fluctuations by offense type also unBooker and post-Gall periods.
doubtedly continue, but the “refined model” provides no separate
analysis by offense type.
c. Different Methodologies; Different Results
Divergent findings in multivariate regression analyses are commonplace due to methodological differences among researchers, random
352
fluctuations, and other sources of error.
The Commission’s own
studies have reached conflicting conclusions, primarily due to changes
353
As reviewers of research before the guidelines
in methodology.
warned: “Any findings that are sensitive to minor changes in model
354
specifications such as these must be interpreted with caution.” The
355
Commission has acknowledged this concern.
Peer-reviewed research authored by academic criminologists at the
Pennsylvania State University, including a former Staff Director of the
Commission (the “Penn State study”),356 replicated the Commission’s
refined model, tested different models, and reached different conclu-

350

See id. at 53 n.164 (stating that “the Post-Koon Period” covers October 1, 1999
through April 30, 2003).
351
See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 14 fig.13 (showing,
under the Booker model, a black/white difference of 10.2% in fiscal year 2000 (October
1, 1999 through September 2000), 8.2% in 2001 (October 1, 2000 through September
2001), no statistically significant difference in 2002 (October 1, 2001 through September 2002) or “pre-PROTECT Act” (October 1, 2002 through April 30, 2003) and 4.9%
post-Booker ( January 12, 2005 through November 1, 2006); id. at 16 fig.B (showing a
7.4% difference post-Booker ( January 12, 2005 through December 10, 2007) and a 10%
difference post-Gall (December 11, 2007 through September 30, 2009).
352
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 118-19, 125, 127.
353
See id. at 121-27; BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 108-09, app B, at 31; DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 2, 14-16, 22-24; Commission Testimony,
supra note 13, at 53-54, app. E.
354
MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 277, at 106.
355
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 127; BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5,
at 108.
356
Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1133.
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357

sions.
Like the Commission, the academic researchers sought to
identify racial disparity caused by judicial discretion. However, their
methodology differed from the Commission’s in several respects. The
authors of the Penn State study questioned several methodological
choices made by the Commission in its refined model, and found that
358
these choices had affected the Commission’s results.
First, the Commission modeled the sentencing decision as a single
decision of how long to imprison, counting probation as zero months
and treating months of home or community detention the same as
359
months of imprisonment.
As the Commission’s own research suggests, certain factors—including criminal history, employment status,
and citizenship—have a greater influence on the decision whether to
360
The Penn
imprison than on the decision how long to imprison.
State study separately analyzed the decisions whether to imprison, and if
so, how long to imprison, and concluded that the Commission’s combination of these two variables into one variable largely explained its
finding of increased sentence length disparity after Booker and again
361
362
after Gall. Analyzing the sentence length decision over five periods,
the Penn State study found that the difference in sentence length
between black and white males had been considerably reduced after
363
The difference in sentence length between black
Booker and Gall.
and white males was: (1) significantly less after Booker and Gall than
before Koon, when judicial discretion was more constrained than at
364
any time other than after the PROTECT Act; (2) “nearly identical”

357

Id. at 1077-78.
Id. at 1081-87.
359
Id. at 1086, 1093-94. In the Fifteen Year Review, the Commission modeled the
decisions whether to imprison and how long to imprison both separately and as one
decision. FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 121-26, app. D at 12.
360
FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 108-09,130; U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
Sentencing Options Under the Guidelines 15-17 (Staff Discussion Paper, 1996).
361
Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1094-96, 1105.
362
The time periods are (1) pre-Koon (October 1, 1993 through September 30,
1995), (2) pre–PROTECT Act (October 1, 2001 through April 30, 2003), (3) post–
PROTECT Act (May 1, 2003 through June 24, 2004), (4) post-Booker ( January 2005
through November 2007), and (5) post-Gall (December 2007 through September
2009). See id. at 1087-88, 1099.
363
Id. at 1100, 1105.
364
Id. at 1099-100.
358
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365

in the pre–PROTECT Act, post-Booker, and post-Gall periods; and (3)
significantly less post-Booker and post-Gall than pre–PROTECT Act when
366
The Penn State
immigration cases are excluded from the analysis.
study thus examined a broader historical context than the Commission’s
refined model, and reached results contrary to the Commission’s with
367
respect to sentence length.
The Penn State study did find an increased difference in sentencing
between black and white males, but only with respect to the odds of
368
incarceration and only after Gall (through fiscal year 2009). As noted
above, the decision whether to impose probation or a term of impris369
Some of those factors
onment is highly sensitive to certain factors.
are missing from the Commission’s datasets, which the Penn State
study also used. For example, employment status is missing from the
370
datasets, and, at least in the general population, employment status
371
correlates with race.
Employment status strongly influences judges’
decisions to impose probation rather than a prison term, in order to
372
permit defendants who are employed to remain employed; this pro374
373
motes the purposes of sentencing by reducing the risk of recidivism.
In other words, the Penn State study’s finding of an increased difference in the odds of incarceration between black and white males may
375
well be the result of missing but relevant variables.

365

Id. at 1094-96.
Id. at 1106.
367
Id. at 1104-05.
368
Id. at 1100, 1105.
369
See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
370
See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 4, 10.
371
See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
372
See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 360, at 16-17 (finding that employed
defendants were twenty-one percent more likely to receive an alternative sentence).
373
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006).
374
See MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4-5, 54 (1994), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/
research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 12, 29 exhibit 10 (2004).
375
The more frequent application of mandatory minimum sentences to black
offenders appears to be another reason for racial disparity in the odds of incarceration.
See infra notes 383-88 and accompanying text. Because the Penn State study and the
Commission’s study both controlled for mandatory minimums, neither could identify
366
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The Penn State researchers also questioned the Commission’s decision, unlike in both its Fifteen Year and Booker models, to exclude
criminal history as a control variable except with respect to its influ376
ence on the presumptive sentence. The Penn State study found that
criminal history has significant and substantial effects beyond the pre377
sumptive sentence, and that it was important to control for these
effects because “sentencing variation explained by criminal history is
378
not variation explained by race.” The Penn State researchers concluded that “Black male disparity is more than 30% larger when a
measure of criminal history is not included in the analysis.”379
Finally, the Penn State study excluded immigration offenses because
noncitizens are handled uniquely in many districts—for instance, with
fast track dispositions—and most noncitizens are subject to deporta380
tion, making probation impossible. The Commission excluded non381
citizens from its Fifteen Year Review analysis for the same reasons.
Employing a model to evaluate the effect of immigration offenses, the
Penn State study found that immigration offenses accounted for forty
382
percent of the effect on sentence length for black males.
Other recent empirical studies conclude that racial disparity in
sentencing after Booker is driven by mandatory minimums that constrain judicial discretion and are applied most frequently to black
383
offenders. The most thorough of these studies, by Professors Joshua
Fischman and Max Schanzenbach, takes an entirely different approach
than the Commission or the authors of the Penn State study. Specifically, it does not seek to control for all “legally relevant” factors; instead,

the impact of such mandatory sentences on racial disparity. See supra text accompanying notes 321-22.
376
Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1086.
377
Id. at 1086, 1093.
378
Id. at 1087.
379
Id. at 1093.
380
Id. at 1085-86.
381
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, app. D at 12; see also U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, supra note 360, at 16 (“Non-citizens are less likely to receive an alternative
[sentence] than are U.S. citizens, reflecting perhaps the impending deportation of the
defendant and the absence of a local residence suitable for home confinement.”).
382
Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1098.
383
See Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 307, at 3, 14-19; Rehavi & Starr, supra
note 307, at 46.
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it includes only control variables that the authors conclude would not
have been influenced by doctrinal changes, such as Booker, in order to
384
best isolate the direct effect of these changes on racial disparities.
This study finds that racial disparities were reduced during periods of
385
greater judicial discretion after Koon and Booker , but had increased
after the more recent decisions in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, as a consequence not of judicial bias but of mandatory minimums that prevent
judges from reducing black offenders’ sentences as often and to the
386
degree that they otherwise would. The authors state that their findings “suggest that judicial discretion does not contribute to, and may
387
This
in fact mitigate, racial disparities in Guidelines sentencing.”
conclusion appears to be confirmed by the Commission’s own data
showing that when judicial discretion is not hindered by a mandatory
minimum, black offenders receive reduced sentences at least as often
388
as white offenders.
In sum, the Commission’s study, standing alone and in light of
contrary findings, does not support a Booker fix. Indeed, as the data
show, offenders of all races are treated more fairly when judges can
effectively take into account their individualized circumstances and
389
the purposes of sentencing in ways the guidelines do not.
Examining only judicial decisions as a source of possible racial disparity in sentencing diverts attention from disparities built into the guidelines and

384

Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 307, at 11-12.
Id. at 3, 18.
386
Id. at 16-18. The authors found that “disparity in departure rates and prison
sentences [for black offenders] relative to whites narrows in periods of deferential review” because “when judges are freer to depart, they do so more proportionally more
often for blacks than whites, resulting in lower prison sentences,” but “judges appear to
be constrained more frequently by mandatory minimums when sentencing black defendants.” Id. at 14.
387
Id. at 19; see also Rehavi & Starr, supra note 307, at 46.
388
See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
389
See Raymond Moore, Fed. Pub. Defender for the Dists. of Colo. and Wyo., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 23-25 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2012021516/Testimony_
16_Moore.pdf (showing through data and case law that judges exercise their discretion
after Booker to take into account the individual strengths and rehabilitative needs of
black offenders); see also supra notes 303-11 and accompanying text (demonstrating that
judges impose below-guideline sentences to compensate for unwarranted disparities built
into the guidelines and disparities stemming from presentence decisions).
385
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mandatory minimums as well as disparities arising at the charging and
390
plea bargaining stages.
C. Interdistrict Disparity
The Commission also offered in its testimony before Congress a
“troubling trend[]” of “growing disparities” in rates of judicial belowrange sentences “among circuits and districts” as grounds for con391
As the only evidence of this claim, the
straining judicial discretion.
Commission noted the difference between the highest and lowest rates
of non-government sponsored below-range sentences by district for
392
certain types of offenses during the “post-Gall period,” and provided
a list, from highest to lowest, of rates of non-government sponsored
below-range sentences for each district in fiscal year 2010.393 These
data are misleading and incomplete. They do not begin to establish
that geographic differences are unwarranted, that they are growing in
a meaningful way, or that they call for greater constraint on judicial
discretion.
Congress directed the Commission to consider local conditions in
394
promulgating the guidelines and directed judges to consider pur395
poses and factors that necessarily take local conditions into account.
While the Commission did not take local conditions into account in
the guidelines, prosecutors and judges always have, and quite appropriately so. Regional differences remained under the mandatory
guidelines and even increased in drug and immigration cases, as com396
pared to the pre-guidelines period. More recently, Attorney General
Holder has adopted a policy of “district-wide consistency,” in accord-

390

See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 135; Engen, supra note 299, at 1143-46.
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 1.
392
Id. at 26, 28, 31, 33, 36, 38, 41, 43, 46, 48, 50, 53.
393
Id. app. D.
394
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4)–(5), (7) (2006) (directing the Commission to consider
“the community view of the gravity of the offense,” “the public concern generated by
the offense,” and “the current incidence of the offense in the community”).
395
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (requiring judges to consider the need for deterrence,
just punishment, respect for law, and protection of the public); cf. id. § 3553(a)(3)
(requiring judges to consider the kinds of sentences available).
396
See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 98-103, 110-12.
391
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ance with “district-specific policies, priorities, and practices,” and “the
needs of the communities we serve.”397
As judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers well know, comparing
rates of below-guideline sentences tells us nothing about whether
398
there is unwarranted disparity.
As the Commission has previously
acknowledged, “The causes of variation in the rates of departure, and
their potential effect on unwarranted sentencing disparity, is a complicated issue that cannot be resolved through simple examination of the
399
Indeed, it would seem more pertinent to know
reported rates.”
whether interdistrict variation in sentencing outcomes has increased
since Booker. The Commission has not addressed that question, but
the authors of the Penn State study have. In another article, they reported that variation in sentence length among districts after Gall is
less than it was before the PROTECT Act and only slightly greater than
400
after the PROTECT Act.
Moreover, determining whether interdistrict variation constitutes
unwarranted disparity is exceedingly complex because, as the Commission once put it, the “potential sources are so many, varied, and inter401
acting.”
The most important of these interacting sources are the

397

Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 245, at 1, 3.
See, e.g., Samuel A. Alito, Reviewing the Sentencing Commission’s 1991 Annual Report,
5 FED. SENT’G REP. 166, 167 (1992) (arguing that “[c]omparisons of the departure rates
of different circuits and districts seem . . . unsound,” because “no reliable inter-district
comparisons can be made without controlling for differences in the mix of offenses
prosecuted” and “for inter-district differences in the magnitude of cases within particular
offense categories”); John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion:
The Role of the Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 656 & n.66
(2008) (demonstrating that regional variations in charging and sentencing appropriately reflect different local priorities and needs); Alexander Bunin, Fed. Pub. Defender
for the N. Dist. of N.Y., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 7-11 ( July 9,
2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_
and_Meetings/20090709-10/Bunin_testimony.pdf (discussing how types of cases and
government policies and practices affect rates of below-range sentences and sentence
lengths among districts in five different circuits).
399
FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152, at 111.
400
See Jeffery Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in the Wake of
the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence Between Courts?, 28
JUSTICE Q. 799, 816 (2011) (finding that interdistrict variation was 6.6% before the
PROTECT Act, 5.8% after the PROTECT Act, 5.2% after Booker, and 6.3% after Gall ).
401
FIFTEEN YEAR R EVIEW, supra note 152, at 93.
398
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government’s practices and policies. Government sponsored departures have always contributed more to interdistrict variation than
402
judge-initiated departures. In 2011, for example, the difference between the highest and lowest rates of government sponsored belowrange sentences by district was 12.5 percentage points higher than the
difference between the highest and lowest non-government sponsored
403
rates. But the Commission has thus far failed to mention this fact to
Congress or, indeed, to provide any information regarding rates of
government sponsored below-range sentences by district. This is a
serious omission, given that government sponsored rates often have a
direct impact on non-government sponsored rates.
Indeed, the Commission’s presentation fails to shed meaningful
light on the question of whether any differences among districts are
unwarranted. To begin to answer that question, it would be necessary
to examine, for each district, the kinds of cases prosecuted, prosecutorial practices and policies, and interactions between prosecutorial and
judicial practices. At the most rudimentary level, this would require a
comparison of government sponsored below-range sentences, judicial
below-range sentences, and sentence length.
For example, Arizona’s low rate of non-government sponsored
below-range sentences in immigration cases (4.2%) is explained by a
high rate of government sponsored below-range sentences (64.7%),
the vast majority of which are imposed under the government404
In contrast, the Southern District of
controlled fast track program.
New York’s high rate of non-government sponsored below-range sentences in immigration cases (63.9%) is explained by the absence of a
fast track program in the district and a resulting 2.5% rate of govern-

402

See id. at 102-07.
Prosecutors sought downward departures and variances in 60.6% of cases in the
Southern District of California and in 4.4% of cases in the District of South Dakota, a
difference of 56.2 percentage points. 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.26. By
comparison, judges imposed downward departures and variances in 49% of cases in the
Southern District of New York and in 5.3% of cases in the Middle District of Georgia, a
difference of 43.7 percentage points. Id.
404
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR
2010 ARIZONA 19 tbl.10 (2010). Fast track departures accounted for 63.8%. Id.
403
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405

ment sponsored below-range sentences. The end result is that average sentence length for immigration cases in the Southern District of
406
New York is slightly higher (23.5 months) than that in Arizona (20.5
407
months).
The Commission has previously found that the presence
of fast track programs in some districts and not in others constitutes
408
Judges appropriately correct for
unwarranted geographic disparity.
409
this disparity.
The Commission’s presentation to Congress omitted
these details and left the impression of wide and unexplained dispari410
ties among districts.
Similar circumstances explain low rates of judicial below-range
sentences in the Western and Southern Districts of Texas, compared
with a high rate—the highest in the country—in the Southern District
411
of New York. A large majority of prosecutions in the Texas districts
are low-level immigration and marijuana smuggling cases with guideline ranges so low (typically 0-6 months and 10-16 months, respectively)
that offenders have already served the guideline sentence, or have lit412
tle left of it to serve, by the time a judge imposes sentence. There is
little need for judges to vary downward in these districts.
The Southern District of New York, by contrast, has a large number of cases with high guideline ranges. These high ranges result from
the operation of the guidelines in fraud cases, in which the “loss”
amount, together with multiple enhancements, often vastly overstates

405

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR
2010 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 19 tbl.10 (2010).
406
Id. at 10 tbl.7.
407
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 404, at 10 tbl. 7.
408
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 185, at 66-67.
409
See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
410
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 26 (stating only that “[i]n the post-Gall
Period,” there was a “range of 65.6 percentage points” between the lowest and highest
rates of “non-government sponsored below range sentences” in illegal entry cases).
411
The rates in the Western and Southern Districts of Texas are 11.1% and 14.9%,
respectively, while the rate in the Southern District of New York is 49%. See 2010
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.26.
412
See Letter from Margy Meyers, Henry Bemporad & David Patton, Fed. Pub.
Defenders, to Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Nov. 22,
2011), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/letter-to-lanny-breuer-fromdefenders.pdf.
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413

the seriousness of the offense; multi-defendant drug conspiracies, in
which the least and most culpable defendants are often subject to simi414
lar guideline ranges; and illegal reentry cases subject to a 16-level
415
416
enhancement, which overpunishes in most cases.
Judges in the

413

In the Southern District of New York, 26% of cases are fraud or other white collar cases, compared to 13.3% nationwide. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at
1 fig.A (2010). The fraud guideline recommends remarkably severe sentences in many
cases in this district. For example, in United States v. Adelson, the government sought a
guideline sentence of life imprisonment in a securities fraud case. 441 F. Supp. 2d 506,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The court explained that in such cases, the guidelines place an
“inordinate emphasis” on the “amount of actual or intended loss.” Id. at 509. Because
these cases can involve “public companies [that] typically issue millions of publically
traded shares,” “the precipitous decline in stock prices that typically accompanies a
revelation of fraud generates a multiplier effect that may lead to guidelines offense
levels that are, quite literally, off the chart.” Id. Finding that “the guidelines have so
run amok that they are patently absurd on their face,” the court instead imposed a nonguideline sentence of 42 months plus restitution. Id. at 507, 515. See also Frank O.
Bowman, III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. SENT’G
REP. 167, 169 (2008) (“[S]ince Booker, virtually every judge faced with a top-level corporate fraud defendant in a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called for by
the Guidelines were too high.”); Alan Ellis et. al, At a “Loss” for Justice: Federal Sentencing
for Economic Offenses, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 34, 37 (noting that the fraud guideline, focusing primarily on monetary loss, “fails to measure a host of other factors that
may be important, and may be a basis for mitigating punishment, in a particular case”).
414
Over 36% of cases in the Southern District of New York are drug cases, compared to 29% nationwide. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 1 fig.A. Sentences are based on drug quantity, which is a poor measure of offense seriousness,
particularly for low- and mid-level offenders. See, e.g., Catharine M. Goodwin, Sentencing
Narcotics Cases Where Drug Amount is a Poor Indicator of Relative Culpability, 4 FED. SENT’G
REP. 226, 226-27 (1992) (explaining that because of the way in which the drug amount
is determined under the guidelines, “minimal participants” in a conspiracy can receive
a sentence “very close to the sentence received by the more culpable offenders”); Eric
L. Sevigny, Excessive Uniformity in Federal Drug Sentencing, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 155, 171 (2009) (finding “robust support” for the claim of unwarranted uniformity
in drug sentencing because drug quantity “is not significantly correlated with role in
the offense”). The Supreme Court has made clear that it is proper to avoid unwarranted similarities in sentences among drug conspirators. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 55 (2007).
415
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2011).
416
In the Southern District of New York, 57.8% of illegal reentry cases in 2010 were
subject to the 16-level increase, in contrast to only 21.6% and 14.4% in the Southern
and Western Districts of Texas respectively. See 2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra
note 231. The 16-level enhancement has consistently and frequently been criticized
since its adoption. See, e.g., Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements
in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV.
719, 760-62 (2010).
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Southern District of New York correct for these often-criticized aspects
of the guidelines. Further, prosecutors in this district seek below417
As a
guideline sentences at a lower rate than the national average.
consequence, while judges in the Southern District of New York impose below-range sentences at the highest rate in the nation, the average sentence length in this district is higher than the national
418
average—and nearly double the average in the Texas districts.
419
As should be clear from these few examples, what kinds of differences among districts exist, what causes them, and whether they are
unwarranted are complex questions which the Commission’s bare listing of rates of below-guideline sentences does not begin to answer. If
interdistrict variation is to be considered seriously as a basis for greater
constraints on judicial discretion, the issue requires meaningful analysis and proof. The Commission has not carried its burden.
D. Interjudge Disparity
Judge Sessions cites increasing interjudge disparity “as a result of
the decreasing adherence to the sentencing guidelines” as a justification for resurrecting mandatory guidelines,420 claiming that allowing
judges to “assess the merits of particular guidelines provisions can only
421
The Commission makes a similar
lead to a system in disarray.”
argument in support of its request for “heightened” review of policy
disagreements.422

417

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 19 tbl.10 (reporting that government sponsored departures and variances were 17.8% in the Southern District of
New York, compared to 25.3% nationwide).
418
Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL
YEAR 2010 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 10 tbl.7 (2010) (reporting a mean sentence
of 17.3 months), and U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:
FISCAL YEAR 2010 WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 10 tbl.7 (2010) (reporting a mean sentence of 13 months), with U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 10 tbl.7
(reporting a mean sentence of 36 months in the Southern District of New York and 30
months nationwide).
419
For other examples, see Letter from Thomas W. Hillier, II, supra note 11, at 810, add. 2-7.
420
Sessions, supra note 12, at 329-30 & n.127.
421
Id. at 335.
422
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.
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The government had advanced a related argument in Kimbrough.
The Solicitor General’s brief noted that if judges could vary based on
their disagreement with the crack/powder disparity, defendants involved with the same quantity of drugs would receive different sentences
depending on the particular judge.423 The Supreme Court responded
that some variation among judges was a “necessary cost” of the remedy
it had adopted in Booker and held that the “proper solution” was “not
424
Instead, the
to treat the crack/powder disparity as mandatory.”
Court emphasized, district courts must consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, along with other § 3553(a) factors, in individual
cases and, in so doing, must weigh sentencing practices in other courts
425
The
against any disparity created by the guidelines themselves.
Commission, the Court explained, would “help to ‘avoid excessive sentencing disparities’” through “ongoing revision of the Guidelines in
response to sentencing practices.”426
The system is working as the Court expected. After Kimbrough,
many, but not all, judges varied from the crack guidelines to avoid the
427
unjust crack/powder disparity.
After recent amendments to the
crack guidelines, prompted in part by judicial variances, judges follow
428
Permitting judges to sentence the indithe guidelines more often.
viduals before them fairly, and giving judges a voice in the evolution of
the guidelines, leads to gradual and well-informed change and less
disparity overall.
Further, after Booker and its progeny, judges properly consider not
only the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, but also the need to
429
avoid unwarranted uniformity.
There will always be individualized
circumstances of the offense or characteristics of the offender that
cannot be included in general rules because they cannot, as a practical

423

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106-07 (2007).
Id. at 107-08.
425
Id. at 108.
426
Id. at 107 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)).
427
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
428
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
429
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 55-56 (2007) (approving the district court’s
differential treatment of coconspirators who were not similarly situated).
424
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matter, be described and assigned numerical values in the abstract.
As the Senate Judiciary Report recognized,

430

[E]ach offender stands before a court as an individual, different in some
ways from other offenders. The offense, too, may have been committed
under highly individual circumstances. Even the fullest consideration
and the most subtle appreciation of the pertinent factors—the facts in
the case; the mitigating or aggravating circumstances; the offender’s
characteristics and criminal history; and the appropriate purposes of the
sentence to be imposed in the case—cannot invariably result in a predictable sentence being imposed. Some variation is not only inevitable
431
but desirable.

Since the mandatory guidelines excessively curtailed judicial discretion, it is not surprising that the transition to advisory guidelines
has resulted in an increase in differences among judges. A “first look”
at post-Booker sentencing by judges in one federal courthouse found
432
A study of 2262 sentences imposed by ten judges
such an increase.
in the District of Massachusetts from October 1, 2001, through Sep433
tember 30, 2008, found that the identity of the judge accounted for
6.1% of variation in sentence length in the nine months after Gall and
Kimbrough, compared to 3.1% during the 33 months from October 1,
434
2001 through June 23, 2004, and 4.7% during the 14 months from
435
enactment of the PROTECT Act through June 23, 2004. The study
also found that the identity of the judge accounted for 6.6% of the
variation in distance from the guideline range in the nine months
after Gall and Kimbrough, compared to 2.4% during the 14 months
436
from enactment of the PROTECT Act through June 23, 2004.

430

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(b) (2011) (“[I]t is
difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.”).
431
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150 (1983).
432
Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (2010).
433
Id. at 24-27.
434
Id. at 32 tbl.1. On June 24, 2004 the Supreme Court handed down Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
435
Scott, supra note 432, at 65 tbl.A9.
436
Id. at 40 tbl.3.
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The author of the study, Professor Ryan Scott, concluded that “the
437
He emphasized that
effect of the judge remains relatively modest.”
“inter-judge sentencing disparity is but one consideration among many
in evaluating the federal sentencing system” and recognized that it “is
entirely possible to conclude that Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall have improved federal sentencing, on balance, by allowing judges greater flex438
In
ibility to reject unjust guidelines and impose just sentences.”
439
seeking to explain judges’ “unexpectedly mild reaction to Booker,”
Professor Scott posited that the reason for the persistent high rate of
sentences within the guideline range (and for differences among
judges) was that some “business as usual” judges agree with the guidelines more than others or believe that the Commission is more compe440
tent to decide sentences than they are.
An increase in differences among judges after Booker, in one district or in the nation as a whole, must also be understood in the context in which it occurs. Most importantly, in contrast to the preguidelines system, judicial discretion is intricately guided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), the statute Congress enacted to ensure reasonable con441
sistency in sentencing. And the Supreme Court has given the guidelines more primacy than does the plain language of the statute, by
directing judges to treat the guideline range as “the starting point and
442
the initial benchmark.” Moreover, the government agrees to or does
not oppose more than half of non-government sponsored below-range
443
sentences. Sentences are subject to appeal by both parties and, as we
have noted, the government’s success rate on appeal is roughly the
444
same or better than before Booker.

437

Id. at 41.
Id. at 41-42.
439
Id. at 42. Indeed, the study found that six of the ten judges ( judges A, C, D, E,
H, and I) imposed below-range sentences less often in the ten-month period after Gall
and Kimbrough than in the two years immediately following Booker, two judges ( judges F
and G) imposed below-range sentences at about the same rate, and two judges ( judges
B and J) imposed below-range sentences at a greater rate. Id. at 35-36 & nn.180-182.
440
Id. at 47, 50-51.
441
See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50-52, 74-75 (1983).
442
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
443
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
444
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
438
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Further, as the Supreme Court suggested in Kimbrough, the Commission itself can avoid excessive disparities among judges by revising
guidelines that most judges (and many prosecutors) find to be prob445
As the Commission improves the guidelines, judges who
lematic.
previously exercised their discretion to reject flawed guidelines follow
them more often, and judges who followed the guidelines in any event
continue to do so. In fact, there has been a notable decrease in belowrange sentences in the District of Massachusetts, the subject of Professor Scott’s study, since the crack amendments went into effect in fiscal
446
year 2011.
Finally, we reiterate that there will always be individual characteristics of the defendant and circumstances of the offense that are not and
cannot be included in general rules. If some judges believe it is their
duty to impose individualized sentences, while others assume (incorrectly) that the Commission has included all relevant factors in the
guidelines and rejected all irrelevant factors, there will be an increase
in interjudge disparity, but a decrease in unwarranted uniformity.
In sum, the components of a system to avoid unwarranted disparity
are in place. While Booker may indeed lead to increased interjudge
disparity, as some judges adjust to their greater sentencing responsibil447
ity differently or more slowly than others, it simultaneously decreases
more troubling kinds of disparity, including unwarranted uniformity,
and inspires long term improvement. In the meantime, it is “better to
have five good sentences and five bad ones than to have ten bad but
448
consistent sentences.”

445

See supra notes 195-96, 426 and accompanying text.
Compare 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.26 (reporting that 35.7% of sentences were non-government sponsored below range in the District of Massachusetts in
fiscal year 2010), with 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.26 (reporting that 30.8%
of sentences were non-government sponsored below range in fiscal year 2011).
447
Cf., e.g., United States v. Johnson, 635 F.3d 983, 987, 989 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing a life sentence under the crack guidelines and remanding for resentencing because
the district court judge did not properly consider whether, per Kimbrough, the life sentence was “‘greater than necessary’ to comply with § 3553(a)(2)” and instead opted to
wait for congressional action); United States v. Montague, 438 F. App’x 478, 479-80
(6th Cir. 2011) (reversing a guideline sentence and remanding for resentencing where
the district court “repeatedly expressed its view that it is not the district court’s job to
‘figure out whether the Guidelines are justified or not’”).
448
Hinkle, supra note 284.
446
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IV. THE PROPOSED FIXES
Accepting for the sake of argument the assertion of the Commission and Judge Sessions that a Booker “fix” is needed, the question
would still remain whether either of their proposals would give rise to
a fair, workable, and constitutional system of federal sentencing. Close
scrutiny of their proposals demonstrates that they would not.
A. Judge Sessions’s Proposal
1. The Details
The current sentencing table consists of 258 cells at the intersection of forty-three offense levels on a vertical axis and six criminal his449
tory categories on a horizontal axis. Judge Sessions proposes a table
consisting of thirty-six cells at the intersection of nine offense levels on a
450
vertical axis and four criminal history categories on a horizontal axis.
451
The thirty-six “broader cells” would contain ninety-two “sub-ranges.”
The Sessions proposal would not “discard” the current forty-three
offense levels; rather, they would be “associated with” and “tie[d]” in
groups to the broader cells in the new table, to assist in determining
452
severity and proportionality and to facilitate data analysis.
The thirty-six cells would be based on the offense of conviction and
453
aggravating factors relating to offense conduct and criminal history.
The Commission would choose these aggravating factors from among
those in the current Guidelines Manual and assign them new numeric
454
values. The sentencing ranges in the broad cells would be “mandatory” but would not violate Booker because aggravating facts concerning
offense conduct would be charged in an indictment and proved to
455
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant.

449
450
451
452
453
454
455

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (2011).
Sessions, supra note 12, at 342-45.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 347-48 & nn.176 & 179, 351-52.
Id. at 347-49.
Id. 346, 348.

Baron-Evans FINAL_v2.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1714

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/13/2012 1:05 PM

[Vol. 160: 1631

Criminal history would be found by the judge by a preponderance of
the evidence or admitted by the defendant.456
Twenty-eight of the thirty-six broader ranges would each contain
457
458
three sub-ranges, with the middle sub-range for “heartland” cases.
Upon conviction, the defendant would be assigned to the middle sub459
range of the broader range.
In order to impose a sentence in the
upper or lower sub-range, the judge would be required to consider (1)
a series of aggravating and mitigating factors identified in application
460
notes (if found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence)
461
The
and (2) “all other relevant factors” in the Guidelines Manual.
factors in the application notes would consist of those factors in the
current Guidelines Manual not chosen by the Commission to be
charged in an indictment and proved to a jury or admitted by the de462
fendant, and would not be assigned numeric values.
The few mitigating factors used to calculate the current guideline
range, such as the defendant’s minor or minimal role in the offense,
could be considered only in choosing a sub-range within the mandatory
463
cell (and in sentencing within that sub-range).
Acceptance of responsibility (i.e., pleading guilty) would “ordinarily” reduce the sentence by “at least one sub-range below where the judge would
otherwise have sentenced the defendant” but “not necessarily” to the
464
next lower cell.
There would be no variances from the broader cells based on the
purposes and factors set forth in § 3553(a), but instead only limited
departures from the otherwise-mandatory cells if permitted by the

456

Id. at 351-52; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27
(1998) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not require the fact of a prior conviction to be charged in an indictment).
457
Sessions, supra note 12, at 345.
458
See id. at 343 (“[M]id-range . . . would serve as an advisory range for a typical or
‘heartland’ case.”).
459
Id. at 347.
460
Id. at 348-49, 350-52.
461
Id. at 348-49, 353-54.
462
Id. at 348-49.
463
Id.
464
Id. at 349.
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465

Commission.
Judicial downward departures would be “infrequent”
466
and based on “truly extraordinary mitigating circumstances.” Departures for cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of others,
however, would be encouraged and would require a government
467
motion. Judge Sessions’s proposal would permit upward departures
468
based on criminal history, but not on other grounds because upward
departures would be “virtually unnecessary” given the breadth of the
469
mandatory ranges and would pose constitutional problems.
Restrictions on downward departures would be enforced through
470
appellate review with “teeth.” In Judge Sessions’s view, the “threat of
471
reversal” would “promote the legitimacy of the new presumptive
472
guidelines.”
Downward departures challenged on appeal by the
government would be subject to “relatively strict scrutiny,” while review
of guideline sentences would be virtually eliminated.473 There would
474
be no “‘substantive reasonableness’” review of any sentence, “just as
475
Appellate courts
there was no such review in the pre-Booker era.”
would review jury fact findings used to set the mandatory cell for suffi476
ciency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, reversing only if the
court, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, [concluded that no] rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
477
A jury finding in favor of the defendant could not be
doubt.”

465

Id. at 350-51; see also id. at 354 n.205 (“[T]he guidelines would be binding on
district judges, who would not be free to ‘vary’ from them as judges can currently do
from the advisory guidelines pursuant to Booker.”).
466
Id. at 351.
467
Id. at 352.
468
Id. at 351-52.
469
Id. at 350.
470
Id. at 351.
471
Id. at 353 (quoting Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics of Sentencing, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2009)).
472
Id.
473
Id. at 354.
474
Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
475
Id.
476
Id. at 354 & n.204 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
477
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
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478

appealed by the government. If Judge Sessions is correct that there
479
would not be a significant increase in jury trials, most sentences
would not be appealable at all because they would be conclusively determined by plea agreements.
Those who value judicial discretion should be satisfied with this
scheme, Judge Sessions maintains, because judges would have “greater
480
discretion” within the mandatory “broad ranges.”
Judge Sessions
asserts that another selling point for judges is that uncharged and
acquitted “relevant conduct” would play a “more limited role.”481
2. The Flaws
Perhaps the most serious flaw of the Sessions proposal is that judicial feedback to the Commission and constructive evolution of the
guidelines would virtually cease. The guideline range in each case
would be set by the prosecutor’s charges and the jury’s factfinding or
the defendant’s negotiated admissions. Judges would have no role in
determining the broader cell range, quite limited authority to sentence outside that range, and no opportunity to provide reasoned criticism of the guidelines. While Judge Sessions acknowledges that the
Department of Justice and Congress undermined the Commission’s
neutrality during the mandatory guidelines era—creating a one-way
upward ratchet, undue severity, and lack of proportionality in the
482
guidelines —his proposal would eliminate the only known antidote,
which is transparent feedback from Article III judges applying the sentencing statute in real cases. The Commission cannot claim to be “at
483
the crossroads” of all three branches without hearing from, and lis484
tening to, the members of the branch in which it is “located.”

478

See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeals from acquittals).
479
Sessions, supra note 12, at 353.
480
Id. at 351.
481
Id. at 350.
482
Id. at 306, 317-23, 334-36.
483
Id. at 305; see also Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 2; Implications of the
Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17 (2005)
(statement of Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission).
484
See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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Judge Sessions offers his proposal as a political “compromise” that
would significantly constrain judicial discretion in return for the hope
that statutory mandatory minimums might be “repealed or at least cur485
tailed.” But even if one were to assume that Congress would repeal
and foreswear all mandatory minimums if it enacted the Sessions proposal, the cure would be worse than the disease. Judge Sessions explains that his proposal would “mak[e] mandatory minimum statutory
486
penalties unnecessary.” If this is true, the reason is that the proposal
itself would create the equivalent of mandatory minimums, or near487
mandatory minimums, across the board.
Moreover, in reality, the
threat of new mandatory minimums would always be present. Mandatory minimums are a function of politics, not changes in the law regarding judicial discretion. Congress enacted mandatory minimums
throughout the mandatory guidelines era, as Judge Sessions acknowledges.488 Since 1987, there has been only one election year—2010,
when the guidelines were advisory—in which Congress did not enact
489
Nor does Judge Sessions explain
or expand mandatory minimums.
why, under his system, the Commission would not feel “compelled,” as
it has in the past, to increase guideline sentences to “ward off” manda490
tory minimum penalties.
Judge Sessions also asserts that if his proposal were adopted, “Congress would have less of an incentive to issue directives” to the Com491
mission to add new aggravators.
This argument posits that, in a
system with wider mandatory ranges, Congress would be less inclined

485

Sessions, supra note 12, at 340.
Id. at 309-10.
487
See Memorandum from Mary Price, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Families
Against Mandatory Minimums, to Spencer Overton, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Policy 7 (Aug. 14, 2009) (on file with authors) (opposing such a compromise
as it “would abandon mandatory sentences that apply to some crimes and replace them
with mandatory or near-mandatory guidelines across the criminal code”).
488
See Sessions, supra note 12, at 331 (“Since 1991, the number of criminal statutes
that have mandatory minimum sentences has increased by more than 78%. There are
now over 170 provisions that bear mandatory minimum sentences.” (citations omitted)).
489
See Study of Mandatory Minimums and Specific Directives, supra note 272.
490
Sessions, supra note 12, at 318 (quoting R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 752 (2001)).
491
Id. at 348.
486
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to issue directives because it would recognize that increasing the range
by even one or two cell levels would be “unduly harsh”; moreover,
“should [Congress] elect to” issue directives anyway, “it would effectively bar itself from inserting any further upward adjustments in the
future” because guideline sentences would quickly reach life impris492
onment. The implications of this argument are alarming. Congress
has not hesitated in the past to direct guideline increases for offenses,
such as drug trafficking and child pornography possession, that were
already treated severely under the guidelines; like mandatory minimums, directives are a function of politics. The fact that congressional
directives would quickly reach the stopping point of life sentences—
and mandatory life sentences at that—hardly recommends the Sessions
proposal.
Judge Sessions claims that his system of wider ranges would simultaneously (1) reduce disparity among judges and (2) provide greater
493
judicial discretion within the broad cell ranges. As a practical, if not
logical, matter, it would be difficult to achieve both these ends, and
Judge Sessions’s attempt to avoid this conundrum leads him to propose
a system of sub-ranges that would be unconstitutional, as we explain
below.
Judge Sessions, like others who have discussed a jury-driven system,
recognizes that to be workable in practice, such a system would require
relatively few aggravating facts for the jury to find, and therefore proposes fewer and consequently wider ranges than exist under the current
494
sentencing table.
But the wider ranges would invite much greater

492

See Bowman, supra note 170, at 1343-44. Judge Sessions adopts Professor Bowman’s argument. See Sessions, supra note 12, at 348 & n.178.
493
Sessions, supra note 12, at 354.
494
Id. at 355; see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 199 (“As a practical
matter, a system that gives juries a larger sentencing role requires that the number of
facts juries are asked to decide be fairly small.”); James Felman, How Should the Congress
Respond if the Supreme Court Strikes Down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 17 FED. SENT’G
REP. 97, 97 (2004) (“The number of culpability factors is a trade-off related to both
complexity and the width of the sentencing ranges which result . . . .”); cf. Felman Testimony, supra note 11, at 22 (noting that “the ranges under a jury-driven system would
almost certainly have to be significantly wider than the ranges under the present guidelines,” and opposing such a system in part because it “could actually increase variations
among sentences because the ranges would be so much wider”).
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variation in sentences than exists under the advisory guidelines system.
The current sentencing table consists of 258 ranges that are overlapping
and narrow; nearly half of the ranges are 12 months or less in width,
495
Under the current
and only 10% are more than 80 months wide.
advisory guidelines system, the median decrease from these narrow
ranges for non-government sponsored below-range sentences is about
496
12 months. Viewed another way, 22% of these below-range sentences
are 6 months or less below the guideline range, 48% are no more than
one year below the range, and 72.4% are no more than two years below.497 In contrast, under Judge Sessions’s proposal the mandatory cells
would vary in width from a low of 16 months to a high of 286 months,
498
Even at the middle of
with 67% of the ranges 80 months or wider.
the Sessions table, the four ranges would vary in width from 80 months
499
This or any similar
to 105 months to 136 months to 226 months.
reduction in the number of ranges and corresponding expansion of
widths would produce ranges that are wider than the vast majority of
judicial departures and variances today.
Thus, the proposed rejiggering of ranges would not please those
who wish to constrain judicial discretion. Anticipating this objection,
Judge Sessions proposes to regulate judges’ sentencing choices
through the introduction of three sub-ranges within each mandatory
range, the middle of which would be an “advisory range for a typical or
500
heartland” case.
The jury’s verdict or the defendant’s guilty plea
would, standing alone, result in a sentence in the middle sub-range.
In order to move from that sub-range to a higher or lower sub-range,
the judge would be required to consider a series of factors chosen by

495

About 48% of the current ranges are 12 months or less in width; 15% are 12-24
months in width; 8% are 25-35 months in width, 7% are 37-47 months in width; 4% are
52-58 months in width, 7% are 65-81 months in width; 8% are 110 months, and 2% are
life. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (2011).
496
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
497
2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra note 231.
498
None of the ranges would be less than 16 months wide, and twenty-four (or
66.6%) would be 80 months wide or more. Only eight of the ranges (or 22%) would
be less than 36 months wide, and only ten (or 28%) would be less than 48 months wide.
Sessions, supra note 12, at 345.
499
Id. at 345.
500
Id. at 343, 347.
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the Commission from among the existing guideline factors, nearly all
501
of which are aggravating. Critically, a judge who imposed a sentence
in an upper or lower sub-range would be reversed unless it was clear
from the record that he considered “all of the relevant aggravating
and mitigating factors identified in the application notes and all other
relevant factors in the Guidelines Manual before imposing a particular
502
sentence.” Reversal would also be required if the judge “considered
503
This appears to mean that, in order to sena prohibited factor.”
tence outside the middle range of the mandatory cell, judges would be
required to consider aggravating facts (and a small number of mitigating facts) designated by the Commission, as well as the restrictions on
mitigating facts set forth in policy statements and commentary—and
only those facts and restrictions. There is, at least, no mention in
Judge Sessions’s proposal of sentencing factors not designated by the
Commission, or of any sentencing principles, such as parsimony, the
purposes of punishment, or the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.
The proposal thus evidently contemplates that the only lawful
bases for imposing a sentence above the middle sub-range would be
judicial factfinding of aggravating factors specified by the Commission.
Yet such a system would violate the fundamental commands of Booker.
A sentencing range is advisory only if the judge is authorized to sentence above or below it based on facts and principles not specified by
504
If we have understood Judge Sessions’s proposal
the Commission.
correctly, the top of the middle sub-range would be the “maximum”
505
Accordingly, sentences above this
for Sixth Amendment purposes.
maximum may not be authorized solely on the basis of aggravating

501

Id. at 347-49.
Id. at 353-54 (emphasis added).
503
Id.
504
What made the guidelines mandatory before Booker was that departures were
available only under circumstances specified by the Commission. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234-35 (2005).
505
The “maximum” for Sixth Amendment purposes is the “maximum authorized
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict.” Id. at 244; see also Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004) (“[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”).
502
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facts found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.
But
507
this is exactly what the Sessions proposal, as we read it, contemplates.
The constitutional problem is best illustrated by the Supreme
Court’s invalidation, in Cunningham v. California, of a sentencing sys508
tem strikingly similar to the one Judge Sessions proposes. The California system provided for an upper term, a middle term, and a lower
509
The judge was directed to start with the middle term and to
term.
move from that term only if the judge found and placed on the sentencing record aggravating or mitigating facts related to the offense or
510
the offender, beyond the facts of which the defendant was convicted.
The system made no provision for the judge to impose a sentence
511
above the middle term based on anything other than facts.
The
Court made plain that the system would have been constitutional if it
had authorized the judge to sentence above the middle term based
solely on a “policy judgment” in light of the “general objectives of sentencing,” or the judge’s subjective belief regarding the appropriate
512
Because California’s sentencing rules referred only to
sentence.
513
“facts” in aggravation, the system violated the Sixth Amendment.514
In contrast, the federal advisory guidelines system is constitutional
because, “[a]s far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard
the Guidelines and apply the same sentence (higher than . . . the bottom of the unenhanced Guidelines range) in the absence of the special facts . . . which, in the view of the Sentencing Commission, would
515
warrant a higher sentence.”
Moreover, “courts are entitled to vary

506

See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2007) (“[T]he Federal
Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to
impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8
(“Whether the judicially determined facts require a sentence enhancement or merely
allow it, the verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.”).
507
See Sessions, supra note 12, at 348-49, 350, 351-52.
508
549 U.S. 270.
509
Id. at 275.
510
Id. at 279.
511
Id. at 279-80.
512
Id. at 279-81; see also id. at 292-93.
513
Id. at 279.
514
Id. at 292-93.
515
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 353 (2007).
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from the . . . guidelines in a mine-run case where there are no ‘particular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a variance from the
516
Because “the Guidelines are now
Guidelines’ sentencing range.”
advisory[,] . . . courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on
517
policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.”
Indeed, it is this ability to sentence outside the guideline range based
on a policy judgment alone that makes the guidelines advisory and thus
constitutional. As stated by then–Solicitor General Kagan, “[T]he very
essence of an advisory guideline is that a sentencing court may, subject
to appellate review for reasonableness, disagree with the guideline in
518
imposing sentencing under Section 3553(a).” While Judge Sessions
519
states that the middle sub-range would serve as an “advisory” range,
this appears not to be so, because there is no provision for the judge to
sentence above or below it based on policy considerations alone.
Judge Sessions’s discussion of offender characteristics further reveals that the promise of “greater discretion” within the broad, manda520
tory ranges is illusory. The Judge states that under his proposed syssystem, “the vast majority of offender characteristics,” while rarely
permissible as grounds for departure, “would be relevant to deciding
521
where a defendant falls within the broader cells.” It appears, however,
that this exercise of judicial discretion within the mandatory cells
would be subject to the Commission’s restrictions regarding offender
522
As assurance that the Commission would not concharacteristics.
tinue to seek to constrain judges from considering offender character-

516

Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009).
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101-02 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (“The sentencing judge . . . may hear
arguments . . . that the Guidelines sentence should not apply . . . because the Guidelines
sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or perhaps because the
case warrants a different sentence regardless . . . .”).
518
Brief for the United States at 11, Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135
(2010) (No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 5423020.
519
Sessions, supra note 12, at 343.
520
Id. at 336-37, 351.
521
Id. at 351.
522
See id. at 353-54 (stating that the judge would be required to consider “all of the
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors identified in the application notes and all
other relevant factors in the Guidelines Manual before imposing a particular sentence”
within the broad cell (emphasis added)).
517
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istics, Judge Sessions points to recent amendments as “signaling at
523
least some change in direction.” It is true that in 2010, when Judge
Sessions was Chair, he and Vice Chair Ruben Castillo sought to revise
the offender-characteristics policy statements to make them consistent
with § 3553(a) and other provisions of the SRA. But other Commissioners resisted, and the changes were marginal at best. The Commission received voluminous empirical evidence and public comment
demonstrating that mitigating offender characteristics are highly rele524
In response, the Commission
vant to the purposes of sentencing.
changed a few characteristics from “not ordinarily relevant” to “may be
relevant,” but only if they are “present to an unusual degree and dis525
tinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines” —
essentially the same standard for characteristics deemed “not ordinarily
526
The Commission simultaneously amended the introducrelevant.”
tory commentary to state that the “most appropriate use” of offender
characteristics is in choosing a sentence within the guideline range,

523

Id. at 336.
See, e.g., Comment of Philip Miller, Chief U.S. Probation Officer, E. Dist. of Mich.
3-4 (2010); Letter from Probation Officers Advisory Grp. to Hon. William K. Sessions,
III, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Feb. 3, 2010); Letter from Jon Conyers, Jr.,
Chair, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Chair, H. Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec., to Hon. William K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n 2-3 (Apr. 6, 2010); Margy Meyers & Marianne Mariano, Fed. Pub.
& Cmty. Defenders, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 19, 43-80 (Mar. 17,
2010); Letter from Practitioners Advisory Grp. to Hon. William K. Sessions, III, Chair,
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 6-10 (Mar. 22, 2010); Letter from Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Assoc. Professor, Ariz. State Univ., to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1-5 (Mar. 17, 2010).
525
Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.11
(2011), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.11
(2001). See also id. app. C, amend. 739 (Nov. 1, 2010). The Commission also changed
drug or alcohol dependence or abuse from a prohibited ground to one that “ordinarily
is not a reason for a downward departure.” Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.4 policy statement (2011), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5H1.4 policy statement (2001). See also id. app. C, amend. 739 (Nov. 1, 2010).
526
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(4) policy statement (2011)
(stating that circumstances deemed “not ordinarily relevant” may be considered “only
if . . . present to an exceptional degree”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§5K2.0 policy statement (2001) (“[A]n offender characteristic or other circumstance
that is, in the Commission’s view, ‘not ordinarily relevant’ . . . may be relevant . . . if
such characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes
the case from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the guidelines.”).
524
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527

rather than varying from it.
Meanwhile, the Commission continues
to deem a large number of mitigating factors to be never or not ordi528
The Commission’s recent actions with respect to
narily relevant.
offender characteristics are not cause for optimism.
Judge Sessions also asserts that under his proposed scheme, un529
charged and acquitted crimes would play a “more limited role.”
It
appears, however, that the use of unconvicted conduct under the proposal would either violate the Sixth Amendment or have a very substantial impact on sentence length. The proposal would require
judges to consider uncharged and acquitted crimes established by a
preponderance of the evidence in choosing a sub-range within the
530
As we have already noted, consideration of unconmandatory cell.
victed conduct in sentencing above the maximum of the middle subrange would be unconstitutional because it would elevate the sentence
above the maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict or the defend531
ant’s guilty plea. If our constitutional argument misunderstands the
Sessions proposal—perhaps because he means to allow a sentence
above the top of the mid-range solely on the basis of policy considerations—then the breadth of the mandatory cells would permit uncon-

527

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2011); id.
app. C, amend. 739 (Nov. 1, 2010).
528
Factors deemed “not ordinarily relevant” include: education and vocational
skills; drug or alcohol dependence or abuse; employment record; family ties and responsibilities; civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions;
and prior good works. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.4, 5H1.5,
5H1.6, 5H1.11 (2011). Prohibited grounds for a departure include: gambling addiction; lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged
upbringing; personal financial difficulties; economic pressures on a trade or business;
diminished capacity if caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants or if
the defendant was convicted of a sex offense; fulfillment of restitution obligations as
required by law; acceptance of responsibility; role in the offense; and decision to plead
guilty. Id. §§ 5H1.4, 5H1.7, 5H1.12, 5K2.12, 5K2.13, 5K2.0(d).
529
Sessions, supra note 12, at 350.
530
See id. (“Uncharged relevant conduct could only be used to sentence within a
larger cell on the simplified grid (and then only if found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence). Acquitted conduct . . . could not increase a defendant’s offense
level.”); id. at 351-52 (“Uncharged prior criminal conduct, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, would remain a valid consideration for an increase in a defendant’s sentence within the relevant sentencing cell on the grid.”).
531
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234-35 (2005); see also supra note 506
and accompanying text.
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victed conduct to have an enormous impact on sentence length. For
example, under the broader cell ranges, a defendant convicted of a
drug trafficking offense placing him in the fifth offense level and with
a Criminal History Category of III could, on the basis of unconvicted
conduct (including reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in fur532
therance of “jointly undertaken” activity ), face a sentence up to 271
533
months, twice the 135-month sentence at the bottom of the range.
The solution to the unjustified use of unconvicted conduct to increase the severity of punishment is not to create broad, mandatory
sentencing ranges. The solution is much closer at hand. The Commission can correct the misguided relevant conduct rule right now, as
534
practitioners and judges have urged for years.
The Commission
could, for example, adopt the proposal of former Commissioner John
Steer, a one-time supporter of the relevant conduct rule, to eliminate
acquitted conduct from the guideline calculation and substantially
535
limit the weight of uncharged conduct.
At the same time, the Sessions proposal would introduce unwarranted disparities that would be hidden and impervious to correction.
The mandatory guideline range would be determined by the prosecutor’s charges and the parties’ negotiations (in cases that do not go to
trial), and those decisions would not be explained in open court or
subject to judicial review. The advisory guidelines system has significantly ameliorated hidden disparities arising from plea bargaining and
536
other presentencing decisions. The Sessions proposal would reverse
these gains.

532

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
Sessions, supra note 12, at 345. In the eight cells in the two rows at the top of
the grid, the impact of relevant conduct would be relatively limited, with increases
ranging from 16 to 46 months. Id. But the remaining twenty-eight cells range from 33
to 286 months in width. Id.
534
Nearly seventy percent of judges responding to a Commission survey believe that
neither dismissed conduct nor uncharged conduct referenced only in a presentence
report (and not presented at trial or admitted by the defendant) should be considered
at sentencing, and eighty-four percent believe that acquitted conduct should not be
considered at sentencing. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8, tbl.5.
535
See An Interview with John Steer, CHAMPION, Sept. 2008, at 40, 42.
536
See supra Sections III.A-B.
533
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Judge Sessions’s proposal also raises separation of powers concerns
that would appear to make the Sentencing Commission itself unconstitutional. When the Supreme Court upheld the initial guidelines system in Mistretta, the Court found it significant that the Commission
would be making rules to be applied exclusively by judges to facts
found exclusively by judges, rather than defining crimes and setting
537
the outer limits of punishment. Under a system of mandatory guidelines with jury factfinding, in contrast, the Commission’s primary task
would be to determine what conduct must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a
defendant then to be sentenced within the resulting range. The prosecutor’s charges and the jury’s factfinding (or the defendant’s admissions), not the judge, would determine that range. Making rules for
that purpose is not “the Judicial Branch’s own business—that of passing
538
sentence on every criminal defendant.” It is the business of Congress.
To be sure, the Court in Booker rejected the government’s argument that the power of the judiciary would be improperly expanded to
include the legislative function of defining crimes were the Commission to make binding rules that determine sentences based on jury
539
factfinding. But the Court has never addressed whether a delegation
of political and substantive functions to a Commission whose members
540
are subject to removal by the President for “good cause” and whose
mandatory guidelines would be directly implemented by the prosecutor’s charges (as opposed to judicial factfinding) would improperly
expand the power of the executive.

537

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989); see also id. at 396-97
(finding that Congress’s decision “to locate th[e] Commission within the Judicial Branch
does not violate the principle of separation of powers,” in part because the guidelines
“do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public or vest in the Judicial
Branch the legislative responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum penalties
for every crime,” but rather pertain to “the special role of the Judicial Branch in the
field of sentencing,” and “leave[] with the Judiciary what long has belonged to it”).
538
Id. at 408.
539
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 241-42 (2005) (relying on Mistretta as
“premised on an understanding that the Commission, rather than performing adjudicatory functions, instead makes political and substantive decisions”); Reply Brief for
the United States at 9-10, 17-19, Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (Nos. 04-0104, 04-0105), 2004 WL
2190496.
540
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
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The Court has recognized that even limited removal power over an
“independent” agent may “dictate that [the officers subject to that
541
power] will be subservient” to the branch holding the removal power.
Judge Sessions’s proposed system would therefore create an agency
whose officers are, at least in constitutional terms, “subservient” to the
executive. Unlike the system considered in Mistretta, this agency would
exercise broad policymaking discretion to create rules that give prosecutors—agents and employees of the executive branch—power to set the
sentencing range of individual defendants, effectively cutting out the
judicial factfinding so crucial to the outcome in Mistretta. Thus, whatever branch the Commission is said to be “located” in, and whether or
not there are judges on the Commission, such a system would unconstitutionally assign to the executive direct control over the traditionally
542
judicial function of sentencing and would unconstitutionally unite
543
the power to prosecute with the power to sentence. As the Supreme
Court recently emphasized in the context of statutory interpretation, it
is not “natural” to read the law as giving an executive agent “what
544
amounts to sentencing authority,” and “our tradition of judicial sentencing” is ever-accompanied by the “desideratum that sentencing [is]

541

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 692-93 (1988) (recognizing that the President’s “good cause” removal power over
an independent agency in the executive branch, though limited, nevertheless allows
some “power to control or supervise” the agency to ensure that it does not take action
that “interfere[s] impermissibly with [the President’s] constitutional obligation to ensure faithful execution of the laws,” and that, under such circumstances, the President
“retains ample authority to assure that the [independent executive official] is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with
the provisions of the Act”); PIERCE, supra note 59, § 2.5, at 84 (arguing that a “cause”
requirement for removal “must include failure to comply with any valid policy decision
made by the President or his agent”).
542
Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916) (“Indisputably under our constitutional system the right . . . to impose the punishment provided by law, is judicial . . . .”).
543
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17 (“[H]ad Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we might face
the constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had assigned judicial
responsibilities to the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute and the power to sentence within one Branch.”); see also Stith, supra note 45, at
480-81 (concluding that uniting prosecutorial and sentencing authority would be
unconstitutional).
544
Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (2012).
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not to be left to employees of the same Department of Justice that
545
conducts the prosecution.”
Even if the President’s removal power in this context would not
mean that the executive branch has actual control over the Commis546
sion’s policymaking and implementation of the SRA, the constitutional difficulty would be altered but not eliminated. If, despite the
material transformations in its duties and despite the President’s removal power, the Commission would not really be controlled by the
executive (and thus not accountable to the people through the executive branch), the question becomes in what branch this Commission
may constitutionally be located. The Supreme Court acknowledged in
Mistretta that the Commission is “not controlled by or accountable to
547
members of the Judicial Branch,” but nonetheless found the Commission to be part of the judicial branch because its primary task was
548
But under the
to write sentencing rules for judges to implement.
Sessions proposal, as we have noted, that would no longer be the primary task of the Commission; the guidelines would be implemented
through the prosecutor’s charges and jury factfinding or the parties’
negotiations. In these circumstances, it would be mere pretense to
assert that the Commission is a judicial branch agency either functionally or formally.
If the Commission may not be located in either the executive
branch or the judicial branch, then its political and substantive powers—as materially transformed by Judge Sessions’s proposal—would be
subject only to Congress’s control. Congress, however, may not circumvent the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment by delegating its fundamental policymaking authority to its

545

Id. at 1471-72.
See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (holding that
Congress may constitutionally limit executive removal power over members of an
“independent” agency performing quasi-legislative functions so that the agency operates “free from executive control”); cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 411 (“[W]e see no risk that
the President's limited removal power will compromise the impartiality of Article III
judges serving on the Commission . . . .”).
547
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.
548
Id. at 392-93.
546
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549

own agent.
Setting mandatory punishment ranges based on factors
charged in an indictment, and either admitted in a guilty plea or
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, is undeniably “the making
550
of laws.”
This leaves no constitutionally permissible location for a Commission exercising the power that Judge Sessions’s proposal would assign
551
to it. It thus appears that only Congress itself could enact the kind of
guidelines Judge Sessions proposes. But Congress lacks the time, expertise, and political impartiality to do so—which is why it delegated
this function to a commission in the first place.

549

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (invalidating a one-House veto of
executive action because it was “legislative in purpose and effect,” and thus an exercise
of “legislative power,” but had not been passed in both Houses and presented to the
President, as required by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution). As Justice Stevens
stated in Bowsher v. Synar, “Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate national policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative
committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress.” 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Congress also may not reserve control over the
execution of the laws, if it could be said that the Commission would assume an executive rather than legislative function. See id. at 726 (majority opinion).
550
See Stith, supra note 45, at 481-82 (noting that, while Congress may legislate sentencing rules, it may not create and command an agency “to do its bidding,” while
“pretending . . . that the agency . . . is part of the same ‘branch’ of government as the
Article III judges whose sentencing authority Congress has decided to take away”); cf.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding “no place within our constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power
other than the making of laws”).
551
We note that Judge Sessions’s proposal bears a strong structural resemblance to
the remedy proposed by Justice Stevens in dissent in Booker. See 543 U.S. 220, 285
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But Justice Stevens’s remedy garnered only four votes,
see id.; id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part), and Justice Stevens did not address the
separation-of-powers argument that we raise here. As noted earlier, Justice Stevens’s
majority opinion in Booker addressed the question whether the Commission’s political
or quasi-legislative power would unconstitutionally aggrandize the judicial branch if
guideline factors were charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra text accompanying note 539. It was apparently in that limited
context that Justice Stevens stated, “We have thus always recognized the fact that the
Commission is an independent agency that exercises policymaking authority delegated
to it by Congress.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 243. To the extent that the Stevens majority
opinion in Booker might be read as approving an independent Commission outside of
either the judicial or executive branches with the primary task of writing substantive provisions of criminal law, we submit that the majority in Booker was, in this respect, in error.
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B. The Commission’s Proposal
The Commission has described several proposed legislative changes,
552
but as of this writing, it has proposed language for only some of them.
The discussion that follows is therefore to some extent provisional.
The Commission has asked Congress to enact legislation requiring
that sentencing courts accord the guidelines “substantial weight.”553
The proposed legislation would also codify what the Commission has
recently asserted in the form of a guideline: that sentencing is a
“three-step” process beginning with calculation of the guideline range,
immediately followed by required consideration of the Commission’s
policy statements and commentary, which primarily seek to restrict
554
sentences outside the guideline range. Only after these steps would
the judge consider the § 3553(a) factors “taken as a whole.”555 In a related vein, the Commission has asked Congress to resolve an alleged
“tension” between the Commission’s interpretation of directives to the
Commission at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, et seq. and Congress’s directive to
judges in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to consider the “history and characteris556
tics of the defendant.” The Commission suggests, for example, that
Congress codify the Commission’s policy statements deeming the defendant’s education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties
and responsibilities, and community ties to be “not ordinarily relevant
to the determination of whether to impose a sentence outside the ap557
plicable guideline range.” The Commission has also asked Congress

552

See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 55-59.
Id. at 58-59.
554
Id. at 57-58; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2011); id.
app. C, amend. 741 (Nov. 1, 2010).
555
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2011).
556
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 57.
557
The Commission posed this formulation to panelists at a recent hearing. See
Henry Bemporad, Fed. Pub. Defender for the W. Dist. of Tex., Statement Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission app. question 4 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.fd.org/
pdf_lib/bemporad_statement_2_16_12.pdf. Similarly, Department of Justice officials
have suggested that judges should be limited to considering the offense and criminal
history in determining the length of a prison term, and that offender characteristics
should be taken into account, if at all, through “prison credits” administered by the
executive branch. See Letter from Jonathan Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 33-34
(Mar. 12, 2012); Matthew Axelrod, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Statement Before the U.S.
553
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to require the courts of appeals, in reviewing sentences, to (1) apply a
“presumption of reasonableness” to within-guideline sentences, (2)
demand a “greater justification” of the district court the further the
sentence imposed is from the guideline range, and (3) apply a
“heightened standard of review” to sentences that result from a policy
558
disagreement with the Commission.
It is clear that these proposals are intended to undo the holdings
of the Supreme Court in Booker and its progeny and to reestablish the
Commission’s guidelines and policy statements as the “law” of sentencing without, however, crossing the line into unconstitutionality by
making the guidelines too mandatory. We have previously explained
why we conclude that the post-Booker sentencing system is far preferable
559
to any regime of mandatory guidelines.
Here we limit ourselves to
the constitutional question: do the Commission’s proposals violate
Booker’s command, as repeated and strengthened in subsequent decisions, that in order to be constitutional the guidelines must be “advisory” only? We believe that the answer is “yes,” although we recognize
that at least as to one proposal the question is close,560 and hence we
invite others to consider our analysis and draw their own conclusions.
The Commission’s rationale for giving “substantial weight” to the
guidelines is that the Commission itself already took into account the
561
§ 3553(a) factors in writing the guidelines.
Quite apart from the
lack of evidence that the Commission has based the guidelines on the
§ 3553(a) factors in any systematic way—and substantial evidence that

Sentencing Commission 10-13 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_Axelrod.pdf;
Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., and Jonathan Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3-4 (Sept. 2, 2011).
558
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 55-56.
559
See supra Part II.
560
See infra notes 583-89 and accompanying text.
561
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 57-58. This is the same implausible
and legally flawed theory the Commission urged upon the courts in the immediate
wake of Booker. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 (stating that “[i]mmediately
after the Booker decision, the Commission developed a post-Booker guidelines training
program” which “explains how the sentencing guidelines reflect Congress’ objectives in
the SRA and that the guidelines accordingly should be given substantial weight” and
“describes federal sentencing under Booker as a 3-step process”).
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562

it has not —this proposal would violate the holdings of Booker and
subsequent decisions concerning the role of the guidelines in the sentencing determination. Specifically, the “Guidelines are only one of
563
the factors to consider when imposing sentence,” there is no “legal
564
presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply,” and “they
565
are also not to be presumed reasonable.”
Policy statements that conflict with § 3553(a) need not be considered and are not entitled to
566
weight. As we have noted, only Justice Alito holds the view that the
guidelines and policy statements can and should be given “some significant weight.”567
The Commission’s proposal that Congress codify its new “threestep” guideline, especially in conjunction with the “substantial weight”
proposal and the proposals involving the standard of appellate review,
is also constitutionally suspect. The Commission forthrightly acknowledges that the purpose of its three-step process is to “ensure[]” that
568
The three-step
the guideline sentence is given “proper weight.”
guideline directs courts that they “shall” in each case “consider Parts H
and K of Chapter Five, Specific Offender Characteristics and Departures, and any other policy statements or commentary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence” and that

562

See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 47, at 51-74 (describing the work of the
original Commission and presenting substantial evidence that the guidelines it produced, and as amended by subsequent Commissions, do not take the purposes of sentencing into account).
563
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007).
564
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). The court of appeals may, on
the other hand, apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to a district court’s
discretionary decision to impose a guideline sentence. Id. at 347.
565
Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009).
566
See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1242-43, 1247 (2011) (holding that
a court of appeals could not, on the basis of a policy statement, prohibit a district court
from considering factors that were “highly relevant” under § 3553(a), especially where
the policy statement “rest[s] on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in
the sentencing statutes Congress enacted”); id. at 1249 (refusing to “elevate” policy
statements above other factors); Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60 (upholding a variance from the
guideline range based on circumstances relevant under § 3553(a) but disapproved by
policy statements); see also supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
567
Gall, 552 U.S. at 68 (Alito, J., dissenting).
568
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 57.
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they “shall” do so before considering § 3553(a) “taken as a whole.”
But the referenced policy statements explicitly forbid or discourage
judges from imposing a non-guideline sentence, as did § 3553(b),
which Booker excised.570 Indeed, these provisions not only deem many
571
factors to be never or not ordinarily relevant to sentencing, but also
572
quote from and cite excised § 3553(b), state that courts are not intended “to substitute their policy judgments for those of the . . . Sen573
tencing Commission,” and inform courts that “the most appropriate
use” of the “history and characteristics of the defendant” under
§ 3553(a) is “to consider them not as a reason for a sentence outside
the applicable guideline range but . . . in determining the sentence
574
within the applicable guideline range.”
Yet the Supreme Court excised § 3553(b) because that provision,
including the “policy statements and official commentary” referenced
575
therein, made the guidelines mandatory.
Accordingly, after Booker,
sentencing courts need not consider policy statements unless raised by
a party as a basis for “departure,” as the Court has made clear in sub576
The Court has further held that the Commissequent decisions.

569

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(b)–(c) (2011).
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
571
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.4. 5H1.5, 5H1.6,
5H1.7, 5H1.11, 5H1.12, 5K2.0(d), 5K2.12, 5K2.13.
572
Id. § 5K2.0(a)–(b); id. cmt. nn.2-4.
573
See id. § 5K2.0 cmt. background.
574
Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.
575
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-35, 245, 259; Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229,
1245 (2011); see also supra Part I.B.2.
576
Under the procedure set forth by the Court, after calculating the guideline
range, the sentencing court must “giv[e] both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
Arguments for a sentence outside the guideline range may take “either of two forms”:
for departure “within the Guidelines framework” or for “application of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV) warrant[ing] a lower [or
higher] sentence.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (first emphasis added). Accordingly, the courts of appeals have held that district courts need not consider
policy statements regarding departures unless a party seeks a departure, and even then
may instead consider a variance under § 3553(a). See United States v. Ball, 418 F. App’x
107, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 362-66 (4th
Cir. 2011); United States v. McGowan, 315 F. App’x 338, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 901 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moton,
570
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sion’s restrictions on consideration of particular factors may not be
elevated above the general sentencing factors described in § 3553(a)
577
or used to deny a variance based on such factors where relevant.
What the Supreme Court said about early efforts by some courts of
appeals to thwart Kimbrough’s holding is also true of the Commission’s
578
“three-step” process: it is a “smuggled-in dish that is indigestible.”
The Commission’s related proposal that Congress resolve a purported “tension” between directives to the Commission and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) by directing the courts that certain offender characteristics
are “not ordinarily relevant” in deciding whether to impose a non579
guideline sentence rests on a misinterpretation of directives to the
580
Commission. Moreover, a statutory prohibition on judges considering virtually all personal characteristics of the offender about to be
sentenced would raise additional constitutional concerns both by mak581
ing the guidelines functionally mandatory, and by offensively inter582
fering with the fundamental judicial function of sentencing.
The Commission also proposes that Congress require courts of
appeals to apply a presumption of reasonableness to guideline sen-

226 F. App’x 936, 939-40 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713,
723 (5th Cir. 2007).
577
See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1242-43, 1249-50; Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60. Accordingly,
the courts of appeals have reversed when judges have declined to consider relevant
circumstances in deference to policy statements. See United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d
482, 499 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 567-70 (5th Cir.
2009); United States v. Hamilton, 323 F. App’x 27, 31 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 830-32 (8th Cir. 2009). Courts of appeals have also rejected challenges to variances based on policy statements that restrict departures. See, e.g., United
States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2008). But see United States v. Bistline, 665
F.3d 758, 766-67 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring—even after Booker, Gall, Rita, and Pepper—
that the district court take into account policy statements on departures in applying
§ 3553(a)).
578
Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009).
579
See supra notes 556-57 and accompanying text.
580
See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
581
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (holding that the guidelines were mandatory and thus unconstitutional because “departures are not available
in every case, and in fact are not available in most”).
582
Cf. Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1471-72 (2012) (noting that “our
tradition of judicial sentencing” is accompanied by the “desideratum that sentencing
[is] not [to] be left to employees of the same Department of Justice that conducts the
prosecution”).
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tences, again to “assist in ensuring” that the guidelines are “given substantial weight” and also to “promote more consistent sentencing out583
The first purpose is contrary to the Court’s holdings as
comes.”
explained above, and the second is puzzling since guideline sentences
584
are rarely reversed for substantive unreasonableness. A presumption
of reasonableness might be thought constitutional standing alone, as
the Court in Rita permitted the courts of appeals to apply a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness when the sentencing judge imposes a
585
For Congress to legislate such a presumption,
guideline sentence.
however, is a very different proposition. First, Rita permitted a presumption of substantive reasonableness only. A presumption of procedural reasonableness would clearly be unconstitutional.586 Moreover,
as we have noted, the nonbinding presumption of substantive reasonableness that the Supreme Court has permitted rests on deference to
587
the sentencing judge, not to the guidelines. The presumption is subject to limitations that make this clear but would be difficult to write
into a statute; the “presumption is not binding,” “does not . . . insist
that [either side] shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or
proof,” does not reflect “deference of the kind that leads appeals
courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert agency than to a
588
district judge,” and has no “independent legal effect.” Without these
limitations, a presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences

583

Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 55-56.
At the time of this writing, only four guideline sentences have been reversed as
substantively unreasonable since Gall was decided, one from a circuit that has adopted
a presumption of reasonableness, see United States v. Wright, 426 F. App’x 412, 414-15
(6th Cir. 2011), and the others from circuits that have not. See United States v. Dorvee,
616 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050,
1055 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Paul, 561 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2009).
585
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
586
Review for procedural error precedes review for substantive reasonableness and
prevents constitutional error. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. It is “significant procedural error”
if, in imposing a sentence within a correctly calculated guideline range, the district
court “treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the § 3553(a) factors, . . .
or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. One study found that reversal for procedural error results in a different sentence on remand more than half the
time. See Jennifer Niles Coffin, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Making the Most of the Need
for Adequate Explanation in Federal Sentencing, CHAMPION, Mar. 2012, at 36.
587
See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
588
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 350.
584
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may function as an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for
589
non-guideline sentences.
The Commission’s other proposals, which would require stricter
review of non-guideline sentences, clearly go too far toward resurrecting the previous mandatory guidelines regime. Preliminarily, it is important to understand that the Supreme Court has recognized only
two standards of review for discretionary decisions involving mixed
questions of law and fact, which includes the determination of the
appropriate sentence under § 3553(a): de novo and abuse of discretion.590 In the federal sentencing context, Booker and subsequent decisions have repeatedly rejected de novo review for sentences outside the
guideline range, including the euphemistically named “heightened” or
591
The Court has emphasized that all sentences must
“closer” review.
be reviewed only for abuse of discretion, “whether inside, just outside,
592
or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” and whether based on
individualized circumstances or on a conclusion that the guideline
593
itself fails to achieve § 3553(a) objectives.
The Commission nonetheless proposes two kinds of intensified review for sentences outside the guideline range. The first would “direct
sentencing courts to provide greater justification for sentences imposed the further the sentence is from the . . . applicable advisory
594
guidelines sentence,” to be enforced on appeal.
But in Gall, the
Court squarely held that an appellate rule, adopted in several circuits
after Booker, “requiring ‘proportional’ justifications for departures from
the Guidelines range is not consistent with our remedial opinion in
595
United States v. Booker.”

589

See Gall, 552 U.S. at 47, 51; Rita, 551 U.S. at 354-55.
HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF
REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY
ACTIONS 4-6, 16-17 (2007).
591
See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-11 (2007); Gall, 552 U.S. at 56, 59-60; United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005).
592
Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; see also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110; Rita, 551 U.S. at 351;
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
593
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110; Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-53, 59-60.
594
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.
595
Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
590
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The Court framed the analysis by emphasizing that “courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of596
discretion standard” and that review of sentencing decisions is “limited to determining whether they are ‘reasonable.’”597 Under the rule
at issue in Gall, courts of appeals would measure the extent of variance
in percentages, and then would require an “extraordinary” justifica598
As Gall explained, this
tion if the percentage was “extraordinary.”
599
approach was not only logistically dubious, but also amounted to de
600
novo review and came “too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines
601
The Court thus concluded that the “practice—common
range.”
among courts that have adopted ‘proportional review’—of applying a
heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines
range . . . is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion
standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing deci602
sions—whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.”
To be sure, the Court, in providing guidance to the district court,
stated that the judge “must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance” and that “a major departure should be sup603
ported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” But the
appellate court is in a different position. The court of appeals “may consider the extent” of a variance as part of the “totality of the circumstances” but “must give due deference to the district court’s decision
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance”
604
and may not substitute its judgment for that of the district judge.

596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604

Id. at 41.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45.
See id. at 47-49.
Id. at 56, 59-60.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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“[I]t is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de novo whether the jus605
tification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable.”
The Commission’s proposed rule would cross the line laid down in
Gall by requiring appellate courts to enforce a rule “direct[ing] sentencing courts to provide greater justification for sentences imposed
the further the sentence is from the . . . applicable advisory guidelines
606
sentence.”
This proposed double directive, from Congress to the
courts of appeal to the district courts, is different from the Supreme
Court’s instructions to sentencing courts in Gall. By transforming the
latter into a standard of appellate review, the requirement would, contrary to Gall’s explicit directions to the courts of appeals, have those
courts substitute their judgments for those of sentencing judges.
Moreover, the Commission’s proposal would make the extent of a variance from the guideline range not just one consideration in the totality of circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,
as Gall directed, but the primary consideration. The proposal is thus
functionally equivalent to the “proportional justifications” approach
that Gall held to be inconsistent with the abuse-of-discretion (or “un607
reasonableness”) standard that Booker required.
The Commission’s second proposal for stricter review of nonguideline sentences—a “heightened standard of review for sentences
608
imposed as a result of a ‘policy disagreement’ with the guidelines” —
is also inconsistent with critical aspects of the Court’s Booker jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has forbidden a de novo standard of review,
609
whether explicit or de facto, and has specifically rejected “a height-

605

Id. at 59.
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.
607
Most courts of appeals have adopted the analysis we present here. See United
States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Townsend, 618
F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469, 475-76 (5th Cir.
2010); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189-90, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc);
United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Martin,
520 F.3d 87, 91-93 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 806-07 (10th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007).
608
Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.
609
Gall, 552 U.S. at 56; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005).
606
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610

ened standard of review” for sentences outside the guideline range.
Moreover, to avoid a Sixth Amendment violation and to ensure that
the guidelines are truly advisory, sentencing judges must be permitted
to sentence outside the range based on a policy disagreement, subject
611
to review for reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
The Commission claims that a “heightened” standard of review would
612
nonetheless be “consistent” with certain dicta in Kimbrough.
There,
the Court dismissed a suggestion that “closer review” might be appropriate for a variance “based solely on the judge’s view” that the guide613
The
line itself “fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.”
Court rejected that suggestion because the justification offered for it—
that the Commission has the capacity to “base its determinations on
614
empirical data and national experience” —did not apply in that case:
“The crack cocaine Guidelines . . . present no occasion for elaborative
discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do not exemplify
the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.”615
Although the Court did not reach the question of whether “closer review” would always violate the Constitution, Justice Scalia’s concurring
616
opinion presented a powerful argument that it would. Moreover, in
Spears, the Court rejected a court of appeals’ later application of

610

Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91, 101-02, 110 (2007); Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 27881, 286-87 & n.12 (2007).
612
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.
613
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).
614
Id. (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)).
615
Id.
616
Justice Scalia wrote separately to say that he joined the opinion because he did
not take the discussion of “closer review” to be “an unannounced abandonment” of the
principle “that the district court is free to make its own reasonable application of the
§ 3553(a) factors, and to reject (after due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines.”
Id. at 112-13 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia continued:
611

[I]f the Guidelines must be followed even where the district court’s application
of the § 3553(a) factors is entirely reasonable; then the “advisory” Guidelines
would, over a large expanse of their application, entitle the defendant to a lesser
sentence but for the presence of certain additional facts found by judge rather
than jury. This, as we said in Booker, would violate the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 113-14.
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heightened review to a district court’s disagreement with the crack
617
guidelines, and in Pepper, it ignored a renewed suggestion that it
618
adopt the “closer review” standard rejected in Kimbrough’s dicta.
Both the Commission and Judge Sessions also suggest that nonguideline sentences based on “policy disagreements” are an affront to
619
Congress’s authority to issue directives to the Commission.
This
620
complaint mischaracterizes the Court’s decisions. It also mistakenly
equates directives to the Commission, which do not bind the courts,
with statutes directed to the courts, which do unless they are unconstitutional. In Kimbrough, the Court rejected the government’s argument
that the Commission and the courts were required to apply the AntiDrug Abuse Act’s 100-to-1 powder-to-crack cocaine quantity ratio to all
621
sentences between the statutory minimum and maximum sentences.
The Court rejected this interpretation because the statute said “nothing
622
about the appropriate sentences within these brackets.” To illustrate
its point that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act did not direct the Commission
to incorporate the ratio into the guidelines, the Court contrasted that
statute with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), a directive that “specifically required the
Sentencing Commission to set Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist
623
offenders ‘at or near’ the statutory maximum.” When the Eleventh
Circuit later interpreted this directive to the Commission as binding on
the courts, the Solicitor General argued, in support of the defendant’s
petition for certiorari, that the “premise that congressional directives

617

Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009).
See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1254 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(indicating that, unlike the majority, he “would decide the question Kimbrough left
open”). The Court did not respond to this suggestion.
619
See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 17; Sessions, supra note 12, at 327.
620
The Court’s decisions permit policy-disagreement variances for guidelines that
fail to properly reflect § 3553(a) considerations; these decisions do not discuss, and are
not limited to, guidelines stemming from congressional directives. See Kimbrough, 552
U.S. at 101-02; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). While some of the
guidelines with which courts have disagreed were largely driven by congressional directives (e.g., the child pornography guideline), others were not (e.g., the crack and illegal
reentry guidelines). Still others exceeded a congressional directive (e.g., the career
offender guideline).
621
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 102-03.
622
Id. at 103.
623
Id. (emphasis added).
618
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to the Sentencing Commission are equally binding on the sentencing
624
courts . . . is incorrect.” If it were otherwise, a great many guidelines
would be mandatory and thus unconstitutional.625 The Court granted
the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consid626
The lesson is
eration in light of the Solicitor General’s position.
clear: the Supreme Court has recognized the authority of sentencing
judges to vary from guideline ranges based on a “policy disagreement”
not as a challenge to Congress but as a legal principle necessary to
627
avoid a Sixth Amendment violation.
CONCLUSION
The history of federal sentencing since the SRA has proved that a
neutral and rational sentencing system is not possible without the balancing influence of the judiciary. The SRA included several procedural mechanisms intended to achieve both reduced sentencing
disparity and increased sentencing fairness in individual cases. Momentously, however, Congress exempted the Commission from judicial
review. The honor system did not work. The Commission, with the
misguided assistance of the Supreme Court, nullified the departure
mechanism intended to allow individualized sentences and constructive
evolution of the guidelines.
As a result, the judicial feedback mechanism for which the SRA
provided did not function until the post-Booker era. As Judge Sessions
put it, “In an advisory guidelines system, the Commission’s acceptance
by the criminal justice community depends upon respect for the exer628
cise of its expertise in sentencing policy.” Indeed, for the first time,
the frontline actors in sentencing—most importantly, the Article III
judges called upon to begin their sentencing deliberations by calculating the guideline range—are informing the Commission of the nature

624

Brief for the United States, supra note 518, at 9.
See id. at 10-11 & n.1; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19 n.5, Vazquez v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010) (No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 543301 (identifying at
least seventy-five “distinct guidelines and policy statements [that] have been promulgated or amended . . . in response to congressional directives”).
626
Vazquez, 130 S. Ct. at 1135.
627
See supra notes 199-204, 508-14 and accompanying text.
628
Sessions, supra note 12, at 335.
625
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and extent of problems with the guidelines. The political branches
remain an influence on the Commission’s work, but they are no longer
the only significant influence. The relatively mild countervailing force
of judges themselves has encouraged the Commission to perform as
the expert body Congress intended.
The sentencing process has also changed for the better, as judges
are permitted to consider all relevant facts about the offense and the
offender. Allowing judges to consider factors and purposes of sentencing that are not adequately taken into account in the guidelines
has avoided thousands of years of unnecessary incarceration under
guidelines that the Commission itself had found to be unjustified by
any legitimate purpose and to have an adverse racial impact. At the
same time, judges have not been unduly lenient. Indeed, they have
responded to the increase in their discretionary authority with restraint and moderation. It is hardly surprising, then, that other frontline actors—including federal prosecutors—also support the advisory
guidelines system. The Commission has made incremental changes to
the guidelines in consideration of the sentencing data and reasons it
receives. We expect that the current system will be stable and enduring
629
as the Commission further revises broken or ill-conceived guidelines.
Proposals advanced by Judge Sessions and the Sentencing Commission are not only unnecessary, but would substantially undo the
balance that Booker has achieved. Judge Sessions and the Commission
acknowledge that judges have not been unduly lenient and that the
guidelines continue to exert a strong gravitational pull on sentences, as
they have since Booker. Their claim of increased racial disparity stems
from an unreliable study, which has been contradicted and explained
by different studies, and the claim of a troubling increase in regional
disparity is simply unsupported. At the same time, Judge Sessions and
the Commission fail to acknowledge that Booker has alleviated proven

629

If, however, the Commission at some point comes under so much political
pressure that it abandons its efforts to fix broken guidelines or even returns to the oneway upward ratchet, the frequency of non-guideline sentencing can be expected to
increase, for the fundamental rule of Booker and its progeny is that judges are not
required to impose guideline sentences that fail to account for relevant sentencing
purposes and factors.
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forms of unwarranted disparity and that their proposals would revive
these problems.
Judge Sessions’s proposal to establish a system of mandatory guidelines would abruptly halt judicial feedback and constructive evolution
of the guidelines, transfer sentencing power from the judge to the parties, and virtually eliminate appellate review. At the same time, there is
no reason to think that his proposal could achieve the legislative compromises he predicts. It would also invite greater variation in sentencing than exists today (under one reading) or require judicial factfinding
in a manner that would violate the Sixth Amendment (under another
reading). Finally, the Sessions proposal raises serious constitutional
issues relating to separation of powers—issues that the pre-Booker
guidelines did not raise and that neither Mistretta nor Booker addressed.
The Commission’s proposals to establish a highly constraining
guidelines regime would similarly interfere with individualized sentencing and constructive evolution of the guidelines. They would also
appear to violate the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as laid
down in Booker and its progeny because, especially taken together, they
would give significant weight to the guidelines and in practical effect
would entail a presumption of unreasonableness for sentences not in
accord with the Commission’s policies. In the meantime, the proposals would spawn years of disruptive litigation.
We repeat: Booker was the fix.

